Constitutionality of Remote Internet Voting: The Estonian Perspective

• Author: Ülle Madise - Priit Vinkel
• Position: Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Tartu - Assistant, University of Tartu. Advisor, Elections Department of the Chancellery of Riigikogu
• Pages: 4-16

4JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL XVIII/2011

Ülle Madise Priit Vinkel

Professor of Constitutional Law Assistant, University of Tartu

University of Tartu Advisor, Elections Department

of the Chancellery of Riigikogu

Constitutionality of Remote

Internet Voting:

The Estonian Perspective

1. Introduction

Estonia has used remote Internet-based voting in f‌i ve elections: twice each in municipal and Riigikogu

(parliamentary) elections and once in European Parliament elections. The number of ‘I-voters’ has grown

sharply from less than 10,000 in 2005’s municipal elections to over 140,000 in the 2011 parliamentary elec-

tions. The latter account for 24.3% of all votes cast and 56.4% of the advance votes. Initially, no individual

complaints claiming unconstitutionality of I-voting were f‌i led in court. In 2011, the situation has changed:

critical public debate has re-emerged, followed by several complaints.

Only Estonia, Switzerland, Norway and a few other countries allow legally binding remote I-voting,

though some countries are on their way toward its countrywide use. The list of countries that have aban-

doned the use of e-voting in various forms is much longer, including the US, Germany, Finland, and the

Netherlands.*1 France, for example, tries to keep alive the tradition of voting only at the polling station, as

this ritualises citizenship*2, but has allowed proxy voting and recently remote I-voting from abroad. The

reasons for allowing or giving up on I-voting are different, but constitutional questions of whether fair and

free voting can be secured in the case of remote I-voting have always been raised.

We are facing the pressure of the information society*3: people require e-services, yet, on the other

hand, cyber-threats are more serious than ever before.*4 Social changes have already forced countries to

allow remote postal or proxy voting.*5 We have to admit that holding on to old traditions (one single elec-

1 See the database for the Competence Center for Electronic Voting and Participation, at http://db.e-voting.cc/. German

constitutional court decision to declare the use of voting machines unconstitutional: BVerfG, 2 BvC 3/07 vom 3.3.2009,

Absatz-Nr. (1-163). Available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/cs20090303_2bvc000307.html (9.10.2011). The

core of the decision in German:

Der Grundsatz der Öffentlichkeit der Wahl aus Art. 38 in Verbindung mit Art. 20 Abs. 1 und Abs. 2 GG gebietet, dass

alle wesentlichen Schritte der Wahl öffentlicher Überprüfbarkeit unterliegen, soweit nicht andere verfassungsrechtliche

Belange eine Ausnahme rechtfertigen.

Beim Einsatz elektronischer Wahlgeräte müssen die wesentlichen Schritte der Wahlhandlung und der Ergebnisermit-

tlung vom Bürger zuverlässig und ohne besondere Sachkenntnis überprüft werden können.

2 L. Monnoyer-Smith. How I-voting technology challenges traditional concepts of citizenship: An analysis of French voting

rituals. – R. Krimmer (ed.). Electronic Voting 2006: 2nd International Workshop Co-organised by the Council of Europe,

ESF TED, IFIP WG 8.6, and E-Voting.CC. Bonn: Gesellschaft für Informatik 2006, pp. 63–64.

3 W. Drechsler. Dispatch from the Future. – The Washington Post, 5.11.2006.

4 J. Farwell, R. Rohozinski. Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War. – Survival 2011 (53) 1, pp. 23–40.

5 See, e.g., the thorough overview of remote postal voting in N. Kersting. Briefwahl im Internationalen Vergleich. – Öster-

reichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 2004 (33) 3, pp. 325–328.