US Fiscal Policy and Asset Prices: The Role of Partisan Conflict

AuthorStephen M. Miller,Chi Keung Marco Lau,Rangan Gupta,Mark E. Wohar
Date01 December 2019
Published date01 December 2019
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12188
US Fiscal Policy and Asset Prices:
The Role of Partisan Conict*
RANGAN GUPTA
,CHI KEUNG MARCO LAU
,STEPHEN M. MILLER
§
AND
MARK E. WOHAR
,k
Department of Economics, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
Department of Accountancy, Finance and Economics, Hudderseld Business School,
University of Hudderseld, Queensgate, Hudderseld, UK
§
Department of Economics, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Las Vegas, NV
College of Business Administration, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha,
NE and
k
School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Leicestershire, UK
ABSTRACT
Fiscal policy shocks exert wide-reaching effects, including movements in
asset markets. US politics have been characterized historically by a high
degree of partisan conict. The combination of increasing polarization and
divided government leads not only to signicant Congressional gridlock, but
also to spells of high scal policy uncertainty. This paper adds to the litera-
ture on the relationships between scal policy and asset prices in the US
economy conditional on the degree of partisan conict. We analyze whether
a higher degree of partisan conict (legislative gridlock) reduces the efcacy
of the effect and response of scal policy on and to asset price movements,
respectively. We nd that partisan conict does not signicantly affect the
relationships between the scal surplus to gross domestic product (GDP) and
housing and equity returns. Rather, if important, partisan conict affects the
actual implementation of scal policy actions.
JEL Codes: C32; E62; G10; H30; R30
Accepted: 22 February 2018
I. INTRODUCTION
Fiscal policy shocks exert wide-reaching effects, including movements in asset
markets (e.g., Blanchard and Perotti 2002; Mountford and Uhlig 2009; Ramey
2011a, 2011b; Ellahie and Ricco 2017; Mertens and Ravn 2014; Ricco 2015;
Linnemann and Winkler 2016). These studies concur that scal policy does
exert signicant effects on the real economy, but the scal multiplier fell in
magnitude after 1980.
* We would like to thank an anonymous referee for many helpful comments. Any remaining
errors, however, are solely ours.
© 2018 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2018
International Review of Finance, 19:4, 2019: pp. 851862
DOI: 10.1111/ir.12188

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