EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM FOR A SPATIAL MODEL OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS*

Published date01 February 2016
AuthorAdrien Blanchet,Filippo Santambrogio,Pascal Mossay
Date01 February 2016
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12147
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
Vol. 57, No. 1, February 2016
EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM FOR A SPATIAL MODEL
OF SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
BYADRIEN BLANCHET,PASCAL MOSSAY,AND FILIPPO SANTAMBROGIO1
Universit´
e de Toulouse (TSE, GREMAQ), France; Newcastle University, U.K. and CORE,
Belgium; Universit´
e Paris Sud, France
We extend Beckmann’s spatial model of social interactions to the case of a two-dimensional spatial economy
with a large class of utility functions, accessing costs, and space-dependent amenities. We show that spatial equilibria
derive from a potential functional. By proving the existence of a minimizer of the functional, we obtain that of spatial
equilibrium. Under mild conditions on the primitives of the economy, the functional is shown to satisfy displacement
convexity. Moreover, the strict displacement convexity of the functional ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium. Also,
the spatial symmetry of equilibrium is derived from that of the primitives of the economy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since Marshall (1920), it has been known that both market and nonmarket forces play an
important role in shaping the distribution of economic activities across space. The new economic
geography literature has reemphasized the role of localized pecuniary externalities mediated by
the market in a general equilibrium framework; see Krugman (1991). Social interactions through
face-to-face contacts also contribute to the gathering of individuals in villages, agglomerations,
or cities; see Glaeser and Scheinkman (2003). In Beckmann (1976), the urban structure results
from the interplay between a spatial communication externality and the land market.
When studying the role of agglomeration forces on the urban structure, the existing literature
traditionally relies on specific functional forms regarding utility functions or transportation
costs. New economic geography models make a wide use of Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) or quadratic preferences over manufacturing varieties and of iceberg transport costs;
see Fujita et al. (1999) and Ottaviano et al. (2002). In Beckmann’s spatial model of social
interactions, the preference for land is logarithmic, and the cost of accessing agents is linear;
see Fujita and Thisse (2002).
More recently, some efforts have been made to build models allowing for more general pref-
erences over goods, with internal or external increasing returns to scale. For instance, some
works have extended the CES preferences traditionally used in general equilibrium models
of monopolistic competition to the case of preferences with variable elasticity of substitution;
see Behrens and Murata (2007) and, more generally, Zhelobodko et al. (2012). Also, in a
multidistrict model with external increasing returns in the spirit of Fujita and Ogawa (1982),
Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) have proved the existence of a symmetric spatial equilibrium
from standard neoclassical assumptions on preferences and technology. Despite these various
Manuscript received December 2012; revised May 2014.
1The authors acknowledge the support of the Agence Nationale de la Recherche through the project EVaMEF
ANR-09-JCJC-0096-01, the Ram´
on y Cajal program at the Universidad de Alicante, and the COST Action IS1104.
The authors wish to thank Marcus Berliant, Masahisa Fujita, Andr´
e Grimaud, Michel Le Breton, Yasasuda Murata,
Daisuke Oyama, J´
erˆ
ome Renault, Franc¸ois Salani ´
e, Yasusada Sato, as well as participants at the IAST LERNA—
Eco/Biology Seminar, the Tokyo workshop on Spatial Economics organized by RIETI and the University of Tokyo,
the Public Economic Theory (PET) conference in Seattle, and the Urban Economics Association (UEA) conference
in Washington for helpful comments. Please address correspondence to: Pascal Mossay, Newcastle University Business
School, 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle, NE1 4SE, UK. E-mail: pascal.mossay@ncl.ac.uk.
31
C
(2016) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social
and Economic Research Association
32 BLANCHET,MOSSAY,AND SANTAMBROGIO
efforts in extending models addressing agglomeration forces mediated by the market mech-
anism, little progress has been made to extend further spatial models where agglomeration
externalities are driven by nonmarket forces. The aim of this article is to fill this gap by address-
ing the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium for general spatial economies involving social
interactions.
Our main results are the following: We generalize Beckmann’s spatial model of social interac-
tions to the case of a two-dimensional spatial economy with a large class of preferences for land,
accessing costs, and space-dependent amenities. We prove the existence and the uniqueness
of spatial equilibrium. So as to get our results, we start our analysis by providing conditions
under which spatial equilibria derive from a potential. Stated differently, we build a functional
of which the critical points correspond to the spatial equilibria of the economy. In this context,
the conditions ensuring the existence of a minimizer of the functional also ensure the existence
of a spatial equilibrium of the economy. As the functional is not convex in the usual sense, we
introduce another notion of convexity, referred to as displacement convexity, a concept widely
used in the theory of optimal transportation. Under mild conditions on the primitives of the
economy, the functional is shown to be displacement convex, and we obtain an equivalence
between the minimizers of the functional and the spatial equilibria of the economy. This pro-
vides a variational characterization of spatial equilibrium. Moreover, if the functional displays
strict displacement convexity, we get the uniqueness of minimizer, and hence that of spatial
equilibrium. Also, the spatial symmetry of equilibrium is derived from that of the primitives
of the economy. We present several examples with the purpose of illustrating the scope of our
existence and uniqueness results. In particular, one- and two-dimensional geographical spaces,
linear and quadratic accessing costs, and linear and power residence costs are examined. Fi-
nally, the circular spatial economy is revisited so as to illustrate the role of nonconvexities in
explaining the emergence of multiple equilibria. A direct method allows us to derive all the
spatial equilibria arising along the circle. The analysis completes the work initiated by Mossay
and Picard (2011).
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the economic environ-
ment and generalizes Beckmann’s spatial model of social interactions. In Section 3, we prove the
existence of a spatial equilibrium. Section 4 is devoted to the variational characterization and
the uniqueness of equilibrium as well as its spatial symmetry properties. In Section 5, we present
several examples of spatial economies so as to illustrate the scope of our results. Section 6 is
devoted to the analysis of the circular economy. Section 7 summarizes the main results of the
article and concludes.
2. SPATIAL MODEL
In this section, we present the economic environment. We consider a closed spatial economy
Eextending along a one- or two-dimensional geographical space KRd,d=1,2, hosting a
unit-mass of agents distributed according to the spatial density λM(K)={λL1(K):λ
0,Kλ=1}, the set of nonnegative, Lebesgue measurable and integrable functions with a unit
norm. Agents meet each other so as to benefit from social contacts. The social utility S(x) that
an agent in location xKderives from interacting with other agents is given by
S(x)=BWλ(x),(1)
where the constant Bdenotes the total benefit from interacting with other agents, W:Rd
R∪{+}the cost function of accessing them, and Wλ(x) the convolution of Wwith λ, KW
(xy)λ(y)dy, representing the accessing cost from location x. To ensure that social interactions
are global, Bis assumed to be large enough, B>maxxWλ(x).

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