How Does Regulation Affect the Relation Between Family Control and Reported Cash Flows? Comparative Evidence from India and the United States
Author | Neerav Nagar,Kaustav Sen |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12157 |
Date | 01 September 2016 |
Published date | 01 September 2016 |
How Does Regulation Affect the Relation Between
Family Control and Reported Cash Flows?
Comparative Evidence from India and the United
States
Neerav Nagar*and Kaustav Sen
ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical.
Research Question/Issue: We conduct a two-countrystudy to understand (i) how family and non-family firms engagein clas-
sification shiftingto manage reported operatingcash flows in each country; (ii) howthis behavior varies between thetwo coun-
tries; and (iii) how corporate governance regulation introduced independently in each country moderates the observed
behavior.
Research Findings/Insights: We find that family ownership has different effects on quality of cash flow reporting in the two
countries. Furthermore, country-level regulation moderates these effects differently. In particular, (i) firms in both countries
engage in manipulating operating cash flows,but the evidence is stronger in the UnitedStates; (ii) family firms in India engage
in more shifting than non-family firms, but this is not observed in the United States;and (iii) family (non-family) firms in India
increase(reduce) shifting, whereasonly non-family firms in the United Statesincrease shifting after regulation. Since non-family
firms in India raise more external capital than family firms after regulation, we infer that family firms in India reacted to this
competition for capital and resorted to shifting.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Most studies assume thatthe incentives for family firm behavior arethe same in different
market settings. However, factors such as efficiency of public capital markets, enforcement of corporate laws and regulations,
and other institutional practices can cause differences in family firm behavior across different market settings. We investigate
the behavior of family and non-family firms in each of these markets and study how a feature of the national governance
system, regulatory design, moderates this behavior.
Practitioner/Pol icy Implications: Our findings should be usefulto global investors and regulatorsin both emerging and devel-
oped markets. The results indicate how similarregulation in the two different settingscan trigger differences in the behavior of
firms.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Cash Flow Manipulation, Operating Cash Flows, Family Firms, Regulation
INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly globalized and connected world, inves-
tors have demanded improvements from the capital mar-
kets around the world due to a variety of reasons. Countries
responded by improving their institutions and firms by im-
proving theirgovernance practices, withan overall goal of im-
proving thenational governance bundle(e.g. see Millar,2014).
Reforms were introduced in developed markets to restore
investor confidencethat was lost due to excessive managerial
greed and in emerging markets to attract capital, primarily
from foreign investors. In this paper, we investigate how a
particular bundle, country-level regulatory design and firm-
level familyownership, has impacted financialreporting qual-
ity of firms in two contrasting settings, India and the United
States (US), where the role played by intergenerational busi-
ness families andenforcement of investor protection laws dif-
fer significantly. Our goal is to examine if this bundle leads to
different outcomes in these two markets.
Weare not the first to examine a particular governance bun-
dle to understand corporate behavior. Focusing on two spe-
cificfirm-level agency problems, Aslan and Kumar (2014)
investigate how national governance factors can be combined
into national governance bundles to address costs associated
with controlling shareholders and debt financing. Kim and
Ozdemir (2014) find that national governance systems based
on investor protection, rule of law, open market institutions
*Address for correspondence: Neerav Nagar, Indian Institute of Management
Ahmedabad Vastrapur, Ahmedabad-380,015, India. Tel: +917,966,324,944; E-mail:
neeravn@iima.ac.in
© 2016 JohnWiley & Sons Ltd
doi:10.1111/corg.12157
490
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2016, 24(5): 490–508
act as complements or substitutes to how boards are struc-
tured to perform their role as creators and protectors of
wealth. Using a sample of large transnational firms,
Markarian, Parbonetti, and Previts (2007) find that non-Anglo
Saxon firms have developed control mechanisms to emulate
the Anglo-Saxongovernance regime. We extend this literature
to include the role of regulatory design.
We focus on family ownership since the literature has well
documented that family owned businesses not only play an
important role in emerging markets (Khanna & Palepu,
2000) but also continue to flourish in developed economies
(see Anderson& Reeb, 2003). There are bothbenefits and costs
to family controlfrom the outside investor’s perspective. Fam-
ily members are actively involved in the business and thus
able to monitor managers better (James,1999); however, since
they have substantial control through ownership and board
representation, they extract private benefits (Shleifer &
Vishny, 1997). Examining the role of national governance
systems, Rees and Rodionova (2015) find that in liberal as
compared to coordinated (i.e. open vs. closed) market econo-
mies, improvements in governance can leadto better environ-
mental and social outcomes even when equity is closely held
by institutional investors but not by families, thus pointing
out the importance ofdiversified ownership. However, given
informal mechanisms that exist in different parts ofthe world,
some recent papers question whether national governance
systems should converge (e.g. Buchanan, Chai, & Deakin,
2014; Millar, 2014). It is in this context we try to understand
the efficacy of corporate governance regulation in these two
countries by examining how family firms react to it. In partic-
ular, we examine how (i) family firms react to regulation as
compared to non-family firms in each market;(ii) family firms
react to regulation across these two markets; and (iii) family
firms react to regulation as compared to their non-family
counterparts across these two markets.
We use quality of operating cash flows, as reported, to as-
sess the outcome ofthe governance bundle mentioned earlier.
Since cash flows play an important role in contracting e.g.
debt covenants and executive compensation, an increasing
number of analysts have started to issue cash flow forecasts
(DeFond & Hung, 2003). Further, stock prices react positively
when cash flow surprises are positive (Brown, Huang, &
Pinello, 2013). Consequently, the probability of manipulation
of operating cash flowshas increased over the years (Mulford
&Comiskey,2005).Wefind that cash flow manipulation
through classification shifting (i) occurs in both countries,
but is stronger in the US; (ii) is higher for family firms than
non-family firmsinIndia,butnotinthe US;(iii)hasincreased
for family firms in India subsequent to corporate governance
regulation, and (iv) has decreased (increased) for non-family
firms after regulation in India (the US) along with a simulta-
neous increase (decrease) of external financing.
CHOICE OF A TWO-COUNTRY SETTING
Two country studies are notuncommon in the regulation and
governanceliterature. Huberman (2013)examines the effect of
labor regulation in Belgium and Brazil in the 1920s; whereas
both replaced labor with capital due to increased regulation,
Belgium flourished by increasing labor productivity, thus
becominga better exporter whereas Brazildid not reap similar
gains, primarily because international trade was collapsing
due to increased tariffs. Elshandidy and Neri (2015) find that
while firms withefficient boards in Italy and United Kingdom
have better (mandatory and voluntary) disclosure of risk,
firms with better boards in Italy that disclose risk voluntarily
show improvements in liquidity. Lattemann, Fetscherin,Alon,
Li, and Schneider(2009) contrast the Corporate Social Respon-
sibility(CSR) activities of firms in China and Indiafinding that
Indian firms communicate CSR due to rule-based rather than
relation-based governance environment.
Multi-country studies have been carried out since it is diffi-
cult to conclude whether the results of single-country studies
are generalizable. These studies use a large set of diverse coun-
tries (e.g. Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003), exploring legal ori-
gins and other factors to understand the differences that exist.
However, Black, De Carvalho, Khanna, Kim, and Yurtoglu
(2014) identify three limitations in multi-country studies: con-
struct validity, lack of time series data and endogeneity. We re-
solve construct validity by designing our study to examine one
country from two contrasting markets, developed and emerg-
ing. Our choice of countries, India and the US, have a long his-
tory of corporate activity, with well populated databases
archived over a sufficiently long time horizon. Finally, the
endogeneity problem in a multi-country setting is eliminated
in our study, since both the countries have been subjected to
a similar natural experiment i.e. regulation. In addition, since
these two countries have the same legal origin, similar political
systems and history of family owned enterprises, any struc-
tural reasons that may cause differences in outcomes to a regu-
lation are eliminated. So any dissimilarities we observe can
probably be attributed to variation in enforcement and/or
the influence of family firms in overall development of the
economy.
FAMILY FIRMS, REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT IN INDIA AND THE UNITED
STATES
Family Businesses
Ownership by Indians in the corporate sector started in the
19
th
century with setting up of textile mills. Most of the corpo-
rate growth up until the middle of the 20
th
century was from
family funds and retained earnings of these Indian owned
companies (Goswami, 1989). Indian owners would retain con-
trol over the companies in addition to performing the other
functions of a promoter. In contrast, given the strong rule of
law and well-developed institutions in the United States, fam-
ily firms are not expected to play a role in the corporate market.
However, large family businesses have been around in the
United States since the industrial revolution, with household
names such as Kohler and S.C. Johnson being around since
the mid-1800s. Using data from 1992 to 99, Anderson and Reeb
(2003) report that 35% of the firms in the S&P 500, representing
18% of the equity are owned by founding families.
At present, about 34% (28%) of the Indian (US) firms are
family-owned,accounting for approximately 27% (22%) of as-
sets and 42% (23%) of profits. For our sample, we find that the
ten largest family firmsaccountforabout21%(12%)ofthe
491CASH FLOW REPORTING: FAMILY CONTROL AND REGULATION
© 2016 JohnWiley & Sons Ltd Volume 24 Number 5 September 2016
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