Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation in Hegel and Rawls

• Author: Emily Hartz,Carsten Fogh Nielsen
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12219
• Date: 01 September 2018
• Published date: 01 September 2018

© 2018 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Ratio Juris. Vol. 31 No. 3 September 2018 (326–345)

Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation

in Hegel and Rawls

CARSTEN FOGH NIELSEN AND EMILY HARTZ*

Abstract. At the heart of any the oretical problem of justice lies the problem of motiva-

tion: Even if we could conceive of a way to develop a comprehensive system of just

laws, and even if we could rationally believe in the justice of thes e laws, how could

we ever ensure that we—or anyone else—would be mot ivated to abide by them? By

unearthi ng how the problem of motivation sways canonical discussions of justice, the

article brings fort h intrinsic similaritie s and differences in these disc ussions that are

often overlooked in the literature. In part icular, the article high lights intrinsic simi-

larities in the a nalysis of the concept of justice in two central works that belong to the

continental and the a nalytic tradition respectively and are ot herwise rarely discuss ed

together: Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Right and Rawls’s Theory of Justice.

1. Introduction: T he Problem of Motivation

In this paper we focus on one of the oldest and most ba sic problems in polit ical the-

ory, the problem of how and why free individuals should subject themselves to the

rule of the political commun ity, also known a s “the problem of motivation.”

Historically, the problem of motivation has been articulated i n many different

ways.1 A closer look at these diffe rent articulations reveal s that the problem of

motivation is not really one problem, but rather a family of disti nct but intimately

related problems concerning the ba sic relation between particularity a nd universality

and between motivation a nd justification.2 In fact, or so we will argue, the fami ly of

problems that constitute the problem of motivation can be see n to structure dis cussions

of justice across historical a nd theoretical divides. The refore, a better conceptual

understanding of the problem of motivation helps us categoriz e similarities a nd

differences across t hese divides. In particu lar, such conceptual clari fication helps us

understand—and possibly bridge—t he divide between continenta l and analytical

* The authors would like to th ank our anonymous reviewers, Jeppe von Platz, Rafeeq H asan,

Carly Lane, and Christo ph Menke for constructive comments and sug gestions. Carsten Fogh

Nielsen would like to th ank Carlsbergfondet for the resea rch grant that provided the oppor-

tunity to fi nish this paper.

1 One of the earliest formu lations can be found in Book s I and II of Plato’s Republic. For an early

formulation of the problem, see Plato 1974, 327–67.

2 Thanks to Jeppe von Plat z for providing us with an e arly formulation of the dist inctions

made in the text.

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Ratio Juris, Vol. 31, No. 3 © 2018 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Why Be Just?

approaches to political philosophy and philosophy of law. This defines t he underlying

aim of the following disc ussion of the problem of motivation.

We start by suggesting a fivefold analytic th rough which to understand the dif-

ferent versions of the problem of motivation. We then apply this analytic to catego-

rize classical phi losophical solutions to the problem. This lays the concept ual ground

for analyzing two central tex ts in political philosophy, namely, Hegel’s Outlines of the

Philosophy of Right and Rawls’s Theory of Justice. These two studies are paradigmatic

texts in the continent al and the analytical tradition respe ctively and have both been

subject to extensive analysis. However, the two texts are rarely dis cussed together.

By using the problem of motivation to bring these t wo texts into dialogue we there-

fore hope to draw attention to important dif ferences and similarities between t hese

two traditions that are othe rwise easily overlooked.3

2. The Problem of Motivation: Conceptu al Distinctions

At the most basic level the problem of motivation can be viewed from the perspective

of the individual as a problem concern ing the intelligibility, rationality, and desirabil-

ity of any set of social, political, or jur idical norms. This perspective on the problem

of motivation arises when an indiv idual member of a political community a sks:

“Why be just?” What she is requesting is a n answer that would provide her with

good reasons for continui ng to submit to the collective rule of the polit ical

community.4

Within this i ndividualistic perspective, there are at least two disti nct versions of

the problem of motivation.5 First, the problem can be interpreted a s an instrumental

problem concerning self-interest, that is, as a quest ion of why and to what extent it is

in the individual’s best interest to become a member of the polit ical community and

to acknowledge the authority of the principles of justice th at governs that commu-

nity. “What do I get out of being just?” the individual might ask. “How does justice

facilitate my interests?” Taken in this sens e the question concerns the mot ivational

basis for accepting and/or rejecting the basic requi rements of justice.6

Alternatively and second, the problem of motivation can be interprete d in norma-

tive terms, as a problem concerning the normative justif iability of the principles and

norms of the political commun ity. In this case, what the individual wants to know is

3Houlgate 2001 and Laborde 2002 constitute ra re exceptions to this general r ule.

4 An extreme version of th is position is the an archical position, where the legitim acy of the

political authority of th e state has to be rationally justi fied to someone who is not yet a member

of the state. This is where Noz ick begins his argument i n Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Nozick ;

see esp. pt. I, “State-of-Nature Theory, or How to Back into a State without Rea lly Trying,”

1–146). It is also here t hat the classical contract theories (Hobbe s, Locke, and Rousseau) take

their start ing point.

5 For the classic formulat ion of this distinction se e Prichard 1912. Prichard does not explicitly

discuss the pro blem of motivation. His primary i nterest is the distinct but st ructurally simi lar

question “Why be moral?” or “Why be vi rtuous?” However, Pricha rd’s basic point, that the se

questions are in herently ambiguous a nd can be approached in at lea st two distinct ways,

seems equally applic able to the problem of motivation.

6 This is how Hobbes fra mes the problem in Leviath an. See Hobbes 1985, chaps. 13–15. See also

Hume 1975, bk. II, pt. I and II and 1978, bk. III, pt. II, sect. I and II. David Gauthier (1986) has

proposed an updated version of Hobbes’s basic position i n the form of a rational choice-based

moral theory.