Transit migration

• Author: Slobodan Djajić
• Published date: 01 November 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12294
• Date: 01 November 2017

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Transit migration

Slobodan Djajić

The Graduate Institute of International

and Development Studies, Geneva,

Switzerland

Correspondence

The Graduate Institute of International

and Development Studies, 11A Avenue

de la Paix, CH-1211 Geneva,

Switzerland.

Email: slobodandjajic@yahoo.com

Abstract

Unauthorized international migration to the advanced coun-

tries has become increasingly more costly and indirect. The

hazardous land and sea routes that pass through one or more

transit countries offer liquidity-constrained individuals an

opportunity to economize on the pecuniary cost of migration

as well as to work along the way to pay for the next leg of

the journey. This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of

transit migrants and examines its implications for the effec-

tiveness of immigration control measures of the transit and

final-destination countries in deterring unauthorized migra-

tion. Strengthening of border controls at the final destination

is shown to increase the relative effectiveness of internal

enforcement measures of the transit countries, while tougher

internal enforcement in the transit countries increases the rel-

ative effectiveness of border controls at the final destination.

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INTRODUCTION

Restrictions on labor mobility from the developing to the advanced countries have limited the opportu-

nities for documented international migration of low-skilled workers. One of the consequences is that

unauthorized immigration is becoming increasingly important, with services of human smuggling

organizations playing an ever more prominent role in the migration process (see, e.g., Interpol, 2010).

Along with these services come the high smuggling fees. For many of the potential migrants from the

developing economies, the fees can be far higher than their asset holdings and even exceed an entire

lifetime’s savings at home. Human smuggling fees vary depending on the distance traveled, the mode

of transport, and the degree of complexity of the operation, but have been generally increasing with the

steady rise in border-control spending on the part of destination countries.

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For both economic

migrants and asylum seekers who lack liquid assets and/or access to credit, an increasingly popular

way of reaching the desired destination involves multistage migration through one or more transit

countries (see, e.g., Djajić& Michael, 2014; Grabska, 2006; Jakobsen, 2005). The purpose of the pres-

ent study is to analyze the behavior of transit migrants and its implications for the effectiveness of

immigration policies of a final-destination country.

Transit migration can be defined as migration to “...one country with the intention of seeking the

possibility there to emigrate to another country as the country of final destination, by means that are

Rev Int Econ. 2017;25:1017 –1045. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/roie V

C2017 JohnWiley & Sons Ltd

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Received: 14 October 2015

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Revised: 10 March 2017

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Accepted: 24 March 2017

DOI: 10.1111/roie.12294

partially, if not fully, illegal”(Papadopolou, 2005, p. 4). Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania are

examples of transit countries, used as stepping stones by migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa trying to

reach Western Europe. According to the Council of Europe (2008), estimates of the number of people

passing through their territory on the way to the European Union have risen to at least 100,000 per

year. Before joining the European Union, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary were the major

transit states for migrants coming from the east. At the same time, Turkey and, more recently, Moldova

and Ukraine, have become key transit countries for migrants from Asia and the Middle East on the

way to the European Union.

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In the Western Hemisphere, Mexico and the countries in Central America

are witnessing increasing volumes of transit migration to the United States. It is reported by the Mexi-

can National Institute of Migration that some 400,000 people cross Mexico’s southern border illeg ally

every year and that around 150,000 of them aim to go eventually to the United States (Gorney, 2008).

The choice of land routes through transit countries is not only the cheapest undocumented means

of getting to the final destination, but it also allows a migrant to work and accumulate savings at vari-

ous points along the way to pay for the next leg of the journey. In North Africa, for example, there are

large gaps between the per-capita gross domestic products (GDPs) of some of the key transit countries

such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, and those of their neighbors to the south.

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These per-capita GDP

differentials suggest that the funds needed to pay for the last, most expensive leg of the journey, which

involves crossing the sea to reach a final-destination country, can be accumulated more quickly by

working in a transit country than in the migrant’s country of origin. As in the advanced economies, cer-

tain sectors of transit countries, such as construction, agriculture and household services, exhibit a

strong demand for immigrant labor, including undocumented workers.

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A“transit-migrat ion”strategy

thus has the appeal of providing potential migrants the most affordable way of getting to the final desti-

nation as well as the possibility of earning a wage in transit that is often significantly higher than the

wage back home.

Although transit migration has become an important mode of international labor mobility in the

21st century, in the large theoretical literature on unauthorized immigration,

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there is not a single study

that applies economic analysis to the behavior of individuals who choose transit migration as their opti-

mal strategy. My objective here is to try and fill some of the existing gaps in the literature by address-

ing two related issues. First, to model the behavior of transit migrants and examine their response to

changes in the conditions they face at home, in transit, and at the final destination. The questions that

emerge in this context include the following:

(1) Under what conditions does it pay to become a transit migrant?

(2) What is the role of wages at home, in transit, and at the final destination in influencing a

migrant’s saving behavior and the optimal duration of stay in each location?

(3) How is the optimal migration strategy shaped by migration costs atvarious points along the jour-

ney and the difficulties anticipated in transit?

Answers to these questions set the stage for the second part of the paper that addresses policy issues.

In this context the focus is on how the various instruments of immigration control interact with market

conditions in influencing migration decisions. Of key interest is the question of relative effectiveness

of border controls and internal enforcement measures at various stages of the migration process in

terms of their capacity to deter unauthorized migration. Increasing the cost of migration by tightening

border controls between origin and transit countries is shown to be more effective than doing the same

between the transit and final-destination countries. Stricter internal enforcement measures are also

found to be relatively more effective when applied in the transit countries than they are when applied

at the final destination. Moreover, strengthening of border controls at the final destination is shown to

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