The war on energy: why the United States and the international community need cohesive energy infrastructure security policy.

• Author: Leibert, Richard A.

1. INTRODUCTION II. THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE A. The Past and Present 1. Colombia's Fight to Save a Pipeline 2. Creative Energy Terrorism in Chechnya 3. The War ... on Energy Infrastructure ... in Iraq B. The Future ... It's Shocking 1. The Oil Shockwave 2. The NATO Forum on Energy Security Technology III. THE NEED FOR ENERGY SECURITY POLICY A. United States Energy Security Should Not Stop at the Coastline: Congress Should Model Federal Energy Security Legislation After The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 1. Layers of Security Plans 2. Regulating Security 3. Federal Energy Security Guards B. The International Need for Effective Energy Security: The United Nations' Next Big Initiative? 1. Resolution 1373 and the Counter-Terrorism Committee 2. The IAEA and International Nuclear Energy Security 3. The IMO and International Maritime Security 4. NATO Initiative in International Energy Security IV. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION

   There is little debate that since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorism has been a significant topic of U.S. legislation. (1) Moreover, the local gas station marquee demonstrates the impact catastrophic events affecting energy facilities have on the American pocketbook. (2) Legislators and experts recognize, however, that natural disasters are not the sole cause of the spike in energy prices. (3) The importance of securing energy assets from terrorism is gaining both domestic and international recognition. (4) Legislators and experts have recently gone before the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation to discuss the topic of energy security. (5) The international community is also turning its focus to the security of energy infrastructure. (6)

   The purpose of this Comment is to suggest the need for specific domestic and international legislation that would ensure the security of energy infrastructure. This issue has particular relevance given the lack of clearly unified energy security legislation in the United States and the conspicuous silence of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 regarding the security of non-nuclear energy infrastructure. (7) The topic of energy security has further significance internationally because energy assets worldwide have been terrorist targets in the past and there is indication they will continue to be in the future. (8) Furthermore, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is becoming increasingly interested in the issue of energy security, (9) which may help pave the way for United Nations energy security guidelines.

   The first section of this Comment is a historical analysis of terrorist attacks on international energy assets and the measures nations have taken in response. This Comment will not address issues regarding the jurisdictional authority of nations to protect their energy assets abroad, though it will discuss the lengths to which some nations have gone to do so. Additionally, this Part will include a survey of the evidence indicating the intention of terrorist organizations to continue to target energy assets worldwide. This Part will also highlight a recent study called Oil Shockwave. This study primarily called attention to U.S. dependence on oil by playing out fictionalized scenarios such as terrorist attacks on energy facilities. (10)

   The primary analysis of this Comment focuses on the need for clear domestic and international energy security legislation. This Comment discusses the U.S. enactment of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and determines that it could serve as model legislation for federal energy infrastructure security policy. Moreover, this Comment suggests the need for United Nations involvement in the development of international energy asset security guidelines. This Comment focuses on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) efforts in securing nuclear energy sources and the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) role in developing an international framework for maritime security. Finally, this Comment discusses NATO's current focus on energy security (11) and suggests that the United Nations needs to take more initiative in this arena.

2. THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

   1. The Past and Present

      History suggests that energy infrastructure is a preferred target for terrorist organizations worldwide. (12) The insurgency in Iraq is strong evidence of this argument, (13) but energy terrorism has not been isolated to the Middle East. (14) Moreover, national responses to these attacks have been varied. (15)

      1. Colombia's Fight to Save a Pipeline

         Colombia is a leading example of a nation plagued by terrorist destruction of energy assets. Occidental Petroleum discovered oil in Colombia in the early 1980s and began the Cano Limon oilfield. (16) The two major Colombian terrorist organizations, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have targeted Occidental's pipelines extending from the Cano Limon Oilfield since its inception. (17) The terrorist groups treated bombing the pipeline as a fundraising activity, allowing them to extort money from Occidental and its subcontractors. (18) In the late 1990s, the attacks on the pipeline greatly increased, and between February and May 2001, Occidental pumped oil for a total of only thirty hours. (19) The attacks on the Cano Limon pipeline became so numerous it earned the moniker of "the flute." (20)

         Occidental leadership grew weary of the constant pipeline repairs, and in May 2001, threatened to shut down operations entirely. (21) The Colombian government quickly responded to Occidental's announcement. (22) On the same day as Occidental's meeting with Colombian officials, Colombia's head of paramilitary forces reported they would meet the terrorists head on. (23) Though the Colombian ambassador to Washington denied any connection between Occidental's announcement and the paramilitary leader's declaration, the Colombian government also dispatched troops to the embattled region. (24) Additionally, the Colombian government commissioned a team of special prosecutors in its crackdown on the terrorist groups. (25) Occidental helped to fund this team, adding to the dollars it was already paying for the Colombian military's efforts in security. (26)

         Later that same year, on September 11th, the United States was attacked by terrorists. (27) This event sparked the United States to rethink its aid policies towards Colombia, which had largely been directed at the drug trade. (28) The U.S. administration drew up a plan, with a $98 million budget request for Congress, to deploy U.S. Special Forces soldiers to Colombia to train local military in pipeline security operations. (29)

         The success of the joint Colombia-U.S. initiative against the terrorist groups is debatable, but in December 2001, Occidental reported only one attack on its pipeline. (30) Furthermore, studies show that attacks against oil assets in Colombia declined by fourteen percent since the inception of the Colombian energy infrastructure security plan. (31) Additionally, Colombia's state oil company expects production to rise from 292,000 to 400,000 barrels per day by 2010. (32)

      2. Creative Energy Terrorism in Chechnya

         Russia is the world's second largest exporter of oil. Its energy infrastructure has also been the target of terrorism. (33) Chechen terrorists have targeted pipelines in Dagestan, Moscow, and other regions in Russia. (34) The Chechen separatists have been creative with their energy terrorism; they have not been content to merely destroy energy infrastructures. (35) The Russian Interior Ministry has reported that "criminal gangs" pilfer and sell approximately one third of the oil produced in Chechnya to fund future terrorist activities. (36) Russian authorities have responded by closing down illegal refineries and detaining illegal holding tanks. (37)

      3. The War ... on Energy Infrastructure ... in Iraq

         The insurgency currently underway in Iraq is perhaps the starkest example of the desire of terrorist groups to target energy infrastructure. (38) Nearly 300 attacks on pipelines have occurred in Iraq since the end of major combat operations. (39) These attacks occurred all over the country, (40) from the major export artery originating in the northern city of Kirkuk, leading to the Ceyhan terminal in Turkey, (41) to the major oil installations of Basra, which account for more than two-thirds of Iraq's oil production. (42) These attacks have resulted in an estimated $10 billion loss of oil revenues in Iraq, not to mention the heavy toll they have taken on the national rebuilding effort. (43)

         The terrorist attacks on energy assets in Iraq have not been isolated to oil pipelines. (44) Terrorists have bombed pumping stations, launched mortar rounds at natural gas tanks, fired rockets into refineries, and navigated bomb-laden boats into the vital Basra terminal. (45) Electricity plants in Iraq have also been targets of terrorist mortar attacks. (46) Furthermore, numerous members of the energy industry have been killed assisting in the rebuilding effort. (47)

         The U.S. administration responded to these attacks. One mission of the U.S. soldiers deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom has been to protect Iraq's oil infrastructure. (48) This military mission included infantry soldiers guarding pipelines, (49) the Army Corps of Engineers working on damaged pipelines, (50) and the U.S. Navy maintaining a presence in the Basra port facility. (51)

         United States forces are not acting alone in protecting Iraqi pipelines. The Iraqi government has deployed local security guards to protect pipelines, (52) many of whom have lost their lives. (53) Moreover, the Iraqi Oil Ministry has recently been developing new pipeline security measures, fencing off 435...