The Impact of Firm‐Level Illiquidity on Crash Risk and the Role of Media Independence: International Evidence
Date | 01 December 2018 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12162 |
Published date | 01 December 2018 |
The Impact of Firm-Level
Illiquidity on Crash Risk and the
Role of Media Independence:
International Evidence*
ZHE AN
†
,WENLIAN GAO
‡
,DONGHUI LI
§
AND FEIFEI ZHU
¶
†
Monash Business School, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
‡
Brennan School of Business, Dominican University, River Forest, IL
§
Management School, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China and
¶
College of Business and Economics, Radford University, Radford, VA
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the impact of firm-level illiquidity on stock price
crash risk by employing a sample of 21,986 firms across 36 countries span-
ning the years 1997 to 2007. In doing so, the role of media independence in
shaping this impact is also examined. The empirical results suggest that stock
illiquidity is significantly and positively associated with firm-level crash risk.
Furthermore, the positive association between illiquidity and crash risk has
been mitigated in countries with independent media, characterized by a
lower level of state ownership and a higher level of press freedom, in addi-
tion to the reduction effect of media independence per se on crash risk. Our
main conclusions remain valid after taking into account the endogeneity
issues and various robustness tests.
JEL Codes: G12; G15; G28
Accepted: 20 September 2017
I. INTRODUCTION
Stock price crashes are characterized as sudden and dramatic declines in stock
prices in the absence of significant news on the fundamentals. Survey studies
suggest that crashes are ranked as the first-order concern for investors (Olsen
1997; Koonce et al. 2005). Motivated by the model of agency conflicts in Jin
and Myers (2006), recent studies that identify the sources of stock price crash
risk primarily focus on information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders
that are captured by internal factors, such as various accounting
* We thank two anonymousreferees and conference participantsat 2015 FMA European conference,
as well as seminar participants at the Central University of Finance and Economics, and Sun Yat-Sen
University. All errors remain ours. E-mail: zhe.an@monash.edu (Z. An); wgao@dom.edu (W. Gao);
lidonghui@jnu.edu.cn (D. Li); fzhu2@radford.edu (F. Zhu).All correspondence to Donghui Li.
© 2017 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2017
International Review of Finance, 18:4, 2018: pp. 547–593
DOI: 10.1111/irfi.12162
characteristics.
1
However, the role of market microstructure-based information
asymmetry has been largely ignored. This is surprising as “market microstruc-
ture measures of information asymmetry are designed to capture adverse selec-
tion between a larger category of agents (informed traders) and the rest of the
market (uninformed traders) ...... Therefore, market microstructure measures of
information asymmetry are (imperfect) proxies for the financial markets’per-
ception of the information advantage held by firm insiders and the resulting
adverse selection costs”(Bharath et al. 2009, p. 3213). Thus, the information
advantage held by firm insiders prevents the full incorporation of information
in stock prices and should contribute to the occurrence of firm-specific crash
risk. This paper attempts to fill the gap by investigating the impact of market
microstructure-based information asymmetry on the crash risk of individ-
ual firms.
Drawn on the existing literature, we employ various illiquidity measures to
proxy for market-based information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders
(Amihud 2002; Bharath et al. 2009; Armstrong et al. 2010). Illiquidity can slow
the price discovery process and thus slow price adjustments (Bali et al. 2014).
As a consequence, the lack of full incorporation of information in stock prices
implies that the stock prices are distorted and biased. If the negative informa-
tion, as a subset of the full information set, is deliberately hidden from the mar-
ket by firm insiders, it is not easily detected in a market with limited investor
attention and illiquidity (Peng and Xiong 2006; Bali et al. 2014). When the
accumulation of negative information is beyond a certain threshold, the bubble
of overvalued stock prices will burst and a sudden stock price crash will happen.
It has been suggested that illiquidity plays a significant role in causing crashes
in many international financial markets (CGFS 1999), evidenced by the delayed
and costly capital movements even in the presence of buying opportunities
post a crash. As cited in both Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Huang and
Wang (2009), a vivid example of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998
showed the influence of illiquidity on stock price crashes. This highly levered
hedge fund suffered from the liquidity deterioration due to the Russian debt cri-
sis. It had to go through liquidation to meet margin calls, which further low-
ered its portfolio value with high liquidity sensitivity. As argued by Grossman
and Miller (1988), the limited liquidity availability associated with large trading
pressure could lead to significant price shifts. Huang and Wang (2009) modeled
that, when market presence is costly, the need for liquidity could arise endoge-
nously due to infrequent trading and cause large selling pressure and price
drops.
The second question to be investigated by this study is to identify what fac-
tors contribute to the differences in the positive association between illiquidity
1 See Jin and Myers (2006) for firm opaqueness; Hutton et al. (2009) for earnings management;
Kim et al. (2011a) for corporate tax avoidance; Kim et al. (2011b) for CFO option sensitivity;
Callen and Fang (2013) for institutional ownership; DeFond et al. (2014) for mandatory Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption; Andreou et al. (2016) for ownership
structure and CEO incentives; Kim and Zhang (2016) for conservatism in financial reporting.
© 2017 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2017548
International Review of Finance
and crash risks across countries. It has been well documented that institutional
infrastructures vary significantly across countries and their importance has been
highlighted in asset pricing and firm valuation. Therefore, we conjecture that
the effect of stock illiquidity on firm-specific crash risk could be shaped by insti-
tutional features. Specifically, we propose that media independence can play a
significant role in explaining the variations in the association between illiquid-
ity and firm-level crash risk across countries. Independent media without gov-
ernment involvement is probably one of the most effective institutions to
ensure timely release of unbiased and accurate information to the public and
uncover corporate wrongdoings.
2
Bushman and Smith (2001) and Bushman
et al. (2004) argued that firm information flow is impeded without a well-
developed communication infrastructure. Some legendary episodes such as the
exposure of Enron’s accounting irregularities and WorldCom accounting fraud
buttress the view that the press can make a difference. Therefore, well-
developed media channels should be able to help reduce information costs, the
market friction identified in Merton (1987)’s pricing model, and promote mar-
ket efficiency. According to Huang and Wang (2009), with reduced information
costs, investors’market presence will be less costly and the endogenously arisen
liquidity needs will be lowered. As a result, the occurrence of stock price
crashes, which arises from order imbalances in the form of excess supply, will
be less likely.
Accordingly, our empirical tests proceed in the following two steps. We first
investigate the impact of illiquidity on individual stock’s crash risk on our wide
sample of international stocks. We adopt yearly quoted relative spread, effective
spread, Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, and zero-return proportion, together with
their principle components as our primary illiquidity measures. Results show
that all these four illiquidity measures as well as their principle components are
significantly and positively associated with future crash risk. This finding is
robust to the use of various crash-risk measures, that is, negative conditional
return skewness, down-to-up volatility, and the likelihood of crashes. We
attempt several ways to mitigate the concerns over simultaneous determination
and reverse causality between stock illiquidity and crash risk, including employ-
ing an exogenous event—the passage of IFRS in different countries and two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. Our results continue to hold after addres-
sing the endogeneity issue. We also perform a few robustness tests, taking
account the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), American Depositary Receipts (ADRs),
different time periods, and the exclusion of dominant countries. The main con-
clusion remains valid.
We next turn to examine how the positive association between stock illi-
quidity and firm-specific crash risk is affected by media independence across
2 For example, Chen et al. (2013) found that, by discovering and disseminating information,
mass media facilitates public monitoring and enhance audit quality. Dyck et al. (2010) docu-
mented that, due to reputational incentives, journalists play a key role in bringing the fraud
to light.
© 2017 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2017 549
Firm-Level Illiquidity and Crash Risk
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