Moral dilemmas, moral reasons and moral learning: interpreting a real case in terms of particularistic theory

• Published date: 01 July 2015
• Date: 01 July 2015
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/beer.12071
• Author: Patrick Maclagan

Moral dilemmas, moral reasons

and moral learning: interpreting

a real case in terms of

particularistic theory

Patrick Maclagan

Hull University Business School, University of Hull, Hull, UK

The core of the paper consists of dialogue from a true case where an employee experienced moral dilemmas

following a disquieting directive from his manager. The case is considered from the perspective of Dancy’s

particularistic theory of moral reasons (with some insight also from Ross’s theory of prima facie duties). This

case was chosen not to illustrate the theory, but rather to test the assumption that an approach to moral

judgement based on Ross and Dancy has general applicability. It is suggested that, in its simplest form, that

approach approximates to the manner in which people in organisations, without prior knowledge of ethical

theorising, would ordinarily deal with comparable situations, and so it can be relatively easy to learn given

practice. Based on this case, some insight is also offered into individuals’ moral learning, including their need

for personal qualities such as assertiveness and independence of mind. In that context a reciprocal relationship

between Dancy’s approach and Werhane’s thinking on moral imagination is suggested.

Introduction

A number of recent contributions to the literature on

moral judgement and ethical decision making in

business and management have indicated a shift

away from reliance on approaches based on the

‘modern’ theories of Kant and the utilitarians, and

instead have recognised an Aristotelian perspective,

particularly with regard to the intellectual as con-

trasted with the moral virtues (e.g. Lurie & Albin

2007, Roca 2008, Arnold et al. 2010, Smith &

Dubbink 2011, Audi 2012, Maclagan 2012). Of par-

ticular relevance to this paper is the fact that some of

these authors make use of the theory of prima facie

duties (Ross 1930) and/or the work of Dancy (1993,

2004). Dancy acknowledges Ross’s contribution as

central to his own argument for particularism,

explicitly noting the Aristotelian basis to Ross’s

thinking when he refers to the latter’s stress on the

role of judgement, rather than reliance on moral

principles alone (Dancy 1993: 107, note 6). More-

over, in his own approach to the process of arriving

at moral judgements, Dancy attaches fundamental

importance to ‘salient features’ of situations, an

Aristotelian concept as he acknowledges, citing

Wiggins (1976) in that context.

While cases in business ethics tend to be written or

selected to support different approaches to teaching

the subject (Falkenberg & Woiceshyn 2008), the aim

in the present paper is somewhat different. It is

intended – so far as possible – to consider the useful-

ness of Dancy’s approach in relation to an actual

dilemma situation which was certainly not chosen to

exemplify that theoretical perspective. As it is main-

tained that this perspective should be of general

applicability in practice, it may be of interest to see

bs_bs_banner

Business Ethics: A European Review

Volume 24 Number 3 July 2015

© 2014 The Author

Business Ethics: A European Review © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road,

Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA

doi: 10.1111/beer.12071

221

how valid that assumption is here. The case pre-

sented describes an episode witnessed and to some

extent shared with others by the author, while

employed in industry in the past. It reveals the ambi-

guity of an actual workplace situation, which can be

contrasted with textbook examples tailored to serve

as illustrations of specific theories in use. As a ‘par-

ticularist’ or ‘situation ethicist’, Dancy is especially

qualified to note that imaginary cases are rather

unsatisfactory insofar as they do not usually con-

front us with the ‘complexities and problems’ that we

find in real situations (Dancy 1993: 68–69). Of

course, as Falkenberg & Woiceshyn (2008) observe,

simplified cases do help with an initial appreciation

of the main points of a theory; Dancy himself uses

them. However, in relation to the present paper, it is

hoped that this task is served by the brief preliminary

illustration offered (taken from Maclagan 2012) and

by discussion and examples elsewhere (e.g. in Smith

& Dubbink 2011, Maclagan 2012).

As a final introductory point, note that a crucial

feature of the present paper is its focus on moral

problems and dilemmas as something experienced by

individuals, albeit sometimes shared with others. It is

they – individuals or groups – who are the ‘owners’

of problems and dilemmas, and whose intellectual

qualities and personal character are thus put to the

test. And if we are to help people address the situa-

tions which they face in practice, then what they need

is a generally applicable heuristic which they can use

to arrive at their own moral judgements whenever

the need arises. More specifically, they will require a

variety of intellectual, or cognitive, and other per-

sonal skills (Snell 1993). A discussion of these will be

offered at the end of the paper, where the emphasis

will be on the cognitive element; on the capacity to

acquire attributes of insight and judgement required

by Dancy’s approach in particular, an important

function of which is to facilitate greater appreciation

of situations rather than offer a clear decision-

making methodology.

Ross, Dancy and business ethics

The theory of prima facie duties (Ross 1930) has been

discussed recently in the business ethics literature

(e.g. Arnold et al. 2010, Audi 2012, Maclagan 2012).

Also, to a lesser extent, it has over the years been

used or cited by other scholars (e.g. Donaldson 1989,

Kennedy & Lawton 1992, Persson & Hansson 2003,

Watley 2014). For present purposes, Ross’s position

may be briefly summarised as follows.

Faced with particular circumstances, people may

reflect on features of the situation and on the way in

which these are configured, and thus become aware

of moral obligations or duties, such as to keep a

promise, act fairly, help others or not harm people in

that situation. Ross said that such duties will appear

as ‘self-evident’ in the specific case before one, so

that he has been labelled as a moral intuitionist,

although as Dancy points out, this is misleading and

Ross’s epistemology is ‘essentially empiricist’

(Dancy 1993: 94). We can say this because Ross also

maintained that we experience a moral learning

process whereby, through exposure to a succession

of similar situations over time, we acquire ‘moral

convictions’, such as the beliefs that one should

never lie, or always keep promises (Ross 1930:

32–33). These beliefs then form the basis of our

knowledge of prima facie duties, which Ross listed as

including: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, benefi-

cence, justice, self-improvement (in terms of one’s

‘virtue’) and non-maleficence (the avoidance of

harm to others) (Ross 1930: 21). Initially in actual

situations, such duties or obligations only have a

conditional claim on one’s conscientiousness,

because in practice they are liable to conflict with

other moral obligations. (In the context of manage-

ment, it is easy to see how these might be to different

stakeholders, either of the organisation or the indi-

vidual.) Then one may face a moral dilemma. For

Ross, a judgement as to what action (or ‘actual

duty’) to take when faced with such a conflict of

more specific duties will depend on one’s perception

of the detailed nature of the situation (Ross 1930:

41–42). Here he cites Aristotle (2009: 1109b 23)

whose concept of perception, as an ‘intellectual

virtue’, refers to the ability to see the significance of

salient features of particular decision-making situa-

tions (Wiggins 1976; Hartman 2008).

The relationship between moral principles and

Ross’s thinking has been discussed in various sources

(e.g. McNaughton 1988, Waide 1988, Dancy 1993,

2004, Arnold et al. 2010, Audi 2012, Maclagan

2012). Prima facie duties in Ross clearly indicate

Business Ethics: A European Review

Volume 24 Number 3 July 2015

© 2014 The Author

Business Ethics: A European Review © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

222