Is “justice hurried actually justice buried”? An organisational perspective of the Italian criminal justice

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-07-2022-0159
• Published date: 12 January 2023
• Date: 12 January 2023
• Pages: 94-109
• Subject Matter: Public policy & environmental management,Politics,Public adminstration & management
• Author: Roberta Troisi,Gaetano Alfano

Is “justice hurried actually

justice buried”? An organisational

perspective of the Italian

criminal justice

Roberta Troisi and Gaetano Alfano

Department of Political and Communication Science,

University of Salerno, Salerno, Italy

Abstract

Purpose –This study investigates the presence of a productivity–quality trade-off in judicial decisions from

an organisational standpoint, focusing on the courts as bureaucracies. Applied to the Italian context and

focusing on criminal courts, the main question addressed is whether or not increasing productivity diminishes

decision quality.

Design/methodology/approach –Directional distance function (DDF) models were utilised to assess

productivity. Two-sample t-tests are then used to compare the quality of efficient and inefficient units in first

instance and appeal, with the aim to determine whether a productivity–quality trade-off exists.

Findings –The study’s approach yields results that differ from previous studies. (1) The Italian judicial

system is found less efficient. (2) The efficiency of the courts of first instance is relatively uniform. In contrast,

there is a difference in efficiency between northern and southern courts of appeal, with northern courts on

average being more efficient. (3) The analysis reveals a statistically significant productivity–quality trade-off

when the courts of appeal are considered.

Research limitations/implications –New evidence of a judicial system is presented, suggesting reforms

regarding “reasonable time”as the optimal balance between quality and productivity.

Originality/value –The organisational framework leads to evaluatingthe efficiency of the courts by considering

the various types of proceedings based on the gravity/complexity of the cases. In light of the pyramidal structure of

the justice system, the quality is then defined in terms of hierarchical control expressed as review rate.

Keywords Efficiency–quality trade-off, Organizational framework, Criminal justice, Bureaucracy,

Proceedings, Hierarchical control, Reasonable time

Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction

Over the last ten years, there has been a significant increase in academic interest in judicial

systems. It is not surprising, given that a functioning judicial system encourages business

investment, job creation, institutional trust and economic growth (Zak and Knack, 2001;

Tiede, 2018). On the contrary, it has been demonstrated that a dysfunctional legal system can

have a negative impact on many aspects of development, including the legitimacy of the

political system as a whole (Marciano et al., 2019;Voigt, 2016). The length of the proceeding is

the most investigated dimension of judicial efficiency. It is primarily understood as

productivity, which is expressed as the number of cases resolved per capita in a given time

while minimising the resources required (Voigt, 2016). This measure is fully evident and

quantifiably accurate. It is also connected to the concept of “reasonable time”for judgements,

which is the most frequently invoked element of a fair trial in international [1] and national

IJPSM

36,1

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© Roberta Troisi and Gaetano Alfano. Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is

published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce,

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may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:

https://www.emerald.com/insight/0951-3558.htm

Received 11 July 2022

Revised 6 November 2022

8 December 2022

Accepted 12 December 2022

International Journal of Public

Sector Management

Vol. 36 No. 1, 2023

pp. 94-109

Emerald Publishing Limited

0951-3558

DOI 10.1108/IJPSM-07-2022-0159

legal initiatives, as it is an essential guarantee that the demand of justice could be met in a

timely manner, depending on the nature of the case [2].

Furthermore, studies on efficiency are frequently focused on the selection of the model

analysis. These are designed to determine the optimal distribution of resources, typically focusing

on a single court level and viewing it as just one stage in a larger proceeding with a three-tiered

structure. However, measuring efficiency solely based on productivity leaves out a crucial part of

how the legal system should work. Quality is equally a key dimension of the judicial efficiency as

it relates to the reliability of the decisions and, consequently, is a major factor in fostering public

confidence in the legal system. Efficiency and quality are complementary, resulting in a delicate

equilibrium in which an increase in the number of cases may have negative effects on the quality,

especially in terms of inaccuracy (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2016).

Since increased productivity cannot be achieved at the expense of quality, a quality

assessment should accompany the efficiency assessment. Thus, the objective of this work is

to examine the efficiency and quality of judicial systems from a new perspective, covering on

the existing gaps. As a starting point, we propose an organisational framework that can

address the research objectives, analytical methods and results. It views courts as

bureaucratic organisations incorporated within a larger, multi-tie red judicial system

(Canes-Wrone, 2003). Their organisational structure is founded on the criteria of balancing

autonomy and control, which supports its overall functioning (Raine, 2000).

Autonomy is a horizontal organisational criterion that leads to a separation of the work of

the courts, based on a different numerical composition, different roles and different activity,

even though the decision-making activity is identical. This sharp division of labour in terms

of activities, roles and competencies is reflected in the variety of proceedings used,

characterised by increasing complexity, in relation to the gravity of the crime. Thus, a more

serious crime carries harsher penalties, which are counterbalanced by enhancing the

defendant’s procedural guarantees, including major procedural steps than those established

for less serious crimes, additional steps articulated in accordance with the dynamics of the

proceedings, a larger number of judges for each step and finally the collegial composition of

the court (see Section 2.1). Furthermore, the gravity of the crime frequently makes it difficult

to obtain evidence. Particularly, demanding technical investigations or the difficulty of

obtaining reliable testimony tend to lengthen the time required for each procedural stage

(Coscas-Williams and Alberstein, 2019).

In contrast, control acts as a vertical organisational criterion defining the function of the

higher judicial levels in order to maintain a balance between the lower courts autonomy and

community interests. It is a form of bureaucratic control that permits the hierarchical review

of judgements across multiple tiers of the judicial system, ensuring greater accuracy and

reliability for the community. However, it has no direct effect on the lower court’s judges,

thereby preserving their autonomy. These organisational tenets direct the analysis while also

allowing previous gaps to be filled. First, the judicial system is considered a complex

hierarchy to assess as more than one single tier. Second, the productivity of courts is

measured alongside the decisions of the first instance and courts of appeal by considering the

different proceedings according to the complexity of the cases.

Third, by taking into account the pyramidal structure of the justice system, where the

intermediate appeal level reviews a subset of trial decisions and the higher-level reviews a

subset of appealdecisions, quality isexpressed in terms of control,equally considered for both

the firstinstance and courts of appeal. The decisionsof the Supreme Court cannotbe evaluated

in termsof productivity or qualitybecause the court is uniqueand incomparable toother courts

and because itsdecisions are final and not subjectto further review. Consideration of the third

tier is limited to its hierarchical functionof reviewing appeals decisions.

Italy is an interesting case when studying the judiciary. It appears that the sole evaluable

aspect of the Italian judiciary involves performance-related factors. The Italian judiciary has

The Italian

criminal justice

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