Time for the Creation of a Standing U.N. Armed Peace Service and the Potential Employment of Experienced U.S. Veterans as a Significant Component of Such a Force

AuthorRonald Sievert
PositionProfessor of National Security and International Law, George H.W. Bush School of Government and University of Texas School of Law, J.D. University of Texas 1977. The author would like to thank graduate assistant Emiley Pagrabs, Master's in International Affairs Bush School 2018, for her research and editorial assistance in support of this article.
Pages111-130
Time for the Creation of a Standing U.N. Armed
Peace Service and the Potential Employment of
Experienced U.S. Veterans as a Significant
Component of Such a Force
R
ONALD
S
IEVERT
*
We must make sure that its work is fruitful, that it is a reality and not a sham,
that it is a force for action, and not merely a frothing of words . . . .
1
Winston Churchill, speaking of the U.N. Fulton, Missouri 1946
I. History
Since its inception, the founders of the United Nations (U.N.) envisioned
agreements among nations that would establish a responsive, proactive
military force that could take action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
“as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”
2
But the Cold War immediately intervened, and when the
Military Staff Committee established by the Charter
3
first met in 1946, it
found significant disagreements among the permanent five members of the
Security Council as to the size, composition, and basing of such a force.
4
Then U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie proposed, in succession, a U.N.
Guard Force, a U.N. Legion, and a U.N. Volunteer Reserve to at least
maintain peace and perform constabulary functions pursuant to Chapter VI.
5
The U.N. abandoned even these less ambitious plans, however, because the
plans received no support.
6
The United States and USSR were concerned
that a permanent force might act against their interests, especially in the
* Professor of National Security and International Law, George H.W. Bush School of
Government and University of Texas School of Law, J.D. University of Texas 1977. The author
would like to thank graduate assistant Emiley Pagrabs, Master’s in International Affairs Bush
School 2018, for her research and editorial assistance in support of this article.
1. Winston Churchill, Speech in Fulton, Missouri on the UN (Mar. 5, 1946), in M
ARTIN
G
ILBERT
, N
EVER
D
ESPAIR
: W
INSTON
C
HURCHILL
1945-1965, 199 (Heinemann 1988).
2. U.N. Charter art. 42. See Adam Roberts, Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical
History, in T
HE
U
NITED
N
ATIONS
S
ECURITY
C
OUNCIL AND
W
AR
: E
VOLUTION OF
T
HOUGHT
AND
P
RACTICE
S
INCE
1945, 101–102 (Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
3. U.N. Charter art. 47.
4. Roberts, supra note 2, at 100.
5. Dan Hayes Griffith, Improving United Nations Rapid Reaction Capability: is a volunteer
rapid reaction force the answer? 7-8 (2008) (unpublished Honors Thesis, University of Oregon)
(on file with Department of Political Science, University of Oregon).
6. Id. at 8-9.
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
112 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER [VOL. 52, NO. 1
developing Cold War proxy wars between the two superpowers.
7
The U.N.
eventually obtained Security Council authorization to dispatch troops from a
few contributing member states to act as lightly armed truce observers who
would monitor compliance with peace treaties in Palestine, the Sinai,
Kashmir, and Lebanon with the consent of the parties.
8
These troops were
generally under orders never to take the initiative in the use of armed force
and to only act in self-defense.
9
At one point, however, they acted to remove
foreign troops and mercenaries from the Congo.
10
The end of the Cold War reinvigorated the original expectation that the
U.N. should have the ability to quickly field a strong force to maintain peace
and prevent aggression.
11
Between 1988 and 1993, the Security Council
actually sanctioned twelve limited operations in “conflicts that had
[previously] been fueled by Cold War intrigue.”
12
But these operations were
limited in scope, and the U.N. troops were “weak[ ] in the face of violent
harassment . . . [and stymied by] delays in getting states to contribute forces
to . . . urgent [U.N.] mission[s] . . . .”
13
This was painfully obvious in
Cambodia, Angola, Somalia, and, perhaps above all, in the failure to
immediately act during the horribly tragic genocides in Bosnia and
Rwanda.
14
Something had to be done. Sir Brian Urquhart, echoed by the
Netherlands Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo, put forth the strongest
proposals for a standing U.N. Volunteer Military Force.
15
As Urquhart
wrote:
Recent [U.N.] experiences provide a good argument for at least
considering the establishment of an immediately available ´elite [U.N.]
force directly recruited from volunteers worldwide. Hitherto the
Security Council has lacked the capacity to deploy a convincing military
presence at the outset of a crisis before the situation has disintegrated
and become uncontrollable . . . . [This] might give the Security Council
(and the Secretary-General) the capacity to display strength and
determination at a point where larger disasters could be avoided.
16
7. Id. at 7-8.
8. Id. at 6; Finn Seyersted, United Nations Forces Some Legal Problems, 37 B
RIT
. Y. B. I
NT
L
351, 354 (1962).
9. Seyersted, supra note 8, at 399.
10. Id. at 397.
11. Griffith, supra note 5, at 9.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Roberts, supra note 2, at 107.
14. Id. at 107; see also I
N
S
EARCH OF
I
NTERNATIONAL
J
USTICE
(Bullfrog Films 2005); G
HOSTS
OF
R
WANDA
(Frontline 2004).
15. Gordon Wilson, Arm in Arm After the Cold War? The Uneasy NATO-UN Relationship, 2
I
NT
L
P
EACEKEEPING
1, 91-92 (Spring 1995); see also H. P
ETER
L
ANGILLE
, D
EVELOPING A
U
NITED
N
ATIONS
E
MERGENCY
P
EACE
S
ERVICE
55 (Palgrave Macmillan 2016); Roberts, supra
note 2, at 117.
16. Roberts, supra note 2, at 107.
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

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