Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool

• Published date: 01 September 2014
• Author: Svein Eng
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12052
• Date: 01 September 2014

THE NOTEBOOK CORNER

I am pleased to have in this “Notebook Corner” the third and f‌inal article by Svein Eng

discussing John Rawls’s concept of “ref‌lective equilibrium.”

E.P.

Why Ref‌lective Equilibrium?

III: Ref‌lective Equilibrium

as a Heuristic Tool

SVEIN ENG*

Abstract. In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of

“ref‌lective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discus-

sions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author’s knowledge,

no discussion of the most important question: Why ref‌lective equilibrium? In

particular, the question arises: Is the method of ref‌lective equilibrium applicable to

the choice of this method itself? Rawls’s drawing of parallels between Kant’s moral

theory and his own suggests that his concept of “ref‌lective equilibrium” is on a par

with Kant’s concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches

to justif‌ication as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the

ref‌lexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justif‌ication for choice of mode of justif‌ication.

In the f‌irst part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I raised the issue of the ref‌lexivity of

justif‌ication and questioned whether the ref‌lexive challenge can be met within the

framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng 2014b), I outlined a

Kantian approach that represents a paradigmatic alternative to Rawls. In this third

and f‌inal part, I shall argue that Rawls’s ref‌lective equilibrium cannot justify the

choice of itself and that in the broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot

escape the metaphysical issues integral to the Kantian approach.

* The main elements of this enquiry were drafted during a stay at The Centre for Advanced

Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters in 2001–2. Material drawn from the

enquiry was presented at an international Kant conference in Oslo in May 2004. I should like

to thank Susan Haack, Thomas Pogge, and Allen W. Wood, who read and commented upon

previous versions. I should also like to thank Stanley L. Paulson, George Pavlakos, Dietmar

von der Pfordten, Jeffrey Sicha, Howard Williams,Jon Elster, Arnt Myrstad and Helga Varden

for comments on various aspects of the manuscript. I am also indebted to Stanley L. Paulson

for his comments on the entire manuscript with an eye to matters of English style. The

responsibility for any and all remaining shortcomings, of whatever kind, rests with the author.

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Ratio Juris. Vol. 27 No. 3 September 2014 (440–59)

© 2014 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2014 John Wiley& Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main

Street, Malden 02148, USA.

1. Introduction

In the f‌irst part of this enquiry (Eng 2014a), I confronted Rawls’s ref‌lective

equilibrium with the issue of the ref‌lexivity of justif‌ication, and I looked at how the

choice of ref‌lective equilibrium is or could be justif‌ied within the central and

indigenous theoretical framework of A Theory of Justice. In the second part (Eng

2014b), I followed up on Rawls’s comparison of his own theory with Kant’s

practical philosophy, and outlined the main elements in a Kantian approach to the

issue of justif‌ication for the choice of mode of justif‌ication.

In this third and f‌inal part, taking the Kantian approach as my point of

departure, I shall venture upon a more detailed analysis of the justif‌icatory capacity

of Rawlsian ref‌lective equilibrium, supplementing and evolving the picture of the

Kantian approach as we go along. This will provide us with the necessary context

for a conclusion with respect to the justif‌icatory basis for a choice of ref‌lective

equilibrium as the mode of justif‌ication. More particularly, I shall argue that

Rawls’s ref‌lective equilibrium cannot justify the choice of itself and that in the

broader perspective thus necessitated, we cannot escape the metaphysical issues

raised in Kant’s approach.

2. Rawls’s Ref‌lective Equilibrium as an External Object, in Contrast to

Kant’s Reason-Immanent Standard

2.1. Introduction

Throughout this enquiry,I build upon a distinction between the level of justif‌ication

for choice of mode of justif‌ication and the level of justif‌ication for particular

theories of justice.

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls presents a model of the motivation structure of the

agent. In order to resolve our main issue—the ref‌lexive capacity of ref‌lective

equilibrium—we have to ask to which level this element belongs.

At the level of justif‌ication for one or another particular theory of justice, it may

be possible and tempting to view Rawls’s way of modelling the motivation

structure of the agent as a part of his particular theory of justice, not as part of the

idea of ref‌lective equilibrium as such.

This is different at the level of justif‌ication for choice of mode of justif‌ication.

First, at this level, we cannot view Rawls’s modelling of the motivation structure

of the agent as belonging solely to his theory of justice; we have to see it as also

belonging to the method of justif‌ication, that is, to the idea of ref‌lective equilibrium

as such. Further, I shall argue that, at this level, ref‌lective equilibrium cannot evade

metaphysical issues in its modelling of the motivation structure of the agent

without losing justif‌icatory force.

My argument for this claim consists of two main parts. First, I shall show that

the model of the motivation structure of the agent in A Theory of Justice cannot serve

as part of ref‌lective equilibrium at the level of justif‌ication for choice of mode of

justif‌ication; that is, ref‌lective equilibrium thus specif‌ied cannot meet the ref‌lexive

challenge (Section 2.2 below). I place special emphasis on this discussion, partly

due to the centrality of this model in A Theory of Justice, partly due to my taking

its failure to be paradigmatic for non-metaphysical models of the motivation

structure of the agent. Then, I proceed to sketch a more general argument for why

Why Ref‌lective Equilibrium? III: A Heuristic Tool 441

© 2014 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Ratio Juris, Vol. 27, No. 3