International Economic Review

Publisher:: Wiley
Publication date:: 2021-02-01

ISBN:: 0020-6598

Issue Number

Latest documents

THE FACE VALUE OF ARGUMENTS WITH AND WITHOUT MANIPULATION
A sender wishes to persuade a receiver with a (surprising) result that challenges the prior belief. The result stems either from sequential private experimentation or manipulation. The incentive to experiment and to manipulate depends on the quality threshold for persuasion. Higher thresholds make it harder to find a surprising outcome via experimentation and may encourage manipulation. Suppose there are observable nonmanipulable and manipulable research methods. For the decision quality, the quality threshold for persuasion for nonmanipulable methods should be higher than for manipulable methods. We discuss philosophy of science implications, such as field contingent quality standards and P‐value adjustments.
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS: WHY NOT CARTELS?
The relevance of special interests lobbying in modern democracies can hardly be questioned. But if large trade associations can overcome the free riding problem and form effective lobbies, why do they not also threaten market competition by forming equally effective cartels? We argue that the key to understanding the difference lies in supply elasticity. The group discipline, which works in the case of lobbying, can be effective in sustaining a cartel only if increasing output is sufficiently costly—otherwise the incentive to deviate is too great. The theory helps organizing a number of stylized facts within a common framework.
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW REFEREES 2020
PRICE SEARCH, CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY AND EXPENDITURE INEQUALITY OVER THE LIFE ‐CYCLE
We differentiate consumption from expenditure by incorporating price search decision into an otherwise standard life‐cycle model. We first analytically show that, under very general conditions, poorer households search more and pay lower prices compared to wealthier ones. As a result, consumption inequality is smaller than expenditure inequality, and the gap between them increases over the life‐cycle. Next, using a plausibly calibrated model, we find that life‐cycle increase in consumption inequality is about 30% lower than the increase in expenditure inequality. Price search provides an insurance mechanism against income shocks and increases the welfare of a newborn by 3.9%.
ESTIMATING TEMPTATION AND COMMITMENT OVER THE LIFE CYCLE
This article estimates the importance of temptation for consumption smoothing and asset accumulation in a life‐cycle model. We use two complementary estimation strategies: first, we estimate the model‐implied Euler equation; second, we match liquid and illiquid wealth accumulation using the method of simulated moments. In both cases, we find that the utility cost of temptation is one‐quarter of the utility benefit of consumption. Further, temptation is crucial for correctly estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS): EIS estimates are biased downward when ignoring temptation. Finally, the model only matches the share of illiquid wealth if temptation is in the preference specification.
THE DYNAMIC AND DISTRIBUTIONAL ASPECTS OF IMPORT TARIFFS
We use a dynamic trade model with two sectors and two types of workers to analyze the optimal setting of income‐generating tariffs. We study dynamic and distributional aspects focusing on the time horizon of policymakers and workers. The level of tariffs preferred by workers depends on the sector where they are employed as well as their skill class, with the relative weight of both aspects determined by the time horizon of the workers. Unskilled workers in the unskilled‐intensive sector are the ones most in favor of protectionism and might even benefit from a trade war.
GLOBAL GAMES WITH STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES
We study global games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a class of binary‐action, N‐player games with strategic substitutes, we prove that under payoff asymmetry, as incomplete information vanishes, the global games approach selects a unique equilibrium. We characterize this equilibrium profile ; players employ switching strategies at different cutoff signals, the order of which is directly determined by payoff asymmetry. We provide examples that illustrate our result and its connection with dominance solvability. We extend the global game literature, which has thus far been developed for games with strategic complementarities, to new applications in industrial organization, collective action problems, finance, etc .
ISSUE INFORMATION ‐ JIP
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS: WHY IS THE INCOME SHARE OF TOP INCOME EARNERS ACYCLICAL OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE?
In the United States, the income share of the top 5% income group is acyclical over the business cycle. This study attempts to explain the cyclical behavior of the income distribution over the business cycle, particularly focusing on the top 5% income earners' share, using a heterogeneous agent model featuring a choice to become an entrepreneur. The model economy successfully reproduces the acyclical behavior of the income share of the top 5%. During expansions, relatively more people become entrepreneurs at the top, which offsets the decline in the income share of the high‐income earners from workers' side.
REDUCING INEQUALITIES AMONG UNEQUALS
This article establishes an equivalence between four incomplete rankings of distributions of income among agents who are vertically differentiated with respect to some nonincome characteristic (health, household size, etc.). The first ranking is the possibility of going from one distribution to the other by a finite sequence of income transfers from richer and more highly ranked agents to poorer and less highly ranked ones. The second ranking is the unanimity among utilitarian planners who assume that agents' marginal utility of income is decreasing with respect to both income and the source of vertical differentiation. The third ranking is the Bourguignon (Journal of Econometrics, 42 (1989), 67–80) Ordered Poverty Gap dominance criterion. The fourth ranking is a new dominance criterion based on cumulative lowest incomes.