Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification

• Published date: 01 March 2014
• Date: 01 March 2014
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12035
• Author: Svein Eng

THE NOTEBOOK CORNER

I am pleased to have in this “Notebook Corner” the first of three articles by Svein Eng

discussing John Rawls’s concept of “reflective equilibrium.”

E.P.

Why Reflective Equilibrium?

I: Reflexivity of Justification

SVEIN ENG*

Abstract. In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of

“reflective equilibrium.” Although there are innumerable references to and discus-

sions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author’s knowledge,

no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In

particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to

the choice of this method itself? Rawls’s drawing of parallels between Kant’s moral

theory and his own suggests that his concept of “reflective equilibrium” is on a par

with Kant’s concept of “transcendental deduction.” Treating these two approaches

to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the

reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification.

My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue

of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can

be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice.

* The main elements of this enquiry were drafted during a stay at The Centre for Advanced

Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters in 2001–2. Material drawn from the

enquiry was presented at an international Kant conference in Oslo in May 2004. I should like

to thank Susan Haack, Thomas Pogge, and Allen W. Wood, who read and commented upon

previous versions. I should also like to thank Stanley L. Paulson, George Pavlakos, Dietmar

von der Pfordten, Howard Williams, Jon Elster, Arnt Myrstad and Helga Varden for com-

ments on various aspects of the manuscript. I am also indebted to Stanley L. Paulson for his

comments on the entire manuscript with an eye to matters of English style. The responsibility

for any and all remaining shortcomings, of whatever kind, rests with the author.

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Ratio Juris. Vol. 27 No. 1 March 2014 (138–54)

© 2014 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2014 John Wiley& Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main

Street, Malden 02148, USA.

1. The Problem to be Discussed

In what follows, I should like to raise a question concerning reflexivity. The

question is addressed to the theory presented by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.

The question is whether, within the framework of this theory, Rawls’s method of

reflective equilibrium is applicable to the choice of this method itself.

One reason for raising this question is that it is directly related to a central issue

in philosophy: How can we know what we claim to know? In short, the relation-

ship is as follows: The question “how can we know what we claim to know?”

cannot be given a satisfactory answer without the choice of method being itself

reflected in the answer; the critical reflexive turn, that is, a critically reflexive mode

of questioning, is an integral part of the main question.1A method that is simply

postulated, without being given any justification, is of little worth. And any

justification offered should either be reflexive according to its own content and

reflexively consistent when thus thought through, or be part of a broader position

having these properties.2

While this first reason lies on a general plane, my second reason springs from my

understanding of Rawls’s justificatory strategy in A Theory of Justice. The concept of

“reflective equilibrium” is assigned, so to speak, the role of glue responsible for

keeping the basic elements of Rawls’s system together; see the various places in A

Theory of Justice in which Rawls discusses the concept of “reflective equilibrium.”3

More specifically, I shall quote two passages. The first underscores just how central

a place reflective equilibrium is given in Rawls’s theory; more specifically, how

reflective equilibrium is assigned the responsibility of keeping together the archi-

tectonic of the original position (the set of constraints on the initial deliberative

situation), the principles of justice agreed upon in the original position, and our

considered judgements:

The concept of the original position [. . .] is that of the most philosophically favored

interpretation of [the] initial choice situation for the purposes of a theory of justice.

But how are we to decide what is the most favored interpretation? I assume, for one thing,

that there is a broad measure of agreement that principles of justice should be chosen under

certain conditions. To justify a particular description of the initial situation one shows that it

incorporates these commonly shared presumptions. [. . .]

There is [. . .] another side to justifying a particular description of the original position. This

is to see if the principles which would be chosen match our considered convictions of justice

or extend them in an acceptable way. We can note whether applying these principles would

lead us to make the same judgments about the basic structure of society which we now make

1By a “critically reflexive mode of questioning,” I mean thought turning back on itself

(“reflexive”) and asking for the criteria and facts (in a philosophically innocent sense of

“facts”) relevant in assessing the tenability of its own propositions (“critical”). A critically

reflexive mode of questioning is found in philosophy. It is not, however, a form of thinking

peculiar to philosophy (although the study of it may be an activity in which few others than

philosophers take any interest); see Eng 2003, which demonstrates the existence, content and

factual significance of a relatively well-delimited system of critically reflexive tools in analysis

and argumentation formulated in everyday language. In fact, it is the critically reflexive tools

of and in everyday language that make the reflexivity of a philosophical position possible.

2It lies outside the scope of the present enquiry to defend these programmatic sentences;

I offer them only to state part of the background to the question raised.

3See, most importantly, Rawls 1971, 19–21, 46–51, 111, 118–22, 577–87; 1999a, 17–9, 40–5, 95–6,

102–5, 506–14; see also Rawls 1971, 182, 432; 1999a, 158–9, 379.

Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification 139

© 2014 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.Ratio Juris, Vol. 27, No. 1