The Silent Board: How Language Diversity May Influence the Work Processes of Corporate Boards

AuthorLars Oxelheim,Trond Randøy,Rebecca Piekkari
Date01 January 2015
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12085
Published date01 January 2015
The Silent Board: How Language Diversity May
Influence the Work Processes of
Corporate Boards
Rebecca Piekkari*, Lars Oxelheim, and Trond Randøy
ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical.
Research Question/Issue: Corporate boards often change their working language when they acquire foreign members.
Consequently, boards “talk”in one language but “think” in another. The present study explores and explains how language
diversity influences work processes of corporate boards.
Research Findings/Insights: On the basis of a multiple case study of nine multinational corporations (MNCs) from four
Nordic countries, we discovered evidence of impoverished and silenced discussions in board meetings in those case
companies that were unprepared to switch to English as the new working language of the board. Some board members
found it difficult to contribute to board meetings and articulate disagreement. In contrast, such effects were not revealed in
the well-prepared companies. Overall, the presence of employee representatives on the boards made it more difficult to
conduct work processes in English because these members often lacked sufficient language proficiency. Thus, our findings
suggest that the board co-determination act of the Nordic corporate governance model may be associated with the hidden
costs of using a non-native language.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study makes four contributions to research on board diversity. Firstly, it
highlights the “silencing effect” of language diversity on board processes. Secondly, it emphasizes the linkage
between language diversity and board processes. Thirdly, it provides additional evidence that language is a distinct
dimension of diversity. Fourthly, it discovers language in board work as a new research topic that is worthy of scholarly
attention.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Firms need to anticipate the potential effects of language diversity on the work pro-
cesses of their boards in order to ensure that “the voice of diversity” is heard. The board itself as well as the rest
of the organization can take preparatory measures such as producing all board material in the new working language
and selecting board members with the required language proficiency. Although these measures can be implemented
gradually or at a faster pace, they need to be in place before foreign members join the board. Consistent use of one
and the same language in the corporate board and the executive management team supports transparency and good
corporate governance practices. In our opinion, reaping the benefits of board diversity is the particular responsibility of
the chairperson. Even though English is generally well understood in the Nordic countries, chairpersons should also
consider the possible negative effects associated with the use of a board language that is non-native to most of its
members.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corporate boards; Language Diversity; Work processes; Nordic countries
INTRODUCTION
Percy Barnevik, the former long-time CEO of the Swiss-
Swedish firm ABB and one of the most influential and
well-known business leaders in Europe, has noted that atthe
*Address for correspondence: Rebecca Piekkari, Department of ManagementStudies,
School of Business,Aalto University (formerly Helsinki School of Economics), P.O.Box
21210, FI-00076 Aalto,Finland. Tel: +358 50 38 37 380; E-mail: rebecca.piekkari@aalto.fi
25
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2015, 23(1): 25–41
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
doi:10.1111/corg.12085
turn of the millennium “some Swedish multinationals still
had only Swedes on their corporate boards despite reaching
figures of 95 percent foreign sales and 80–90 percent foreign
production” (Barnevik, 2011: 331). To Barnevik this did not
make sense. In his biography Barnevik highlights the need
to change the board’s working language from Swedish to
English in order to attract the best brains from abroad.
Barnevik’s experiences suggest that the language used in
board meetings is critical because it determines whose per-
spectives are included in work processes and decision
making. In the present study, we provide theoretical and
empirical understanding on how language diversity influ-
ences work processes in boards; an aspect of board diversity
that has been ignored in past research. We base language
diversity in corporate boards on the number of mother
tongues of the board members and their degree of fluency in
the working language of the board. In this way, we attempt to
capture situations in which corporate boards “talk” in one
language but “think” in another (Brannen, Piekkari, &
Tietze, 2014).
Barnevik’s concerns appear to be motivated by the poten-
tial advantages of having foreigners in corporate boards, as
these directors may be more competent at assessing firm
performance and prospects in foreign markets than home
country nationals.Foreign board members may contribute to
board work by networking with global suppliers, accessing
non-domestic buyers and providers of finance, or by ensur-
ing that the transparency of strategic decisions and the
accountability of the firm’s actions go beyond the national
context, thereby securing international legitimacy and
resource access (Luo, 2005). Foreign board members are
expected to expand the set of specialized skills available to
the board and introduce multiple viewpoints which stem
from variousdimensions of diversity such as culture, nation-
ality, ethnicity, and mother tongue.
Past research on board internationalization has mostly
focused on who these foreign members are and where they
come from (e.g., Oxelheim, Gregoricˇ, Randøy, & Thomsen,
2013) rather than on what they do (Forbes & Milliken, 1999;
Pettigrew, 1992). Observing the mere presence of foreign
board members, however, provideslimited insight into how
they influence the work processes of boards, which is the
focus of this study. By answering the question of how lan-
guage diversity influences the work processes of boards, our
study makes four contributions to research on board diver-
sity.Firstly, our qualitative case study allowed us to discover
what we call “the silencing effect” of language diversity on
the board’s work processes. As such, this study joins the
small but growing body of qualitative research on corporate
governance issues (e.g., Bansal, 2013; McNulty, Zattoni, &
Douglas, 2013). While previous research provides some evi-
dence of this negative effect, it has focused on organiza-
tional levels well below the board (Lauring & Tange, 2010;
SanAntonio, 1987; Schweiger, Atamer, & Calori, 2003). We
were surprised to identify “the silencing effect” at the board
level because it may carry serious performance implications
not only for the board itself, but for the entire company. The
“silencing effect” also runs the risk of undermining the
board’s function as a negotiation forum that reconciles
potentially conflicting interests of represented shareholders,
builds consensus, and sets common goals for directing
managerial action (Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). Secondly, we
place the work processes of the board at the center of atten-
tion, as the existing diversity literature has primarily been
concerned with the diversity–performance link rather than
the intervening processes (van Dijk, van Engen, & van
Knippenberg, 2012; van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007).
Thirdly, we provide supportive evidence that language is a
distinct dimension of diversity alongside culture and nation-
ality (see Stahl, Maznevski, Voigt, & Jonsen, 2010 for a meta-
analysis; Tenzer, Pudelko, & Harzing, 2014). Fourthly, we
identify the role of languages in board work as a new topic
for future research.
In what follows, we first review past research to gain
insight into the role of communication and language in the
work processes of the board. Thereafter, we provide the
reader with an overview of the Nordic region as a research
context and explain our case-based research strategy. The
effect of language diversity on the work processes of the
board is then contrasted and compared between the well-
prepared, the unprepared, and the outlier cases. We visual-
ize our key findings in a theoretical model and position
them in the extant literature. In the conclusion we argue why
the topic is both timely and important and acknowledge the
limitations of our study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Corporate boardsin publicly traded firms are relatively large
and interdependent decision-making groups, which typi-
cally face complex tasks. Compared to other work groups,
boards have a high level of decision-making power, meet
relatively infrequently (4–10 times per year with limited
working hours) and commonly represent divergent interests
(various owners, employee representatives, etc.). Stahl et al.
(2010: 693), who conducted a meta-analysis of cross-cultural
teams, argue that individuals should have “at least a
minimum of a shared language around which to align.”
Board work also requires a high degree of specialized
knowledge and skills, which foreign members can poten-
tially bring to the board (Luo, 2005). However, the mere
presence of valuable expertise does not ensure that it will be
used by the board, particularly if it is hidden behind a lan-
guage barrier. Forbes and Milliken (1999: 499) maintain that
because board members meet only periodically, “they are
unlikely to have time to fully resolve the attitudinal and
linguistic differences that divide them.” They do not elabo-
rate on what they mean by “linguistic differences,” but
argue that boards are particularly vulnerable to “interaction
difficulties that prevent groups from achieving their full
potential” (Forbes & Milliken, 1999: 492).
Not only is extensive communication necessary for inte-
grating the knowledge and skills of individual board
members in creative and synergistic ways and for applying
them to the board’s tasks, it is also essential for conflict
resolution (Stahl et al., 2010). Forbes and Milliken (1999)
identify cognitive conflicts as a beneficial key process in
board work because they contribute to the quality of deci-
sion making in uncertain environments. Multiple view-
points and alternativesolutions are more carefully evaluated
and considered when both positive and negative views are
26 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Volume 23 Number 1 January 2015 © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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