CGIR Best Paper Award

• Published date: 01 May 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12320
• Date: 01 May 2020

ANNOUNCEMENT

CGIR Best Paper Award

Every year, Corporate Governance: An International Review recognizes

the most relevant and rigorous studies published in the journal with

our Best Paper and runner-up Award. Since 2015, the Geneen Insti-

tute of Corporate Governance sponsors these two awards with

$7,500 for the best paper and $2,500 for the runner-up.

Distinguished members of the CGIR Editorial Advisory Board

nominate those papers published in CGIR in the previous year which

they view to be particularly relevant to corporate governance issues

and significantly advance the field. These nominated papers are then

evaluated and ranked by a selection committee consisting of experi-

enced CGIR Editors and a representative from the Geneen Institute.

At the end of this competitive selection process, the best paper

and the runner-up are announced in the journal and on our webpage.

Moreover, the authors receive a personal plaque and the above prizes

to commemorate their exemplary research.

We are happy to announce this year’s winners of the Best Paper

Award:

2019 Best Paper

Clustered shareholder activism

Tanja Artiga González and Paul Calluzzo

Corporate Governance: An International Review 2019;27:210-225.

In this study, González and Calluzzo introduce the new concept

of clustered shareholder activism that they define as activism cam-

paigns where multiple activists simultaneously target the same firm.

They provide a well justified and thoroughly explained cost based

model on why clustered activism emerges and how this form of activ-

ism impacts on the performance of the target firm. More specifically,

they show that cost sharing motives tend to drive clustered activism

as clustered activists tend to be geographically proximate which

makes it less costly to communicate and coordinate, and to target

larger firms where activism campaigns are costlier. Regarding the con-

sequences of activism, the authors distinguish between the interests

of the lead clustered activists, the follower clustered activists, and the

smaller shareholders of the firm. Based on various performance mea-

sures and multiple robustness tests, the results suggest that clustered

activist interests align with smaller shareholder interests and that the

clustered activists tend to reduce principal-agency costs and improve

firm performance. As one member of the CGIR Advisory Board con-

cludes, the paper “is theoretically rich in introducing a new concept,

and empirically rich in assessing both its antecedents and conse-

quences.”The authors provide a new concept that has not yet been

addressed explicitly but has much relevance to study the various

forms and phenomena of shareholder activism and their impact on

firm performance.

2019 Runner-up Paper

“Passing the Baton”: The effects of CEO succession planning on

firm performance and volatility

RanTao and Hong Zhao

Corporate Governance: An International Review 2019;27:61-78.

Tao and Zhao examine how CEO succession plans affect firm per-

formance and volatility during CEO turnover. More specifically, they

focus on relay succession where the incoming CEO has been groomed

as an heir top executive within the firm. The authors demonstrate that

firms with relay successions tend to achieve higher post-turnover

accounting performance, higher long-term stock returns, and lower

volatility. These positive effects of relay succession on performance

tend to be more pronounced in firms with higher human capital

requirements. The nominating member of the CGIR Advisory Board

summarizes: “The paper addresses the question of CEO succession –

arguably one of the most important and difficult issues for company

boards and corporate governance. It presents credible and well docu-

mented evidence that an orderly process (relay succession –in which

an heir apparent succeeds the CEO) is associated with better post

succession performance in terms of accounting performance, long-

term stock returns, and (lower) volatility. The results indicate that bet-

ter performance of internal succession may be attributable to a longer

relay period, during which the candidate has served with the CEO.”

The article hence contributes nicely to a widely studied field of

research by illuminating a special but highly relevant niche. It promises

much impact as CEO succession plans are gaining increasing attention

in theory and practice.

Congratulations to the authors on these achievements! We thank

them for their contributions to the journal and hope that these articles

will receive their deserved attention.

Received: 21 February 2019 Revised: 4 April 2020 Accepted: 6 April 2020

DOI: 10.1111/corg.12320

Corp Govern Int Rev. 2020;261. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/corg © 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 261