The role of social ties in accelerating career progress of senior executives and directors in Poland

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-01-2021-0042
Published date25 October 2021
Date25 October 2021
Pages720-747
Subject MatterStrategy,Corporate governance
AuthorPaweł Mielcarz,Dmytro Osiichuk
The role of social ties in accelerating
career progress of senior executives and
directors in Poland
PawełMielcarz and Dmytro Osiichuk
Abstract
Purpose This study aims to elucidate the roleof social ties in facilitating the career progress of senior
officerswithin public companies in an emerging market.
Design/methodology/approach The authors followedthe career track of 2,151 senior officers serving
on management and supervisory boards of Polish public companies. The authors used multivariate
econometricmodeling to investigate the factorsshaping their career progress.
Findings The authors document an increasingimpact of officers’ social networks on the likelihood of
assuming multiple consecutive senior positions. It takes progressively less time for incumbent senior
officers to find a subsequent/concomitant board position with a network of social ties from prior
workplaces facilitating career progress and prior experience being negatively associated with multiple
positions. Officers’ social ties at the senior level are also shown to be positively associated with total
compensation and with the likelihood of cross-industry career transition in both executive and
supervisoryroles.
Originality/value Social network appears to play a more salient role in accelerating careers of
supervisoryboard members even though executives also benefit therefrom.Finally, the network of social
ties with former or incumbentsupervisory board members exercisesa more pronouncedpositive impact
on careerprogress than ties with former or incumbent executives.
Keywords Corporate governance, Social ties, Executive compensation
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Anecdotal evidence suggests that thereis a tipping point in the career track of some senior
officers after which their progress accelerates significantly, and their mobility options
expand well beyond background-related constraints. Statistically, between the age of 40
and 50 (based on the studied sample from Poland), seasoned executives and directors
start accumulating external affiliations by assuming multiple additional roles on boards of
third companies, often in industries unrelated to their prior business experience. Senior
executives change roles more frequently enjoying better mobility, a richer palette of
employment opportunities, and improved bargaining power vis-a
`-vis new employers’
compensation committees. With reservations, one may cautiously assume that not much
changes during this time in terms of officers’ industry expertise, educational profile or
temperamental features (of which all but the last one can be reliably operationalized in
quantitative analysis) therebysuggesting that alternative factors may be at play.
This study presents a statistical verification of the mentioned anecdotal evidence. We track
the career record of 2,151 senior officers serving on management and supervisory boards
of 644 publicly traded companies in Poland. The selected sample is notorious for the fact
that all officers occupied more than two senior leadership roles (either concomitantly or
Paweł Mielcarz and
Dmytro Osiichuk are both
based at Kozminski
University, Warsaw,
Poland.
JEL classif‌ication G30
G34
Received 25 January 2021
Revised 7 July 2021
13 September 2021
Accepted 2 October 2021
PAGE 720 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jVOL. 22 NO. 4 2022, pp. 720-747, ©Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 DOI 10.1108/CG-01-2021-0042
consecutively) i.e. either senior executive roles or positions on supervisory roles up to
the moment of empirical analysis. We contrast this group with a set of 12,688 executives
and directors, who managed to get only one senior role in Polish public companies in their
career. While both groups are statistically similar in terms of demographic characteristics
average age and gender composition the crucial factor, which markedly distinguishes
between them is the gross network brought from prior workplaces. We postulate and
confirm empirically that after controlling for experience, prior background, academic
degree, and demographic characteristics, network in the form of informal social ties with
senior executives and supervisory board members is the most important factor shaping
officers’ improved career outcomes.For the purposes of the present study, we assume that
when serving in senior roles, officers create ties with all other senior executives and
supervisory board members, who serve along with them. It is a standard approach to the
operationalization of such an otherwise non-quantifiable phenomenon (Javakhadze et al.,
2016). Correspondingly, when moving to another company, officers bring the network of
contacts with them.
The two prevailing theories, which explain the favorable role played by the social network in
advancing senior officers’ careers, are the resource dependency theory (Boyd, 1996) and
the “small world” theory (Milgram, 1967). While the former postulates that selection by
network is favorable and even necessary as it allows the company to secure access to
resources and possibilities, which would otherwise remain inaccessible through formal
channels, the latter suggests thatthe formation of close informal ties is a by-product of class
stratification and increasing concentration of all forms of capital, including social capital.
While our empirical findings do not contradict either of the said theories, we nevertheless
support the idea that the phenomenon of hiring through informal social networks may be
inherently harmful across multiple economic and societal dimensions, if left unchecked by
shareholders and monitors. Despite facilitating intra-group cooperation and flow of
information, it is a potentially fertile ground for favoritism, preferential hiring, clientelism,
collusion, insider transactions. It may limit within-firm career mobility, reduce competitive
incentives (Yang et al., 2016) and foster inefficient allocation of resources. Shareholders
should, therefore, remain vigilant and monitor executive and director appointments to
preclude the possibility of opportunisticbehavior on the part of socially connected officers.
This study is looking to answer the followingthree research questions:
RQ1. Does officers’ social connectedness play a role in accelerating their careers by
securing them multiple seniorpositions across a number of companies and better
total compensation?
RQ2. In which roles (executiveor supervisory) does social connectedness play a more
salient acceleratoryrole?
RQ3. What type of social connections plays a more important role in fostering officers’
career mobility?
This is the first study investigating the role of social ties in advancing the careers of senior
officers in the corporate sector in Poland. The existing studies are almost exclusively
focused on mature markets (Harjoto and Wang,2020;Vairavan and Zhang, 2020). This gap
in the research literature is primarily caused by impeded access to firm-level data
necessary to conduct a large-scale graph analysis aimed at establishing social networks
prevailing in the corporate sectorsof emerging economies. Across the majority of emerging
markets including Poland, firms are exempt from responsibility to disclose social ties
between senior officers or complete lists of directors’ affiliations. Officers’ biographies and
history of employment also need to be compiled, analyzed and encoded to present the
complete network of social contacts. Therefore, any large-scale empirical study inquiring
into executives and directors’ social ties necessitates manual data collection. The present
study attempts to fill the research gap by compiling a unique firm-level data set exploring
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