Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising

Date01 September 2019
Published date01 September 2019
AuthorWansheng Tang,Fuxiao Lu,Jianxiong Zhang
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12388
Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 26 (2019) 1977–2003
DOI: 10.1111/itor.12388
INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS
IN OPERATIONAL
RESEARCH
Wholesale price contract versus consignment contract
in a supply chain considering dynamic advertising
Fuxiao Lu, Jianxiong Zhang and Wansheng Tang
College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
E-mail: fxlu1990@tju.edu.cn [Lu]; jxzhang@tju.edu.cn [Zhang]; tang@tju.edu.cn [Tang]
Received 20 May2016; received in revised form 29 September 2016; accepted 6 December 2016
Abstract
Supply chain contracts are widely considered as useful and necessary tools to guide and restrict channel
members’ behaviors. Considering the effect of dynamic advertising, we investigate two distinct types of
contracts between a dominant retailer and her manufacturer. One contract is a traditional wholesale price
contract and the other is a consignment contract. The results show that, compared to the wholesale price
contract, the consignment contract is always more desirable from the perspectives of the retailer and the
entire channel and brings more consumer surplus. When the dominant retailer’s advertising effort is very
effective or channel members have enough patience,the dominant retailer and the manufacturer can achieve a
Pareto improvementunder the consignment contract; otherwise the manufacturer prefers the wholesale price
contract.
Keywords: supply chain management; differential game; dynamic advertising; consignment contract; wholesale price
contract; Pareto improvement
1. Introduction
Supply chain contracts are widely considered as useful and necessary tools to guide and restrict
supply chain parties’ behaviors. For this reason, retailers often try differentcontractual relationships
with their manufacturers.In a traditional supply chain, the products are often sold under wholesale
price contract, where the retailer purchases the product at a wholesale price from the manufacturer
and then sells it to end consumers at a retail price. The wholesale price contract is commonly
observed in practice due to its ease of implementation and administration (El Ouardighi and Kim,
2010). Alternatively, in recent years, with some retailers gradually dominating the supply chain, it
appears another type of contract, that is,the consignment contract, which has been applied in many
retailing industries, is especially popular in online marketplaces. Consignment contract actually
refers to a special contract form in which the retailer promotes a product whose ownership is
retained by the manufacturer to consumers, and no purchase of the product from the manufacturer
C
2017 The Authors.
International Transactionsin Operational Research C
2017 International Federation ofOperational Research Societies
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA02148,
USA.
1978 F. Lu et al. / Intl. Trans.in Op. Res. 26 (2019) 1977–2003
takes place. Moreover, for each unit of the product sold, the retailer deducts a percentage from the
sales revenue (i.e., the retail price) for herself, and remits the remaining share to the manufacturer
at the wholesale price (Hackett, 1993). For example, when manufacturers’ products are sold at
Amazon.com by consignment, Amazon as a retailer will charge a percentage of the retail price as
the commission according to the item’s category, for example, 15% for shoes, 6% for computers,
20% for jewelry, and 8% for electronics and camera and photo items (for more information, please
go to http://www.amazon.com).
Based on the above description of the two contract types, it is obvious thatthere is a fixed relation
between the wholesale and retail prices under consignment contract, that is, the wholesale price is
proportional to the retail price. In contrast, under the traditional wholesale price contract, there
does not exist any compulsory constraint relation between the wholesale and retail prices. In this
case, the consignment contract at first thought does not seem to be effective, and hence has received
relatively little attention from researchers. However, we initially explore it primarily since it has
been observed in practice and is becoming prevalent in industries such as book retailing, mobile
applications, and Internet commerce (Wang et al., 2004; Avinadav et al., 2015a). In this study, the
conclusions of how the wholesale price contract and the consignment contract will perform with
the rational manufacturer and retailer, are quite interesting.
It is noted that in the past two decades, some retailing giants such as Wal-Mart, Best Buy,
Home Depot, Amazon, and Tesco have emerged. They have gradually become powerful retailers
not only because of their ability to offer consumers the unprecedented opportunity for one-stop
shopping and to manufacturers effective promotional services, but also because they are frequently
the largest distributors for manufacturers (Raju and Zhang, 2005). Sales through Wal-Mart, for
instance, account for17% of P&G’s total sales in 2002, 39% of Tandy’s, and a double-digit percentage
for many other large manufacturers (Useem, 2003). As a result, these retailers can be tough and
dominating when dealing with their manufacturers. Business Week reported that “one multinational
supplier . .. says Wal-Mart buyers in Mexico were aggressive and abusive pulling his product off
shelves for several months when he objected to a deep price cut that would have wiped out his
profits” (Smith, 2002). USA Today cites that “Big food companies including Kraft, which gets
10% of its revenue from Wal-Mart, have not been able to raise prices as quickly as they once did
because of Wal-Mart’s demands” (Xue et al., 2014). In this background, we are eager to know how
dominant retailers interact with their manufacturers under traditional wholesale price contractand
consignment contract, and their preferences for these two different types.
Additionally, most retailers face the threat of increased competition from globalization, shorter
product life cycles, and fragmenting mass markets. Survival in this new economic environment
depends on the ability to smoothly deliver the required products to consumers through their mar-
keting decisions. In this case, retailers have to execute advertisements to lure customers and boost
sales. For example, online retailers JD.com and Tmall.com advertise on radio, TV, Web, and direct
mail to alert consumers about new products, promotions, and anniversary sales, or just frequently
display their names to establish a good enterprise image and win the trust and praise of customers.
Other retailers are using different forms of social media to advertise themselves and promote their
business goodwill. For example, American Eagle has Facebook applications, while retailers such
as Wal-Mart and Target have Facebook-sponsored groups; Urban Outfitters has MySpace pages;
Buy.com, Radioshack, and Overstock.com have Youtube/Video podcasts (Ailawadi et al., 2009).
Meanwhile, it should be noted that, for any supply chain, the advertising strategy is not static but
C
2017 The Authors.
International Transactionsin Operational Research C
2017 International Federation ofOperational Research Societies

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