Trinidad and Tobago, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Roodal v. The State [2003] UKPC 78 (20 November 2003); 16 BHRC 147; [2004] 2 WLR 652; [2005] 1 AC 328

• Jurisdiction: Trinidad & Tobago
• Subject Matter: Mandatory death penalty,Fixed penalty,Interpretation Act,Separation of powers

1. Identification of the Sentence

Trinidad and Tobago, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Roodal v. The State [2003] UKPC 78 (20

November 2003); 16 BHRC 147; [2004] 2 WLR 652; [2005] 1 AC 328.

2. Abstract

The appellant was convicted for murder and sentenced to the mandatory death penalty. He argued that the death

penalty was no longer mandatory because the Interpretation Act allowed it to instead to be the highest but not the

only penalty a judge could impose. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the Interpretation Act

allowed for the death penalty to be the maximum penalty and that the trial judge had the discretion to apply sentences

such as life imprisonment which were less than the death penalty. They also held that the law should be modified

using the Interpretation Act so that the alternative of imprisonment be read into the Act.

3. Facts

The appellant was convicted for murder in July 1999 and sentenced to mandatory death under section 4 of the 1925

Offences Against the Person Act. Under that act, every person convicted of murder was to be sentenced to death

under what has been referred to as the mandatory death penalty. The appellant first attempted a series of appeals

against his conviction but those were dismissed by both the Court of Appeal and the Judicial Committee of the Privy

Council (JCPC). He then appealed his death sentence.

The JCPC remitted the matter to the Court of Appeal to reconsider the sentence given to the appellant but the Chief

Justice, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the sentence and

affirmed the mandatory death penalty imposed on him. The appellant then appealed the decision to the JCPC to

determine whether the penalty for murder was a mandatory or a discretionary death sentence.

The majority of the JCPC held that the death sentence was no longer mandatory in Trinidad and Tobago. They held

that the Interpretation Act allowed for the death penalty to be the maximum penalty and that the trial judge had the

discretion to apply sentences such as life imprisonment which were less than the death penalty. They also held that

section 4 of the 1925 Offences Against the Person Act should be modified using section 68 of the Interpretation Act

so that the alternative of imprisonment could be read into the Act. The JCPC majority therefore held that the

mandatory death sentence imposed on the appellant was to be quashed and the trial judge was to once again decide

the appellants sentence now that imprisonment was now an option provided.

4. Decision

The issues before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) were i) whether in light of section 68 of the

Interpretation Act 1962, section 4 of the 1925 Offences against the Person Act meant that the mandatory death

penalty was to be understood as the maximum penalty and not the only possible penalty; ii) whether section 4 of the

1925 Act required modification to allow for a discretionary sentence of death in order to have it conform with the

1976 Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago; and iii) whether the imposition of a mandatory death

sentence violated the constitutional principle of the separation of powers.

On the first issue concerning the status of the mandatory death penalty as a mere maximum penalty, the majority

of the JCPC held that section 68 of the Interpretation Act allowed for the death penalty to be the maximum penalty

and for the trial judge to have the discretion to apply the final sentence. Section 68 of the Interpretation Act outlined

that, where an Act gave a fixed penalty, the fixed penalty was to be understood as the maximum that could be given.

The JCPC majority considered that murder covered a wide spectrum of cases and, as such, discretion on sentencing

was needed.

On the second issue concerning whether section 4 of the 1925 Offences Against the Person Act should be modified

in order to allow it to conform with the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution, the JCPC majority held that it should.

They held that section 4 of the Act which stated that the death sentence was mandatory if a person was convicted for

murder should now be interpreted as providing a discretionary life sentence. The JCPC majority held that, based on

the world today and in light of the Constitution as well as domestic and international laws, section 68 of the

Interpretation Act altered the mandatory death penalty and provided the obvious alternative of imprisonment. No

other modification was required to section 4 of the 1925 Act.

Concerning the final issue of the separation of powers, the JCPC majority held that, given its conclusions on the

first and second issues, it was unnecessary to consider the argument concerning the separation of powers.

Based on the above, the JCPC majority held that the Interpretation Act allowed for the death penalty to be the

maximum penalty and that the trial judge had the discretion to apply sentences such as life imprisonment which were

less than the death penalty. They also held that section 4 of the 1925 Offences Against the Person Act should be

modified using section 68 of the Interpretation Act and that the alternative of imprisonment be read into the Act. The

JCPC majority therefore held that the mandatory death sentence imposed on the appellant was to be quashed and the

trial judge was to once again decide the appellants sentence now that imprisonment was now an option provided.

5. Dissenting Judgment of Lord Millett and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry

The minority held that section 68(2) of the Interpretation Act which spoke of a fixed penalty did not and had never

been intended to apply to the death penalty and was therefore inapplicable. They considered that, since no other

penalty had been provided by section 4 of the Offences Against the Person Act, the Interpretation Act could provide

no assistance. The purpose of the Interpretation Act was to help explain the written words and so where no words

existed that allowed for a discretion, none could be created. The implication of the Interpretation Act making the

death penalty discretionary would be that the public, the legal profession, the courts, and the legislature of Trinidad

and Tobago had all acted under the mistaken belief that the death penalty was mandatory and that made little sense

if something as serious as the mandatory death penalty had changed status. The minority saw the interpretation

favoured by the majority as not only untenable but liable to subvert the operation of the Constitution. They therefore

held that the appeal be dismissed.

6. Jurisprudence

 United Kingdom, House of Lords, R v Powell (Anthony) [1999] 1 AC 1

 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin Et Al v Trinidad and Tobago,

Judgment of June 21, 2002

 United Kingdom, House of Lords, R v Ireland [1998] AC 147

 United Kingdom, House of Lords, Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-

Aschaffenburg A G [1975] AC 591

 Belize, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Reyes v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 235

 Trinidad and Tobago, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, de Freitas v Benny [1976] AC 239

 Canada, Supreme Court, Schachter v Canada [1992] 2 SCR 679

 New Zealand, Court of Appeal, Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9

 South Africa, Constitutional Court, S v Manamela [2000] 3 SA l; 2000(5) BCLR 491

 The Bahamas, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC

319

 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution No. 3/87, Roach and Pinkerton v United

States (22 September 1987)

 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, OC 10/89, dated 14 July 1989, given at the

request of the Government of Colombia

 St. Lucia, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, R v Hughes [2002] UKPC 12; [2002] 2 AC 259

 United Kingdom, Chancery Division, Bennett v Chappell [1966] Ch 391

 United Kingdom, House of Lords, Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of

Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800

 United Kingdom, House of Lords, R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL

13; [2003] 2 WLR 692

 United Kingdom, House of Lords, R v Ireland [1998] AC 147

 United Kingdom, House of Lords, Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [2001] 1 AC 27

 United Kingdom, House of Lords, R v Powell [1999] 1 AC 1

 Jamaica, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Hinds v The Queen [1977] AC 195

 Canada, Supreme Court, R v Drybones [1970] SCR 282

 Jamaica, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Director of Public Prosecutions v Nasralla [1967] 2

AC 238

 Trinidad and Tobago, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Maharaj v Attorney General of Trinidad

and Tobago (No 2) [1979] AC 385

 The Bahamas, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Pinder v The Queen [2002] UKPC 46; [2003] 1

AC 620

 Jamaica, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica v

Mollison [2003] UKPC 6; [2003] 2 WLR 1160

 The Federation of Malaya, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Kanda v Government of the

Federation of Malaya [1962] AC 322

 St. Kitts and Nevis, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Browne v The Queen [2000] 1 AC 45

 St. Lucia, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, R v Hughes [2002] UKPC 12; [2002] 2 AC 259

 St. Kitts and Nevis, Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Fox v The Queen [2002] 2 AC 284

 St Christopher, Nevis, and Anguilla, West Indies Associated States Supreme Court, Attorney-General

of St Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla v Reynolds [1980] AC 637

 South Africa, Constitutional Court, State v Manamela [2000] (3) SA 1

 Ireland, Supreme Court, Deaton v Attorney-General and the Revenue Commissioners [1963] IR 170

7. Key words

 Mandatory death penalty

 Fixed penalty

 Interpretation Act

 Separation of powers