Transcript: preparing for the mother of all trials and lessons learned from Dujayl.

• Author: Hodgkinson, Sandra
• Position: Symposium: 'Lessons from the Saddam Trial'

MS. HODGKINSON: Good morning and welcome. I am currently the Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues at the U.S. State Department, the Honorable John Clint Williamson. From 2003 to 2004, during the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), I was the Senior Advisor for Human Rights and I also served as Director of the Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice in Baghdad, which supported Iraq's efforts to establish the Iraqi Special Tribunal, now known as the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT).

In the summer and fall of 2003, Ambassador Paul Bremer, then head of the CPA, delegated the authority to draft the statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in CPA Order Number 48. The statute provides for the prosecution and accountability of senior-level former Iraqi regime officials. The offenses include a select few offenses under Iraqi criminal law as well those under international criminal law including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Several members of my office--including representatives from the United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, and the Czech Republic--supported Iraqi efforts to draft the statute by providing appropriate technical and practical expertise. On December 10, 2003, days prior to Saddam Hussein's capture, the statute became law and the tribunal was born. Two years later, in late 2005, the newly formed Iraqi National Assembly endorsed the court's statute with only a few revisions and renamed it the Iraqi High Tribunal. Throughout the process, the Iraqis were unified in wanting the court to be seated in Iraq and for trials to be conducted in Arabic by Iraqi judges. They requested international support in undertaking this process but made it clear that they did not want their court to be run by international actors outside the country. They sought control of the process from start to finish. It is U.S. policy to support domestic war crimes tribunals when the local government is willing and able to carry out justice. In Iraq's case, the Iraqis were clearly willing and, with some additional legal assistance and support, we believed that the Iraqi judges were fully capable to conduct such trials. After all, Iraq is where the Hammurabi Code was written, the University of Baghdad Law School is a well-recognized legal institute, and throughout its history Iraq has boasted strong legal values and developed a qualified cadre of legal professionals. It is unfortunate, however, that during the reign of Saddam Hussein, many of these qualified legal professional were manipulated by the government.

Localized justice often sends a powerful message to local populations and to the broader international community that impunity for mass atrocities will not be tolerated by civilized societies. It also can assist in deterring would-be dictators. In Iraq, the development of the IHT is one of the ways in which the Iraqi people are demonstrating that rule of law is returning to Iraq and its people.

There are also cost factors to consider. A decision by the Iraqis to hold trials outside of Iraq would have increased the tribuhal's costs exponentially, which is a factor for the Iraqi government and donor nations to consider. I would like to applaud the hard work and dedication of so many brave Iraqis in pushing the IHT to succeed, especially when so many faced personal, familial, and national suffering under Saddam's brutal regime.

As I mentioned, my office in the CPA supported Iraqi efforts to deal with the broader issues of human rights and transitional justice in Iraq. This meant that the IHT was only one part, albeit a major part, of a much larger transitional justice system. The need for a holistic approach encompassing many truth-revealing mechanisms was discussed early on by the Iraqi people and ultimately holds the path forward. The IHT, however, was envisioned to prosecute roughly twenty of the most serious regime offenders. The remaining accused, typically lower-level officials, could be tried in local courts. The issue of how many individuals should be prosecuted in the IHT continues to provoke debate as some Iraqis would prefer that more lower-level officials be tried before the IHT. Others may prefer truth and reconciliation. However the Iraqis choose to move forward, it will be important...