World Trade Organization

Pages46-48
46 Volume 18, April–June 2012 international law update
© 2012 Transnational Law Associates, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com
In 2005, Rahim’s relatives led an action against
the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, asserting claims of torture
and extrajudicial killing under the Torture Victim
Protection Act (“TVPA”). e Defendants led a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. e
district court granted the motion, concluding that
the Act allowed lawsuits against “an individual,
which only extended to natural person. e circuit
court armed. e Plaintis appeal.
e Supreme Court of the United States arms
the lower courts’ ndings to resolve the split among
the Circuits regarding whether the TVPA authorizes
suits against defendants that are not natural persons.
e Court notes that the statute does not dene the
word “individual.” e Plaintis argue that because
the Act does not explicitly dene “individual,” the
word can include nonsovereign organizations.
e Court declined to interpret individual in
such a way. e Court then moves on to look at
the ordinary meaning of the word. “We say ‘the
individual went to the store,’ ‘the individual left the
room,’ and ‘the individual took the car,’ each time
referring unmistakably to a natural person. And no
one, we hazard to guess, refers in normal parlance
to an organization as an ‘individual.’ Evidencing
that common usage, this Court routinely uses
‘individual’ to denote a natural person, and in
particular to distinguish between a natural person
and a corporation.” [Slip op. 7]
e Court also notes that Congress does not
use the word dierently than courts. e Dictionary
Act of Congress demonstrates that individual is
quite distinct from the articial entities that are
considered “persons.
Next, the Court looks to the intent of Congress
when enacting the TVPA. “is is not to say that the
word ‘individual’ invariably means ‘natural person
when used in a statute. Congress remains free,
as always, to give the word a broader or dierent
meaning. But before we will assume it has done so,
there must be some indication Congress intended
such a result.” e Court nds that Congress did
not intend a dierent meaning for individual in
the TVPA. Since the word is used several times
throughout the statute in the same way, the Court
notes that an organization could not be tortured;
therefore, “individual” was meant to only refer to
natural persons. “It is also revealing that the Act
holds perpetrators liable for extrajudicial killing to
any person who may be a claimant in an action for
wrongful death. ‘Person,’ we have recognized, often
has a broader meaning in the law than ‘individual,’
and frequently includes nonnatural persons. We
generally seek to respect Congress’ decision to use
dierent terms to describe dierent categories of
people or things. Our construction of ‘individual’ to
encompass solely natural persons credits Congress’
use of the disparate terms; petitioners’ construction
does not.” [Slip op. 9]
e Plaintis argue that the TVPA should be
read similarly to acts like the Alien Tort Statute;
however, the Court disagrees. “We also decline
petitioners’ suggestion to construe the TVPA’s scope
of liability to conform with other federal statutes that
petitioners contend provide civil remedies to victims
of torture or extrajudicial killing. None of the
three statutes petitioners identify employs the term
‘individual’ to describe the covered defendant, and
so none assists in the interpretive task we face today.
Lastly, the Court concludes, “e text of the
TVPA convinces us that Congress did not extend
liability to organizations, sovereign or not. ere
are no doubt valid arguments for such an extension.
But Congress has seen t to proceed in more modest
steps in the Act, and it is not the province of this
Branch to do otherwise. e judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit is armed.”
citation: Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., No. 11-88,
(U.S. Supreme Court, April 18, 2012).
WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
WTO Appellate Body rejects European
Union’s claims that United States
provided $19 billion in subsidies to The
Boeing Company, finding that majority
of programs challenged by EU were not
subsidies
On March 12, 2012, the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) Appellate Body issued a
report in the case of the “United States—Measures
Aecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint).” is dispute began several years ago on

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