Artificial intelligence and the administration of justice - remarks on independent judges

• Author: Aleksandra Partyk
• Pages: 91-106

91





remarks on independent judges1

Aleksandra Partyk2



“Artificial intelligence” has increasingly been drawing attention among

the representatives of the world of science. A debate continues among experts in

various fields and across the globe, concerning the possibility of using AI-based

systems in different areas of life. One can notice that it is also pondered upon by

lawyers, theorists and practitioners alike. What draws their attention in particular

is the question of possibility to utilise artificial intelligence within broadly defined

administration of justice3. As it was pointed out, „the future of the judiciary

may […] depend on the further development of artificial intelligence.”4 The

issue has been sparking substantial controversies, as it concerns the ever so

1 The research was financed from the funds allocated for the maintenance and development of

research potential in the discipline of law no: WPAiSM/PRAWO/SUB/9/2020. Translation by Krystyna

Sylwestrow.

2 PhD; Assistant Professor at Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University; apartyk@afm.edu.pl;

ORCID: 0000-0003-3196-6601.

3 See: ZAŁUCKI, Mariusz, 2020. Rozdział XI. Wykorzystanie sztucznej inteligencji do

rozstrzygania spraw spadkowych (in:) LAI, Luigi, WIERCZYSKI, Marek (eds.). Prawo sztucznej

inteligencji. Warszawa: C.H. Beck. 2020, pp. 145-156; PARTYK, Aleksandra, 2019. Legitim 2.0., czyli

o robocie przyszłoci… rozstrzygajcym spory zachowkowe. .

2019/2, pp. 30-31.

4 ZAŁUCKI, Mariusz, 2020. AI and Dispute Resolution (in:) GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, Javier,

ALZINA LOZANO, Álvaro, MARTÍN RODRÍGUEZ, Gabriel (eds.), El derecho público y privado ante

las nuevas tecnologias, Madrid: DYKINSON, 2020, p. 340.

A P

92

sensitive issue of the very essence of adjudging5. And it was this subject matter

that constituted the basis for a plethora of various concepts trying to address the

challenging question of the limits to permissibility of decisions during court

cases being made by non-human entities6.

The enthusiasts of enabling machine systems to administer justice emphasise

the possibility of creating algorithms which will be able to secure issuance of quick

and predictable judgments. They advocate for opening the door to judiciary and

permitting the introduction of such solutions, highlighting their advantages such as,

in particular, enabling the examination of cases free from fear of lengthiness, which

has been a sore spot nearly all around the world. By contrast, those who oppose

the use of artificial intelligence as an active support to the adjudgment process

point out that incorporating artificial intelligence into judging might threaten

the very essence of the justice system. Even if they see some benefits related to

improvements in courts’ functioning, resulting from utilizing machine systems,

they remain critical towards artificial intelligence entering the area of adjudication.

Alongside those extreme proposals, there are also some halfway stances, assuming

that an artificial intelligence system could be a tool improving the work of judges,

who would still make decisions themselves, doing so in particular by proposing

optional further actions or proceedings.

To analyse the issue of artificial intelligence’s participation in administering

justice, one needs to pay attention not only to opportunities and potential benefits

which it could bring. Since one cannot forget about a number of threats which

might be connected with implementing such solutions in courts. The question

arises whether such solutions could be considered permissible or not and if they

threaten the very idea of cases being decided on by independent judges. In this

article I would like to try to answer the question whether humans can and should

share with machines their competence to authoritatively examine disputes as part

of administering justice. Is it not so, that the fundamental rule of the right to a

fair trial is immanently linked to the administration of justice being performed by

humans?

5 WHITE PAPER On Artificial Intelligence -A European approach to excellence and trust,

Brussels, 19.2.2020, where it is stressed that using artificial intelligence within the administration

of justice poses ‘high risk’. Regarding the issue see also: DYMITRUK, Maria, 2020. Rozdział XX.

Sztuczna inteligencja w wymiarze sprawiedliwoci? (in:) LAI, Luigi, WIERCZYSKI, Marek (eds.).

Prawo sztucznej inteligencji. Warszawa: C.H. Beck, 2020.

6 See i.e. JASISKA, Katarzyna, 2020. Czy „referendarza z Lublina” moe zastpić „sdzia-

robot?”. . 2020/1, pp. 76-77.