Militant Democracy

AuthorAmos N. Guiora and Kristine J. Ingle
Pages97-160
97
3
Militant Democracy
Amos N. Guiora and Kristine J. Ingle
This chapter examines the pressing need of the hour through
two distinct perspectives: militant democracy and bystander
democracy. As is explained in the pages that follow, the term
“militant democracy” was coined by Professor Karl Loew-
enstein in the alarming years of the 1930s, prior to the ter-
rible events of the Second World War; “bystander democracy”
reflects our “tweak” of the original term in an effort to cap-
ture the unwillingness to directly confront pressing, and
immediate, threats. The two terms, as we shall come to see,
are at polar opposites: one reflects recognition of threats and
the need, and willingness, to respond; the other suggests a fail-
ure to recognize threats, an unwillingness to confront them,
or a combination of the two. The two concepts—militant and
bystander democracy—are, clearly, at polar ends, reflecting
two distinct approaches to internal threats.
It is, however, insufficient to recognize threats; it is neces-
sary to develop mechanisms, subject to the rule of law, that
enable application of protective measures. The measures that
reflect respect for the rule of law, subject to separation of
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Populist and Islamist Challenges for International Law
98
powers, checks and balances, and judicial review are essen-
tial to protecting democratic values. There is great tension,
and risk, in this undertaking: in an effort to preserve democ-
racy, there is always the possibility of overstepping, resulting
in unwarranted—and unintended—negative ramifications. In
other words, protections have costs; sometimes those costs
are justified to achieve the desired goal; other times, overstep-
ping—in an effort to protect—results in unwarranted minimi-
zation of individual rights.
As history has shown, it is a particular challenge to bal-
ance these competing interests; similarly, as repeatedly dem-
onstrated, it is very difficult to undo the damage of limiting
rights.1 In other words, putting the proverbial genie back in
the bottle poses great challenges to democracies seeking to
protect themselves from internal threats.
The questions we pose in this chapter are at the forefront
of the challenges facing contemporary democracies. This is,
then, a two-step process: Does the nation-state recognize an
internal threat and if yes, what measures does it take to pro-
tect against that threat; if the nation-state fails to recognize a
threat, what are the consequences of that failure, deliberate or
otherwise?
Comparative Approach: A Brief Word
To best illustrate our analysis, this chapter is comparative in
that we examine these questions through the contemporary lens
of three different countries. In doing so, we seek to show how
the three countries—Israel, Germany, and the Netherlands—
resolve distinct domestic threats. In undertaking a compara-
tive analysis, we do not aim at “equal billing” among the three
1. T hese rights are establish ed by domestic law, intern ational law, and natu ral
law.
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Militant Democracy 99
examined countries. That is not our aim. Rather, we hope that
by providing examples from the three countries, we can suffi-
ciently, and compellingly, demonstrate the profound dissonance
between militant and bystander democracy.
Threat: A Brief Word
Recognizing the threat is an important step; the more diffi-
cult inquiry is how does democracy protect itself and what are
the limits of such efforts? While protection is essential, demo-
cratic values and principles impose limits and restraints. Oth-
erwise, democracy is at risk. In the same breath, democracy
is at risk if protection measures are not considered, much less
applied. Balance and limits are critical concepts; the thin line
between protection of democracy and tolerance of challenges
is tenuous.
The failure to recognize—and respond—to an internal
threat reflects bystander democracy. However, threats are
nuanced; there are real and perceived threats. Mistaking one
for the other can result in unjustified minimizations of indi-
vidual rights, liberties, and privileges. Conversely, failing to
recognize a direct threat can endanger individuals and the
state alike.
A perceived threat may, ultimately, prove itself to be real;
however, some perceived threats are just that, perceived. Act-
ing on perceived threats is fraught with danger; there is the
chance of misreading actions and words that may result in
unwarranted minimization of individual rights with recourse
limited, if not unavailable.
On the other hand, waiting for a perceived threat to
actualize is also risky. By the time the risk is direct—rather
than perceived—the opportunity to mitigate its impact may
be significantly minimized, and the proverbial “point of no
return” may have been crossed. That conundrum highlights
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