The Ultimate Force of the Law: On the Essence and Precariousness of the Monopoly on Legitimate Force

Published date01 September 2016
AuthorRalf Poscher
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12131
Date01 September 2016
The Ultimate Force of the Law:
On the Essence and Precariousness
of the Monopoly on Legitimate Force
RALF POSCHER
Abstract. In his new book, Fred Schauer adopts a prototypical approach to the law
in order to reestablish the importance of “The Force of Law”, and I strongly support
his claim that there are interesting things to be said about the relationship between
law and force. One aspect concerns the special kind of force to which the law is
related. In the tradition of political philosophy, this kindof force has often been char-
acterized with the state’s monopoly on legitimate force. Whereas the essay will sup-
port the idea that the law has a monopoly of force, it will challengethe idea that it is
its legitimacy that makes it characteristic. It is a monopoly not so much on legitimate,
but on ultimate force. The robustness of the force the law is—prototypically—related
to, however, should not obscure the fact that the relation between law and force is
quite delicate and precarious. Three strategies of the law to manage this fundamen-
tal precariousnes s are pointed out.
In his recent book, Schauer (2015) adopted a prototypical approach to the law to
reestablish the importance of force for the law, and I strongly support his claim
that there are interesting things to be said about their relationship. He convincingly
made the point that the relations between law and force are not ephemeral. He left
the armchair and tried to back up his claims with empirical research results.
As always, however, this was only possible on the basis of analytical distinctions
between different aspects of obedience to the law, allowing him to isolate the rele-
vant empirical questions. It is only against the background of such analytical work
that empirical research can make sense, and Fred Schauer impressively combines
analytical and empirical aspects in his analysis of the force of the law.
I see my observations not as critical to his endeavor, but rather as complemen-
tary to it, although much more armchair-based and in the form of somewhat anec-
dotal empirical observations. I wish to organize these observations around two
questions regarding the relation between law and force: First, what kind of force is
specific to the law? Second, what characterizes the relation between the law and
this specific kind of force? My observation here is that the relation between law
and force is a precarious one despite the robust character of the force associated
with it.
V
C2016 The Author. Ratio Juris V
C2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main
Street, Malden 02148, USA.
Ratio Juris. Vol. 29 No. 3 September 2016 (311–322)

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT