Meta-frontier and measures of efficiency emphasising optimal corporate governance risk across countries

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-09-2020-0414
Published date19 August 2021
Date19 August 2021
Pages89-113
Subject MatterStrategy,Corporate governance
AuthorWalaa Wahid ElKelish,Panagiotis Zervopoulos
Meta-frontier and measures of eff‌iciency
emphasising optimal corporate
governance risk across countries
Walaa Wahid ElKelish and Panagiotis Zervopoulos
Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to investigatethe internal and external determinants of firms’efficiency and
develop optimal corporate governance risk benchmarks for the manufacturing sector across different
countries.
Design/methodology/approach Corporate governance risk data were acquired from Institutional
ShareholderServices Europe SA. Data on firms’ efficiencyand for explanatory and controlvariables were
taken from the DataStream database. The generalised directional distance function data envelopment
analysis (GDDF-DEA) model and its stochastic extension provided corporate efficiency measures and
optimal corporategovernance benchmarks. The authors used ordinaryleast squares multiple regression
analysiswith wild bootstrapping to test the study hypotheses.
Findings The authors found significantdifferences between firms’ optimal and actual efficiencyinput/
output variables and corporate governance risks in the manufacturing sector acrosscountries. Internal
firm characteristics such as group affiliations, product market competition and insider ownership and
external institutional factors such as the legal system, the rule of law, control of corruption, law
enforcementand cultural values are vitaldeterminants of firms’ efficiency.
Practical implications This paper provides valuable guidance to enable corporate managers,
regulatorsand policymakers to enhance firms’ efficiencyand corporate governance practices.
Originality/value This paper develops optimalcorporate governance risk benchmarks and identifies
the most critical internal and external factors affecting firms’ efficiency in the manufacturing sector in
various countries. It also used a novel GDDF-DEA model, with the multi-parametric model for bias
correctionof efficiency estimator.
Keywords Data envelopment analysis, Corporate governance, Eff‌iciency,
Directional distance function, Manufacturing sector
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
In recent years, corporate governance systems have been subject to intense pressures
after international corporate failures, including Enron and WorldCom. Regulators have
introduced mandatory regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) to control
corporate behaviour, guarantee audit independence and ensure market stability. However,
these regulations were not enough to prevent subsequent problems such as the sub-prime
mortgage financial crisis (2008). This was partly attributed to a failure of corporate
governance to protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders (De Haan and
Vlahu, 2016;Kirkpatrick, 2009). Several corporate governance practices are still under
flexible self-regulation across countries and mandatory regulations only cover marginal
practices that may encourage management manipulations (Blair, 2003;Bratton, 2002;
Brown and Caylor, 2006). For example, the mandatory SOX (2002) regulations in the US do
not address vital issues such as management bias towards short-term investments
Walaa Wahid ElKelish is
based at the Department of
Accounting, University of
Sharjah, College of
Business Administration,
Sharjah, United Arab
Emirates.
Panagiotis Zervopoulos is
based at the Department of
Management, University of
Sharjah, College of
Business Administration,
Sharjah, United Arab
Emirates.
JEL classif‌ication M40, M41
Received 15 September 2020
Revised 10 May 2021
17 June 2021
Accepted 26 July 2021
DOI 10.1108/CG-09-2020-0414 VOL. 22 NO. 1 2022, pp. 89-113, ©Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jPAGE 89
(Gordon, 2007), limited shareholder engagement, board structure (Jackson, 2010)or
compensation committees (Anand, 2006). They may also fail to address differences in firm-
specific characteristics (Bainbridge, 2002;Harris and Raviv, 2008).Subsequent regulations
such as the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank
Act) (2010) and the New York stock exchange (NYSE/NASDAQ) (2009) listingrequirements
on executive compensation provisions and board and audit committee composition,
enhance some aspects of the SOX (2002) but more improvements are needed to avoid
corporate failure in the future.
Several previous studies have investigated the relationship between corporate governance
and firms’ valuation (Starks and Wei, 2013) and efficiency (Huang et al.,2011). However,
they provide limited evidence in single regions. They also had mixed results for several
reasons, including using single corporate governance and firm performance indicators,
applying simple models to measure firm efficiency and omitting technology heterogeneity
within and across industries. There are also concerns aboutthe accuracy of the accounting
performance measures used in previous studies, which may depend on various factors
such as demand, market growth, exchange rate and taxes and may be unsuitable for
assessing certain dysfunctional projects (Destefanis and Sena, 2007;Shabbir et al.,2020;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986;Zhang and Ouyang, 2017). Financial accounting ratios also mix
input and output variables (Pi and Timme, 1993) and are unstable for measuring efficiency
(Maudos et al., 2002). Previous studies have only highlighted reactive corporate
governance practices, which precludes proactive improvements (El Mahdy, 2019;
Hermuningsih et al.,2020). Corporate governance also only partially explains efficiency
variations because of the absence of local institutional factors such as regulations and
social and economic conditions (Dedman and Filatotchev, 2008;Judge et al.,2008;
Shabbir et al.,2020). This paper, therefore, investigated the main internal and external
factors affecting firms’ efficiency. It establishes proactiveoptimal corporate governance risk
benchmarks, considering within-industry heterogeneity across countries. We defined
corporate governance as the “set of organisational practices aimed at monitoring and, if
needed, restraining managerial discretion” (Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2014, p. 291). Firm
technical efficiency was definedas “the ratio of the quantities of the actual output produced
and the maximum producible output from the quantity of input it has used” (Ray, 2019,
p. 422).
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it evaluates firms technical
efficiency in the manufacturing industry and highlights the most essential firm-specific and
external institutional factors across countries. Secondly, it develops proactive optimal
corporate governance benchmarks to improve efficiency and avoid corporate crises in the
future. It will, therefore, help corporate managers, regulators and policymakers to
understand how to enhance firm efficiency and corporate governance. Thirdly, it
incorporates corporate governance risk variables as endogenous undesirable output
variables under management control. This overcomes the problem of simultaneity, which
implies that the objective is the identification of their minimal optimal levels.The optimisation
of corporate governance risk variables and other variables leads firms to efficiency.
Fourthly, it uses a novel generaliseddirectional distance function (GDDF) data envelopment
analysis (DEA) model, with the multi-parametric model for bias correction (MPBC) of
efficiency estimators. Thisnew mixed methodological approach develops optimal corporate
governance benchmarks, deals with desirable and undesirable variables, corrects the bias
of efficiencies arising from the dimensionality of the production set and yields efficiency
estimators consistent with the meta-frontier theory (Zervopoulos et al.,2019).
The empirical results show significant differences between optimal and actual firm
efficiency input/output variables and corporate governance risk mechanisms in the
manufacturing industry across countries. They show that several internal and external
factors influence firms’ efficiency such as group affiliations, product market competition,
PAGE 90 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jVOL. 22 NO. 1 2022

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT