The impact of audit committee, CEO, and external auditor quality on the quality of financial reporting

Pages263-279
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-07-2019-0204
Date25 November 2019
Published date25 November 2019
AuthorAbdulaziz Alzeban
Subject MatterCorporate governance,Strategy
The impact of audit committee, CEO, and
external auditor quality on the quality of
f‌inancial reporting
Abdulaziz Alzeban
Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to explore theinfluence of corporate governance (CG) componentson the
quality of financial reporting (QFR). The components investigated are the Audit Committee (AC), CEO
and external auditor quality. The study also examines whether the AC mediates the effects of other
componentsof CG on the QFR.
Design/methodology/approach Data were collected from 386 listed companies in four European
countries for the period 2015-2017. The QFR was measured using two proxies, discretionary accruals
and accruals quality.Firstly, an OLS regression model was estimatedto measure the effects of the three
variables investigatedon the QFR, and to determine which of these variables had the greatestinfluence
in this relationship. Secondly, several mediation analyses were performed to test whether the AC
mediatesthe effects of the CEO, and external auditor quality on the QFR.
Findings The findings reveal that each of these threecomponents has a positive impact on the QFR,
but that the AChas the greatest effect in this respect.The findings also indicate that the AC mediatesthe
effect of the CEO on the QFR. Alternative tests and different measures for the variables confirm the
robustnessof the results obtained.
Practical implications Significant implications are provided for regulators and policy-makers.
Findings of the presentstudy help regulators and policymakers to pay moreattention to the enforcement
of AC policies, and the appointment of AC members. Further, the results are helpful to policy-makers
concernedwith improving CG, and who need evidenceof the role of high QFR in this matter.
Originality/value The findings provide insights into the effect of CG on QFR, and into the most
influential componentin this relationship; hence, they make a valuablecontribution to the literature. They
also contribute to thetopic of mediations analysis in CG research, providingadditional evidence that the
AC mediatesthe effects of the CEO, and externalauditor quality on the QFR.
Keywords CEO, Corporate governance, External audit, Audit quality, Audit committee,
Quality of f‌inancial reporting
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
According to Cohen et al. (2004), one of the most vital functions that corporate governance
(CG) can perform is the assurance of the quality of financial reporting (QFR) process. As
noted by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), (2005), the principal components of CG are
the audit committee (AC), executive management, the external auditor quality (EXQ) and
the internal audit function (IAF). Specifically, the AC is seen as adoptinga key oversight role
through its monitoring of the work of the IAF, and through the provision of advice to
managements in respect of the implementation of internal accounting control systems and
the production of financial statements (Arun et al.,2015;Zalata et al., 2018). Additionally,
the effects of the CEO on earnings management are explored by some scholars (Almadi
and Lazic, 2016;Yasser and Al Mamun, 2015), as is the influence of EXQ on the QFR
Abdulaziz Alzeban is based
at Department of Business,
Community College, King
Abdulaziz University,
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
Received 8 July 2019
Revised 10 September 2019
2 November 2019
Accepted 5 November 2019
DOI 10.1108/CG-07-2019-0204 VOL. 20 NO. 2 2020, pp. 263-279, ©Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jPAGE 263
(Inaam and Khamoussi, 2016). Further, other studies have provided evidence of the link
between corporate governance and firm performance (Afrifa and Tauringana, 2015;
Assenga et al.,2018;Bhat et al.,2018;Dalwai et al.,2015;Kao et al., 2019;Merendino and
Melville, 2019). However, although these studies highlight the impact of CG on the QFR,
there has been limited effort, if any, directed towardsexploring which of these CG elements
has the greatest impact on the QFR, and whether the AC mediates the effects of other
components of CG on the QFR.
The study is motivated by this shortcoming in the literature, and intends to explore the key
driver within these different CG elements (the AC, CEO and EXQ), that secures improved
QFR. It uses data obtained from four European countries (the UK, France, Italy and Spain).
Additionally, the study investigates whether the AC mediates the effects of the CEO, and
EXQ on the QFR.
Data were collected from 386 listed companies in the four mentioned countries for the
period 2015-2017. The QFR was measured using two proxies, discretionary accruals and
accruals quality. Firstly, a regression model was estimated to measure the effect of these
variables (AC, CEO and EXQ)[1] on the QFR, andto determine which of these variables had
the greatest effect in this relationship. Secondly, several mediation analyses were
performed to test whether the AC mediates the effects of the CEO, and EXQ on the QFR.
Two proxies were used as indicators ofAC effectiveness, these being independence of the
AC, and experience of its members. CEO was measured using CEO tenure and expertise,
and Big 4 was used as a measure of EXQ. The key findings show that while the AC, CEO
and EXQ all have significantimpacts on the QFR, the two AC variables independence and
experience of its members are the most influential in this respect. Moreover, the findings
reveal that the AC mediates the effects of the CEO and EXQ on the QFR. Additionalanalysis
provides more support for themain results obtained and their robustness.
The limited research effort thus far on the influence of the AC, CEO, and EXQ on the QFR
provides the motivation for this study. Hence, the study makes a welcome addition to the
literature, doing so in several ways. Firstly, most prior research focuses on the US (Prawitt
et al., 2009), with only a few studies having been conducted in other developed countries
(Alzeban, 2018;Gutie
´rrez, 2006;Piot and Janin, 2007;Rainsbury et al., 2009). This study
differs from those studies by concentrating on four European countries, therefore
expanding the literature. Furthermore, it includes the governance components (AC, CEO
and EXQ) in one model in those four countries to examine which variable has the most
effect on the QFR. Contrary to other studies (Piot and Janin, 2007;Rainsbury et al., 2009)
that found no significant relationship between the AC and QFR, and no difference in the
effects of the big audit firms and other audit firms on earnings management, this paper
provides evidence that AC independence and expertise havea strong positive influence on
the QFR. Hence, the present research contributes to the expandingliterature that testifies to
the role of ACs as key, among the other elements, in the enhancement of the QFR.
Secondly, the study findings also contribute to the topic of mediations analysis in CG
research, providing additional evidence that the AC mediates the effects of the CEO, and
EXQ on the QFR. Furthermore, these findings have implications for regulators and
policymakers. For example,the results that AC independence and expertise of its members
are the most influential on the QFR imply that AC characteristics are more valuable than
other variables (CEO, and EXQ) in improving the QFR. Consequently, regulators and
policymakers need to pay more attention to the enforcement of AC policies, and the
appointment of AC members. In other words, a high QFR might result only from the
presence of an effective AC, determined by reference to its independence and expertise.
Simultaneously, the results are helpful to policy-makers concerned with improving CG, and
who need evidence of the role of high QFR in this matter. By acknowledging the AC as a
critical ingredient in CG, corporate codes or regulations have the means to place pressure
on ACs to be effective.
PAGE 264 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jVOL. 20 NO. 2 2020

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