Tracking Banks’ Systemic Importance Before and After the Crisis

Published date01 June 2015
AuthorPiergiorgio Alessandri,Andrea Zaghini,Sergio Masciantonio
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/infi.12068
Date01 June 2015
Tracking BanksSystemic
Importance Before and After the
Crisis
Piergiorgio Alessandri, Sergio Masciantonio
and Andrea Zaghini
Banca dItalia, Rome, Italy.
Abstract
We develop a methodology to identify and rank systemically important
nancial institutions(SIFIs). Our approach is free of discretion and
based entirely on publicly available data, thus lling the gap between
the judgment of the regulator and the views that market participants
may form with their own information. We apply the methodology to
three samples of banks (global, EU and euro area) for the years 2007
2012 and nd that both the nature of systemic importance and its
geographical distribution have changed signicantly over time, with a
shift from advanced western economies towards emerging markets,
particular ly China. Moreover, a distinc tive consequence of the crisis is
theproliferationofSIFIsthatareatthesametimecomplexandpoorly
substitutable, a combination that seemed relatively rare at the onset of
the crisis and might not be entirely consistent with regulatory aspira-
tions for a less risky nancial framework.
The authors would like to thank Olivier de B andt, Giorgio Gobbi, G iuseppe Grande and Stefa no
Siviero for helpful discussions an d suggestions. An earl ier version of the paper was c irculated under
the title Everything you always wanted to know about systemic importance (but were afraid to ask).
The views expressed do n ot necessarily reect those of the Bank of Italy.
International Finance 18:2, 2015: pp. 157186
DOI: 10.1111/infi.12068
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
I. Introduction
The term systemic importanceentered the economic le xicon only recently. It was
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 that showed how the failure of a single
nancial institution one that is not n ecessarily large but deeply interconnec ted
could endanger nancial stability worldwide. While the too big to failprob lem had
already been identied by both academics and regulators, the issue of effect ively
dening, measuring a nd modelling system ic importance gaine d attention only after
the crisis erupted.
The methodolog y proposed by the Ba sel Committee on Bank ing Supervisi on
(BCBS 2011, 2013) to identify global systematically important nancial inst itutions
(G-SIFIs) carries important practical implications because all banks identied as G-
SIFIs will be subject to cap ital surcharges and en hanced prudential supe rvision
starting in 2019, in an effort to make the default of a system ically important
nancial insti tution less likely. Effective regulati on requires that banks and ma rket
participants h ave a good understan ding of its procedures. T he proposed BCBS
methodolog y, however, is insufciently transparent; it cannot be replicated owing
to its reliance on unreleased sup ervisory d ata, supervi sorssubjective discreti on and
important undisc losed procedural det ails.
To overcome these aws, we con struct a systemic i mportance (SI) inde x using a
non-discretionar y procedure, and base d exclusively on public data. We therefore
provide a methodolo gy by which mar ket participa nts can directly asse ss banks
systemic importa nce in a way th at is consiste nt and directly comp arable with th e
nancial stabi lity board (F SB) assessment. Our index e xtends that of Mas ciantonio
(2013), who implements the BCBS procedure using only publicly available data, and
whose results closely resemble the ofcial set of G-SIFIs for 2010 and 2011.
Building on this methodological contribution, we then study how systemic
importance varied between 2007 and 2012. The comparis on of pre- and post- crisis
data integrates the (l imited) informat ion disclosed by the FSB, which covers only
2010, 2011 and 2012. Our sample includes large banks, and we examine separately
global, European and e uro-area institut ions. Measuring system ic importance wit hin
specic regions as well as g lobally is importa nt for at least two reasons. First, bank s
may have a signicant i mpact on their national na ncial system even if they are not
systemically impor tant globally, and domest ic regulators have an obvious interest in
monitoring systemic impor tance at that level. Secon d, bank failures may cause
cross-border spillovers that create internat ional problems, and the l ine between
domestic and global importance is quite thin, particularly when dealing with large
economic areas like the EU (BCBS 2012; EBA 2014). Our results suggest that both
the nature and the geog raphic distribution of systemic i mportance change d signi-
cantly after the c risis: systemic i mportance has shif ted from developed to emergi ng
markets, particularly China, and the most important determinant of systemic
importance has become complexit y, instead of size.
158 Piergiorgio Alessandri et al.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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