Managerial ability and real earnings management in family firms

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-02-2021-0083
Published date29 July 2021
Date29 July 2021
Pages1475-1494
Subject MatterStrategy,Corporate governance
AuthorAdhitya Agri Putra,Nanda Fito Mela,Ferdy Putra
Managerial ability and real earnings
management in family f‌irms
Adhitya Agri Putra, Nanda Fito Mela and Ferdy Putra
Abstract
Purpose This study aims to examine the effect of managerial ability on real earnings management
(hereafterREM) in family firms.
Design/methodology/approach The sampleconsists of 864 firms-years listed in theIndonesian Stock
Exchange.REM is measured by abnormal activities. Managerialability is measured by data envelopment
analysis.Data analysis uses random-effect regressionanalysis.
Findings Family firms reducethe possibility of higher ability managers to engage in REM. Compare to
non-family firms, higher ability managers in family firms are more likely to engage in REM to improve
futureearnings.
Research limitations/implications This research only uses efficiency score data envelopment analysis to
measure managerial ability while the managerial ability is, by nature, multi-dimensional and unobservable. This
research also does not find the role of professional Chief Executive Officer (hereafter CEO) in the family firms in
REM behavior because does not consider the professional CEO motivation (e.g. compensation structure).
Practical implications This research is expected to helpfamily firms formulate managersselection
based on managerial ability. This research also is expected to help investors and creditors to put their
funds in the familyfirms with higher ability managers that reduce earningsinformation distortion.
Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this research is the first research that
examinesthe managerial ability on REM in Indonesianfamily firms. This research alsocontributes to fil the
findingsgap in managerial ability and REM.
Keywords Family f‌irms, Real earnings management, Managerial ability
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Managerial characteristics are an essential factor to determine the policy and strategy as
managers are the main actors to run and execute the business decisions. One of the
characteristics is managerial ability. Managerial ability refers to the skill, knowledge,
expertise and experienceto make an effective business decision (Kor, 2003).
One of the managers’ goals is to beat earnings targets as it is important to evaluate managers’
performance. Earnings management can be used as a strategy to achieve the goal. Earnings
management refers to managers’ policy to change the earnings number by using accounting
standard weaknesses (accruals earnings management) or by deviating the normal b usiness
activities (real earnings management, hereafter REM) (Roychowdhury, 2006). Opportunistic
managers tend to use REM than the accruals one as regulatory bodies and auditors are more
likely to focus on accruals earnings management (Alzeban, 2019) than the real one, especially
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act implementation (Cohen et al.,2008;Roychowdhury, 2006). For
example, Owusu et al. (2020) find that managers tend to shift accruals earnings management to
REM especially when the auditors are males ones. Also, REM activities are increased when there
is lower corporate governance, such as weak internal control (Al-Haddad and Whittington, 2019;
Wali and Masmoudi, 2020) or ineffective parent firms’ monitoring (Li et al., 2021).
Adhitya Agri Putra, Nanda
Fito Mela and Ferdy Putra
are all based at Riau
University, Pekanbaru,
Indonesia.
Received 22 February 2021
Revised 11 April 2021
12 May 2021
Accepted 5 June 2021
DOI 10.1108/CG-02-2021-0083 VOL. 21 NO. 7 2021, pp. 1475-1494, ©Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jPAGE 1475
Previous studies find the positive effect of managerial ability-related attributes , such as experience,
expertise and education, on REM (Alhmood et al.,2020;Li et al., 2016;Qi et al.,2018). On the
other hand, Huang and Sun (2017) find that higher ability managers have less REM. Inconsistence
of previous findings comes from the point of view that, all else equal, all managers with di fferent
ability have the same pressure to beat the earnings target (Huang and Sun, 2017). It leads to a
similar possibility to improve earnings opportunistically (Suryani et al.,2018). Huang and Sun
(2017) explain that if the relationship between managerial ability and REM is still questionable, then
there is a chance that firms’ characteristics more likely determine REM behavior.
The family attribute in the firms is one of the unique firms’ characteristics in Indonesia that
refers to family firms. Family firms are the firms where the founders or their family are
involved in the board, executive or as the block-holders shareholders (Cheng, 2014).
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014) reports that 95% of businesses in Indonesia are family
businesses. Susanto et al. (2007)also report that 90% of listed firms in the Indonesian Stock
Exchange are family firms.
In the context of REM behavior, family firms perform effective monitoring to prevent
managers act opportunistically. Family firms are more likely to have lower agency conflicts
of managers-shareholders. Effective monitoring comes from motivation by founder and
family to maintain their reputation to not engage in controversial behavior such as earnings
management (Santoso and Rakhman, 2013) as the business will be passed on to the next
generation of the foundingfamily (Alves and Gama, 2020;Andres, 2008;Tabor et al., 2018).
Family firms do not only give priority to financial return but also family existence (G
omez-
Mejı
´aet al.,2007
), so higher business performance (explicitperformance) comes in second
place after the good reputation of the family name (culture performance) (Hall and
Nordqvist, 2008;Tabor et al.,2018). Previous studies (Achleitner et al.,2014;Ghaleb et al.,
2020;Tian et al., 2018) find that familyfirms are less engaged in REM.
The characteristic of family firms could moderate if higher ability managers decide to
engage in REM. As REM originally comes from a conflict of managers-shareholders, family
monitoring is expected to mitigate the conflict and reduce the opportunistic behavior of
managers. Family involvement can use the higher ability of managers to improve earnings
without deviating any normal level of firm business instead of using the aggressive strategy
of REM that can reduce firmreputation.
While Achleitner et al. (2014),Ghaleb et al. (2020) and Tian et al. (2018) find that family
involvement reduces REM; Razzaque et al. (2016) and Eng et al. (2019) find that family
firms have a greater level of REMthan non-family ones. Suhardianto and Harymawan (2011)
suggest that the inconsistency of monitoring function on earnings management behavior
comes from the unclear motivation of earnings management if it is done by opportunistic
motivation or efficient contracting one. As family firms are more likely to promote a good
reputation (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008;Tabor et al., 2018), they will allow managers to
engage in REM only for efficient contracting. As an efficient contract, REM can signal better
future earnings, while an opportunistic one can destroy the firms’ economic value
(Simamora, 2019). In this case, higher ability managers who engage in REM are more likely
to improve future earnings in family firms than non-family ones. Huang and Sun (2017) find
that managerial ability improvesREM as a signal of future performance.
This research aims to examine the role of family firms to mitigate higher ability managers to
engage in REM. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this research is the first study that
examines the managerial ability toward REM in Indonesian family firms. This research also
contributes to fil the findings gap of managerial ability and REM. As ability attributes of
managerial can both increase (Alhmood et al.,2020;Li et al.,2016;Qi et al., 2018)and
decrease (Huang and Sun, 2017) REM activities, this research follows the suggestion by
Huang and Sun (2017) by considering the firms’ characteristics to determine higher ability
managers’ behavior which is the family rolein the firms.
PAGE 1476 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jVOL. 21 NO. 7 2021

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