Emotion, rationality, and the European union: a case study of the discursive framework of the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU membership.

• Author: Easton, Martha

The European Union (EU) of today could not have been imagined back in 1956 when the first seeds of a united Europe were planted by Jean Monnet. The great leap towards integration of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the massive territorial expansion of the Nice Treaty (2001), the adoption of a common currency, the opening of borders resulting from the Schengen Agreement (1985), and the tentative rise of a European identity have been powerful and, in many ways, unlikely changes to the recent social geography of Europe. Yet despite the many successes of the Europe project, the EU remains a controversial symbol of discontent for many Europeans. As the recent Irish referendum against the Lisbon Treaty suggests, when Europeans have the opportunity to formally voice a protest, the EU has received more than its share of rejection. Of course, the Irish are not alone. Amongst the many rebuffs: the French and the Dutch sank the EU Constitution by rejecting it in respective referenda, the Swiss repudiated EU membership, the Danes spurned the use of the euro, and the Norwegians renounced EU membership twice.

What are the issues that make the EU so controversial? This study uses a single case, the 1994 Norwegian rejection of EU membership, to help flesh out some of the discursive elements behind the anti-Europe movement. The discursive approach employed in this study allows for a closer look at the way the idea of Europe is structured as a symbol, and allows for an analysis of the ways in which nationalism and identities mesh or clash with popular understandings of the EU. This approach also allows for a qualitative richness of data that can not be seen with larger statistical analyses. By examining the larger discourse structure that framed the Norwegian EU membership debate, this study shows how symbolic ideas were encoded in everyday emotions, as well as in figurative notions of time, space, and place. In so doing, one can see how the actual discursive ideas of rationality and emotion became campaign issues. As this study will show, these symbols played an important role in the politicization process as Norwegians went to the polls.

Norway's 1994 Referendum: The Results

What happened during the 1994 referendum? Norwegian surveys published in the months following the referendum suggest that many factors explain its negative outcome. With an astonishing 89% voter turnout, the EU membership question failed by 127,899 votes, or 52.2%. Given this narrow margin of defeat, the difference was not statistically significant. In the Swedish referendum just two weeks earlier, the margin of success was even smaller. In both Norway and Sweden, 'yes' support was steadily increasing in the six weeks before the referenda. Opinion polls in Sweden suggested that a majority of Swedes began to support EU membership only two weeks before the referendum; in Norway, support for EU membership was slowly and steadily increasing. Eleven percent of Norwegian voters made up their minds in the week before the vote, while six percent finally decided how they would cast their vote on the day of the referendum. (1) As several analysts have suggested, the 'yes' trend might have prevailed in Norway (as well as in Sweden), if only the Norwegian referendum were held several weeks later. (2)

The most significant result of the referendum return was found in a marked rural-urban divide. High 'yes' areas were mainly urban, with Oslo being the primary majority 'yes' region in Norway (66.7%). Other high 'yes' areas were located around Bergen (52%), Stavanger (53.2%), and Trondheim (51.7%). (3) Each of these areas are major urban sites in Norway, with a total urban population of 1,159,315 (as of 1996). As cities go, however, Oslo, the capitol, with a population of 722,871, is the only Norwegian city that is considered a traditional urban center in an international sense. Most Norwegians live in small-towns or in rural areas. Norway's small-town population (i.e., towns of less than 2,000 people), as of 1996, was 469,808 people, while its rural population stood at 1,128,885 people. (4) In most small-towns and rural areas, the 'no' vote was dominant--in some cases by more than ninety percent. Accordingly, sociologist Kristen Ringdal and political scientist Henry Valen suggest that population density explains this rural-urban divide. In high population density areas in Norway, there was a sixty-five percent 'yes' vote rate, whereas in medium density areas, there was an even split of the vote. In low population density areas, the 'yes' vote rate was only thirty-three percent? This was a stunning division in the vote.

Aside from the large rural-urban divide, another interesting result found in the county return data was that the further north the county, the higher the percentage of 'no' votes reported. The highest percentage of 'no' voters (74.5%) came from Finnmark, the northernmost county of Norway. (6) In addition to being physically the furthest from Oslo, these counties have experienced a depopulation rate much higher than other rural areas in Norway. As a result, they have received a higher number of legislative directives from the Norwegian Parliament, particularly those attempting to deal with rural depopulation areas. Professionals such as doctors and teachers receive tax breaks, debt forgiveness, and other incentives to live in the area. Some businesses have been granted extra state subsidies, and ordinary northern residents are officially encouraged by the state to remain in northern Norway. (7)

The return data also suggests that there was a gender difference in support for EU membership, with men being somewhat more inclined to be pro-membership. Women's slightly higher resistance to EU membership was found in all regions, rural and urban. This gender difference cut across all age groups and class backgrounds. The results showed that women had a 'no' rate of about fifty-seven percent, varying across region. Men voted 'yes' at a rate of fifty-five percent. Thus, there was almost a twelve-point difference in the gender vote on EU membership. (8)

Age was another factor in which support for EU membership differed. In general, middle-aged voters were more pro-membership, while older and younger Norwegian voters demonstrated a higher level of resistance. This age differential can be seen in returns from both urban and rural areas. Young Norwegian voters, ages eighteen to twenty-nine, voted 'no' at a rate of almost fifty-five percent. Older voters, ages sixty-one to ninety, voted 'no' at a rate of around fifty-two percent. Middle-aged voters, ages thirty to sixty--mainly the large baby-boomer generation--voted 'no' at a rate of only forty-eight percent. (9)

In Norway, the education level of voters corresponded quite highly to the outcome of the EU membership vote: the higher the level of education completed by the voter, the higher the propensity for that voter to be pro-membership. Voters with only a primary school education rejected EU membership at a rate of sixty-one percent. A low level of secondary education corresponded to a slightly more pro-EU position; among this group of voters there was a membership rejection rate of approximately fifty-five percent. Completion of secondary education dropped the voter rejection rate to forty-nine percent. Voters who had earned a university degree voted 'no' at a rate of only forty-two percent. (10) This strong linear finding suggests that education levels had a strong impact on voting returns. However, the strong overlap of more highly educated voters living in urban areas indicates that education levels may overlap with occupation or social class issues.

In terms of occupations, the self-employed and those employed in white-collar jobs were strongly pro-membership. Self-employed Norwegians voted 'yes' at a rate of sixty-one percent. White-collar Norwegians, the strongest supporters of EU membership, voted 'yes' at a rate of sixty-eight percent. Pink collar Norwegians, or low status non-manual workers, voted 'yes' at a rate of fifty-one percent. Blue-collar workers voted 'yes' at a rate of only forty-eight percent. Farmers cast eighty-eight percent of their vote against EU membership. Income corresponded to voting returns as well: Norwegians in the lower quartiles of income voted 'yes' at a rate of only forty-five percent; those in the higher quartiles voted 'yes' at a rate of sixty-five percent. Interestingly, union membership did not seem to play a significant role in EU positioning. Both union and non-union members voted 'yes' at a rate of forty-nine percent. (11)

These data can identify some interesting patterns in the EU membership vote. The stunning rural-urban division of Norway over EU membership clearly is a central part of explaining the negative outcome of the referendum vote. The northern aspect of the vote, gender and age differences, as well as occupation and income are also key areas of interest in explaining the returns. For this study, I chose to use the return data and the interesting possibilities they suggested as a starting point. The challenge is to examine and understand some of the findings of the survey research. In particular, the highly dichotomized nature of the political discourse, explicated in this study, begins to suggest some of the ways that Norwegian voters thought about their own politicization process as they evaluated the issue of EU membership.

Understanding the Referendum

There have been many explanations for the 1994 EU referendum results in Norway. Some of these analyses are quite good, but none have completely dominated the field. One explanation is derived from a rational choice perspective. Proponents of this explanation argue that Norwegians simply voted for their pocketbooks. According to political scientist Tor Bjorklund, farmers and fishermen--two groups which may have felt a threat to their livelihood--united with public-sector employees in voting against...