Corporate governance and generalist CEOs: evidence from board size

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1108/CG-02-2021-0058
Published date16 August 2021
Date16 August 2021
Pages148-158
Subject MatterStrategy,Corporate governance
AuthorPattanaporn Chatjuthamard,Viput Ongsakul,Pornsit Jiraporn,Ali Uyar
Corporate governance and generalist
CEOs: evidence from board size
Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard, Viput Ongsakul, Pornsit Jiraporn and Ali Uyar
Abstract
Purpose The purpose ofthis study is to contribute to the debate in the literatureabout generalist CEOs
by exploring the effect of boardgovernance on CEO general managerial ability, focusing on oneof the
most crucial aspects of the board of directors, board size. Prior research shows that smaller boards
constitutea more effective governance mechanismand therefore are expectedto reduce agency costs.
Design/methodology/approach The authors estimate the effect of board size on CEO general
managerial ability, using a fixed-effects regression analysis, propensity score matching, as well as an
instrumental-variable analysis. These techniques mitigate endogeneity greatly and make the results
much more likelyto show causality.
Findings The results show that firms with smaller board size are more likely to hire generalistCEOs.
Specifically, a declinein board size by one standard deviation raises CEOgeneral managerial ability by
15.62%. A lack of diverse experiencesin a small board with fewer directors makes it more necessary to
hire a CEO with a broad range of professional experiences. Furthermore, the agency costs associated
with generalist CEOs are greatly diminished in firms with a smaller board. Hence, firms with a smaller
board are more inclinedto hire generalist CEOs.
Originality/value Although prior researchhas explored the effects of board size on various corporate
outcomes, strategies and policies, this study is the first to investigate the effect of board size on CEO
general managerial ability.This study contributes to the literature both in corporate governanceand on
CEO generalmanagerial ability.
Keywords CEO general managerial ability, Board size, Corporate governance, Generalist CEOs,
Specialist CEOs, CEO general managerial skills, Board of directors
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
CEO managerial ability has been the focus of several recent studies. Recent research finds
that CEO managerial ability contributes to more efficient investment decisions (Gan, 2019),
lowers credit risk (Chen et al.,2017) and increases CSR performance (Yuan et al., 2019).
However, as one of the most common measures of board quality, board size has not been
investigated as one of the potential determinants of CEO managerial ability yet. Hence, this
study aims to fill this existinggap in the literature.
The board of directors is regarded as the paramount governance mechanism. Not
surprisingly, a massive volume of research has been conducted on the role of the board of
directors. The two most common attributes of the board that have been most frequently
investigated in the literature are board size and board independence. We contribute to the
literature on corporate boards by exploring the effect of board size on CEO general
managerial ability. Prior research shows that smaller boards constitute a more effective
governance mechanism (Yermack, 1996;Eisenberg et al., 1998)[1]. However, given the
two principal functions of boards such as monitoring and advising (Garner et al.,2017),
smaller boards may fall short in advising, although they are effective at monitoring as board
advising requires broader expertise and diversity and connections with the external
Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard
is based at the Center of
Excellence in Management
Research for Corporate
Governance and
Behavioral Finance, Sasin
School of Management,
Chulalongkorn University,
Bangkok, Thailand. Viput
Ongsakul is based at the
NIDA Business School,
National Institute of
Development
Administration (NIDA),
Bangkok, Thailand and The
Securities and Exchange
Commission of Thailand,
Bangkok, Thailand. Pornsit
Jiraporn is based at Great
Valley School of Graduate
Professional Studies,
Pennsylvania State
University, Malvern,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Ali
Uyar is based at CERIIM,
Excelia Business School,
France.
Received 4 February 2021
Revised 1 June 2021
Accepted 26 July 2021
The research was funded by
Chulalongkorn University under
the Ratchadapisek Sompoch
Endowment Fund through
Center of Excellence (CE) in
Management Research for
Corporate Governance and
Behavioral Finance and Sasin
School of Management through
SASIN Major Grant for a
research program.
PAGE 148 jCORPORATE GOVERNANCE jVOL. 22 NO. 1 2022, pp. 148-158, ©EmeraldPublishing Limited, ISSN 1472-0701 DOI 10.1108/CG-02-2021-0058

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