Recasting trust and distrust in the boardroom

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-06-2021-0235
Published date23 February 2022
Date23 February 2022
Pages1004-1025
Subject MatterStrategy,Corporate governance
AuthorMorris Mthombeni,Amon Chizema
Recasting trust and distrust in the
boardroom
Morris Mthombeni and Amon Chizema
Abstract
Purpose This study aims to analysetrust and distrust as specific board processes betweenthe board
chair and chief executive officer (CEO) aimed at reducing corporate governance (CG) risk partially
mitigated by regnantCG mechanisms. This study incorporates the nascentliterature that posits trust and
distrustas two separate constructs that co-exist simultaneouslyto recasts them in the CG domain.
Design/methodology/approach This paper analysed data from 20 in-depth interviews conducted
with board representatives at four financial services firms in The Netherlands, South Africa and
Zimbabwe.
Findings This paper found that the foundationalbases of the chairCEO relationship determine how
trust and distrust are apportioned between them, which impacts board dynamics. This paper also
confirmedthat the constructs of trust and distrust are separate thusdo not sit at opposite ends of a single
continuum. Finally, this paperfound that high levels of task-based distrust (as opposed to mistrust) are
necessary during periods of organisational distress and more effective if there are also high levels of
relationaltrust between the parties.
Originality/value This paper empirically examines the relationship between trust and distrust in
CEOchair dyadic relationships in multiple companies across multiple countries. This paper also
introducesthe concept of tempered trust, which is definedas interpersonal trust tempered by task-based
distrust,recasting the traditional characterisationof trust and distrust in the CG domain, thereby makinga
usefulcontribution to the literature on board dynamics.
Keywords Board dynamics, Chairperson, Chief executive, Trust,Distrust
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
An underlying assumption in agency theory is that distrust, rather than trust, plays a
dominant role in the regulation of governance actions and behaviours (Eisenhardt, 1989a;
Roberts, 2001). This view places trust and distrust at the centre of the discourse on
corporate governance (CG) relationships (Nicholson et al.,2017), constructs that are often
considered to be the polar opposites of each other (Schoorman et al.,2007) and have been
characteristic effects of accountability (Roberts, 2001). This study joins scholars that focus
on directly revealing the mechanisms of trust in CG (Huse and Zattoni, 2008;Migliore and
Horton DeClouette, 2011), in so doing deviates from the work of scholars that considertrust
indirectly and alongside accountability (Roberts, 2001) or equate distrust with mistrust
(Kostis and Na
¨sholm, 2020) an effort to motivate for rigid control mechanisms (Roberts
et al.,2005
). Trust and distrust have been evaluated simultaneously by scholars from
different and unconnected fields like coopetion (Raza-Ullah and Kostis, 2020) and sports
leadership (OBoyle et al., 2020),but this study is one of few CG studies to do so.
While governance mechanisms are implemented to counter the risks and uncertainties
(Elkelish, 2018) that give rise to distrust and mistrust (which is distinct from distrust) (Kostis
and Na
¨sholm, 2020), some researchers have shown that their increased use paradoxically
leads to even higher levels of distrust (Goranova et al.,2017). Such scholars, who suggest
Morris Mthombeni is based
at Gordon Institute of
Business Science,
University of Pretoria, Illovo,
South Africa.
Amon Chizema is based at
School of Business and
Economics, Loughborough
University, Loughborough,
UK, and Gordon Institute of
Business Science,
University of Pretoria,
Johannesburg, South
Africa.
Received 4 February 2021
Revised 30 November 2021
Accepted 13 December 2021
©Morris Mthombeni and Amon
Chizema. Published by
Emerald Publishing Limited.
This article is published under
the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence.
Anyone may reproduce,
distribute, translate and create
derivative works of this article
(for both commercial and
non-commercial purposes),
subject to full attribution to the
original publication and
authors. The full terms of this
licence may be seen at http://
creativecommons.org/licences/
by/4.0/legalcode
PAGE 1004 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jVOL. 22 NO. 5 2022, pp. 1004-1025, , ISSN 1472-0701 DOI 10.1108/CG-06-2021-0235
that relying on agency theory solutions amplifies the negative effects of distrust (Cuevas-
Rodrı
´guez et al.,2012
;Goranova et al.,2017), may find solace in stewardship theory which
suggests that managers are not motivated by individual goals but are instead stewards
whose motives are aligned with the objectives of principals in an organisation (Lo
¨hde et al.,
2021).
In this paper, we challenge and aim to recast the current boardroom logic that is
informed by traditional theoretical depictions of trust and distrust as polar opposites in
CG literature (Roberts, 2001) and tease out the more nuanced internal relationships of
the board of directors that drive the effectiveness of boards (Sur, 2014). We build on the
extant literature on trust between CG actors ((Huse and Zattoni, 2008;Price et al., 2018)
and add to recent scholarship that acknowledges the co-existence of trust and distrust
(Kostis and Na
¨sholm, 2020;Schillemans and Bjurstrøm, 2020) in the boardroom
(Nicholson et al., 2017).
Relying on a multi-disciplinary, multi-theoretic and multi-country approach (Mnif and Borgi,
2020), our intention is to illustrate contribute to the re-conceptualisation of trust and distrust
as essential and complementary constructs between board chairs and chief executive
officers (CEOs) in a manner that couldreveal additional and more effective CG mechanisms
(Garg and Eisenhardt, 2017;Koskinen and La
¨msa
¨,2017;Krause, 2017;Mostovicz et al.,
2011;Schillemans and Bjurstrøm, 2020;Sur, 2014;Watson et al., 2021). To this end, our
research question is:
RQ1. How does trust and distrust influence effective board dynamics, focussing
specificallyon the role of the board chair and CEO?
Our study aims to contribute to the literature of CG and to practice. First, the study seeks to
contribute to the growing body of literature that is calling for better understanding of CG
processes (Nicholson et al., 2017), going beyond the characterisation of governance
through structure. Second, our study seeks to improve our understanding of the concepts
of trust and distrust in CG and demonstrate the conditions under which distrust is
considered useful.
Literature review
Trustand distr ust bipolar or separate constructs in corporate governance
Trust refers to a person’s belief that another party to a transaction or relationship will make
sincere efforts to uphold commitments and not take advantage of them, given the
opportunity (Rousseau et al.,1998). Yet there is a risk that the other party may not behave
predictably and will instead use guile to act in their own self-interest. Therefore and in
general, trust is depicted as occurring under conditions of risk and as a mechanism for
reducing uncertainty (Skinner and Spira, 2003). This requires the trusting party (the
“trustor”) to develop sufficiently favourable expectations of the intentions and behaviour of
the other party (the “trustee”) to prompt a willingness to become vulnerable to the trustee’s
future conduct (Grobler andHotlzhausen, 2018;Mayer et al., 1995;Rousseau et al., 1998).
Definitions of distrust typically use trust as the reference point.Consider the distrust defined
as “confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct” (Lewicki et al.,1998,
p. 439). As such, most researchers conceptualise trust and distrust as “antithetical” (Bigley
and Pearce, 1998, p. 407), at mutually exclusive ends of a single, continuous construct
(Migliore and Horton DeClouette, 2011). According to this traditional view, a “complete lack
of trust and distrust are the same thing” (Schoorman et al.,2007, p. 350). This view is
consistent with earlier conceptualisations of distrust as an “absenceof faith in other people”
(Ross et al.,2001, p. 569). Here, the general positivity bias in thetrust literature, which rarely
engages with the negative consequences of trust like unethical behaviour (Chen andEweje,
2020), supports this positioning of distrust (Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006;Yenkey, 2018) and
VOL. 22 NO. 5 2022 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jPAGE 1005

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