The evolution and effectiveness of football banning orders.

• Author: Stott, Clifford

Framing the banning order debate

As we have seen, the disorder in Marseille and Charleroi brought the debate about hooliganism by English fans abroad back to the front pages of the newspapers--and to the front benches of the House of Commons. However, the rhetoric had not evolved at all from that of the late 1980s, following the disorder in Germany and Sweden. No one appeared ready to tackle what, for us, was the central issue: why was it that some England away matches would pass off peacefully, while others resulted in major disorder? Why was it that England fans were involved in a large-scale riot in Marseille at the 1998 World Cup, but that the same fans did not fight at the following match in Toulouse? How could sixty thousand Manchester United fans, including many identified by the police as 'troublemakers', descend on Barcelona in 1999 with barely a single arrest?

In short, our contention is that, despite its widespread popularity the theory that wide-scale disorder was caused by individuals who travelled with the intention of 'kicking it off ' could not explain the wildly different outcomes when large numbers of English football supporters followed their team in Europe. But despite its limitations as a theory, it was this account that still dominated media and political debates about the subject. Most significantly, it was felt that if the hooligans could be identified and prevented from travelling, then the problem could be solved. The argument that removing known troublemakers from a crowd would stop hooliganism was the same proposal that gained popularity in the late 1980s, and led to the introduction of the National Identity Card Scheme in Part One of the Football Spectators Act 1989.1 The ID Card Scheme was conceived and introduced as an attempt by the then Conservative government to 'break the link' between football and hooliganism, by excluding hooligans from all football grounds in the UK (although the scheme was never actually implemented).

Attempts to ban fans by the football authorities

Football banning orders in their current form arise from legislation (the Football Spectators Act 1989, as amended by the Football [Disorder] Act 2000) but the idea of excluding those identified as troublemakers from matches, or from travelling to a country hosting a match, is not a new one. The first attempts to ban English supporters from travelling abroad came from the football clubs and authorities themselves, following notable early incidents of disorder involving Manchester United supporters at St. Etienne and Tottenham Hotspur fans in Rotterdam. Manchester United, for example, banned its own supporters from attending European away ties in the early 1980s, although Buford documents that many United fans travelled to a key 1984 European Cup-Winners' Cup tie in Turin anyway. (2) Following Heysel, of course, the ultimate sanction was imposed when all English clubs were banned front European club competitions by UEFA. However, given that it was only club sides that faced the ban, many fans simply started to follow the national side abroad instead. During this time, the Football Association also made attempts to stop England fans travelling--for example, by refusing to take up their ticket allocation for a key World Cup qualifier in Sweden in 1989. The subsequent disorder that occurred was almost certainly escalated by the confusion and frustration among those hundreds of England fans who travelled anyway, to try to gain entry to the ground without official tickets.

So attempts by clubs and governing bodies to stop English fans travelling were largely unsuccessful at tackling the English disease. The simple fact is that fans were willing to travel to matches without tickets, independently of their club or the FA, the clubs and authorities having no legal power to prevent them travelling or even attending games. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest these bans may even have exacerbated trouble, with fans purchasing tickets for the home sections of foreign grounds in the absence of an official away allocation, or 'mobbing up' and marching to the ground in the often quite valid hope that the authorities may allow them entry to avoid disorder (as occurred in Sweden, 1989).

Restriction orders for those convicted of football-related offences

The failure of the Football Association to prevent England supporters travelling to Sweden, combined with the subsequent disorder and outrageous exaggeration of incidents by the media, finally led to a situation in which legislative action was taken. At the time of the disorder in Gothenburg, the Football Spectators Act 1989 was progressing through Parliament, proposing a National ID Card Scheme for all football spectators, the creation of a Football Licensing Authority and, in part two of the bill, the introduction of a legislative power called a 'restriction order'. Part two of the act (which, as we will see, has since been amended on a number of occasions) applied only to football matches played outside England and Wales: (3)

Restriction Orders (on Conviction of a Relevant Offence) Section 15

(1) A court by or before which a person is convicted of a relevant offence or, if a person convicted of such an offence is committed to it to be dealt with, the Crown Court on dealing with him for the offence, may make a restriction order in relation to him.

(2) No restriction order may be made unless the court is satisfied that making such an order in relation to the accused would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with designated football matches.

(3) A restriction order may only be made--in addition to a sentence imposed in respect of the offence of which the accused is (or was) convicted; or in addition to a probation order

...

(5) A restriction order shall specify the police station in England or Wales at which the person subject to the order is to report initially.

(c)Crown Copyright 1989

In layman's terms, the new legislation therefore allowed a court sentencing someone convicted of a relevant (i.e. football-related) offence to be served with a court order in addition to their criminal sentence, requiring them to report to their local police station when an English team was playing abroad. In theory this would prevent them from travelling abroad to watch their team and becoming involved in disorder. However, the court could only serve the individual with such an order if it was satisfied the restriction was necessary to prevent disorder at football matches. Restriction orders would last for five years if the defendant was imprisoned for the offence, or two years for noncustodial offences. (4) Should the individual served with the order fail to report to the police station (without reasonable excuse), they would be committing a criminal offence, and could be imprisoned for a month. (5)

In the absence of a legal definition of 'football hooliganism', the legislation included a definition of football-related offences based on that used in the Public Order Act 1986, for the purposes of imposing exclusion orders. (6) This definition includes 'football-specific' crimes such as drink offences under the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985, along with more generic offences such as disorderly behaviour under the Public Order Act, and other offences of violence or disorder which occur at a football match, or on the journey to or from during the "period relevant to a designated football match". (7) This period begins two hours before the start (or advertised start) of a match, and ends one hour after the end. (8) In layman's terms, this means that a person who is at a match, or travelling to a match, and commits an offence of, for example, threatening behaviour, they have committed a 'football-related' offence and, if found guilty could have a restriction order imposed on them in addition to their sentence. However, if a supporter was not going to a game, and instead ended up fighting with a rival supporter in their local pub whilst watching the game on television, they could not be served with a banning order despite the fact that their offence was to all intents and purposes connected with football.

The legislation was widely heralded as an important tool in the 'battle' against hooligans travelling abroad. However, five years after the act was introduced, a major incident of disorder at an Eire v England friendly in Dublin caused widespread criticism of how it was being implemented. The incident was blamed on groups of known troublemakers, and, in the aftermath, the Football Intelligence Unit revealed it was aware of groups of hooligans travelling with this intent. However, it was subsequently revealed that only two fans in the UK were subject to restriction orders at the relevant time. This was due to an apparent reluctance on the part of magistrates and judges to impose the orders, due to the onus placed on them by section 15(2) to be confident that it would actually reduce the likelihood of future disorder abroad. Two years later, when Italian riot police baton-charged England fans at a World Cup qualifier in Rome, the number of fans banned had only risen to nine (contrasting sharply with the estimated four hundred fans subject to domestic exclusion orders under the 1986 Public Order Act).

As we have already noted, the disorder in Rome in 1997 should not be understood as an incidence of hooliganism. Nonetheless, the revelation that, of the thousands convicted of football-related offences, only nine fans had been banned from travelling to the game, led to a media inquest. Subsequently, Home Secretary Jack Straw admitted, "Restriction orders haven't really worked." (9) As a result, in December 1997, guidelines were issued by the Home Office to the courts, 'reminding' them of their powers to impose restriction orders upon those convicted of football-related offences in the run-up to France98. The guidelines, criticised at the time...