The Impact of Financing Constraints and Agency Costs on Corporate R&D Investment: Evidence from China
Author | Shengqiang Liu,Z. Jun Lin,Fangcheng Sun |
Published date | 01 March 2017 |
Date | 01 March 2017 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12108 |
The Impact of Financing Constraints
and Agency Costs on Corporate R&D
Investment: Evidence from China*
Z. JUN LIN
†
,SHENGQIANG LIU
‡
AND FANGCHENG SUN
‡
†
School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau, China and
‡
Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing, China
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the association between financing constraints/agency
problem (agency costs) and corporate R&D investment in China by using
the two-tier stochastic frontier model initially developed by Kumbhakar and
Parmeter (2009) in light of the Euler equation analysis framework. The results
show that there is a significantly negative association between financing con-
straints and firms’R&D investments and a significantly positive relationship
between agency costs and R&D investments. Thus, financing constraints lead
to R&D underinvestment, while agency costs cause R&D overinvestment by
the sample firms. However, government subsidies have a positive moderating
effect on the relationships. The impact of financing constraints and agency
costs on R&D investment varies slightly by firms in different geographical
regions, industries, business ownerships, and years.
JEL Codes: G31; M21; O32; M48
I. INTRODUCTION
In pace with the rapid progress of knowledge economy and the acceleration of
global economic integration, the importance of innovation for a firm or a
country has been overwhelmingly recognized (Aboody and Lev 2000; Coad
and Rao 2008; Aw et al. 2009; Brown et al. 2012; Barge-Gil and López 2014). As
a direct impeller to innovation and technology upgrading at firm level, research
and development (referred as R&D thereafter) investment is an important strate-
gic decision that determines a firm’s ability for survival and growth. Gordon and
Griliches (1997) contend that all production efficiency improvements, if being
properly measured, can be attributed to R&D investment. Porter (1990) also
argues that if a country, even with abundant resources, stays a long time in the
production-driven stage and does not transform itself into innovation-driven
stage, it will face severe challenges in economic development. These views are
* Authors are grateful to anonymous reviewers and Journal Editor for their valuable time and insight-
ful comments and suggestions to the previous version of the paper. The remaining errors are ours.
(Corresponding author,Dr S.Q. Liu). Financial support from China National Social Science Foundation
(Project #14BJY083) is acknowledged.
© 2016 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2016
International Review of Finance, 17:1, 2017: pp. 3–42
DOI: 10.1111/irfi.12108
shared by many scholars (Lev and Sougiannis 1996; Toivanen et al. 2002; Hall
and Oriani 2006; Manso 2011; Bronzini and Iachini 2014; Aghion et al. 2015).
After the global financial crisis in 2008, countries around the world have more
clearly recognized the importance of innovation and R&D investment (Brown
et al. 2009; Cohen 2010; Hall and Lerner 2010; Hsu et al. 2012; Paunov 2012;
Tongue and Allan 2013; Choi and Williams 2014; Lamperti et al. 2015). Recently
the “G8”group has explicitly contended that it is necessary to change the mode
of economic development and countries must vigorously promote strategic eco-
nomic restructuring and integrate both economic resources and new technolo-
gies, thus make the economic development relying more on the advancement
of sciences and technology (Aghion et al. 2012; Nunes et al. 2012; Bronzini
and Iachini 2014). Especially for China, the world’s largest developing country
with many economic growth problems such as production overcapacity and in-
vestment inefficiency,a transformation towards a market-based economy and in-
dustrial restructuring can only be achieved through increasing R&D activities
and technological innovation (Xu et al. 2008; Liu and Liu 2010; Zhen and Tang
2012; Chen 2013). It is now a general consensus in China that firms must en-
hance their competitiveness and maintain sustainable development by
expanding R&D investments and promoting technological innovation (Liu and
Liu 2011; Gu and Zhai 2012; Yang et al. 2012; Lu et al. 2013; Phillips 2013; Choi
and Williams 2014). The Chinese government has also significantly expanded
preferential policies and financial supports to firms’R&D investments in recent
years.
Similar to capital asset investments, R&D investment requires a large amount
of input, long investment cycle, and slow investment returns. For each firm,
although the demand for technology innovation is inherent, its R&D investment
behavior is confined by financing constraints from external capital market and
imperfect corporate governance with severe agency problems. The outcome of
R&D investment is mainly intangible assets that could not be the collaterals for
borrowing money from banks. The intangible outputs resulted from R&D
activities usually involve with business secrets or core technological knowhow
by specificfirms, so many firms are reluctant to disclose R&D-related informa-
tion. These characteristics make R&D investment facing more serious financing
constraints. In addition, R&D spending is a high-risk investment as its initial
input is usually a permanent sunk cost with high uncertainty or no returns can
be expected. Because a firm’s executives’compensations are more or less linked
to its financial performance, short-term managerial behavior to maximize mana-
gerial compensations at the expense of the firm’s long-term growing potential is
a typical agency problem derived from the conflicts between owners (share-
holders) and managers. A firm’s R&D investment is nevertheless affected by the
agency costs underlying the agency problem. Therefore, the association between
afirm’s R&D investment and its financing constraints or agency problem (agency
costs) is complicated. This leads to several questions such as how will financing
constraints and agency problem/costs impact a firm’s R&D investment behavior,
and what is the influencing magnitude of these two factors? There is a lack of
International Review of Finance
© 2016 International Review of Finance Ltd. 20164
convincing evidence in the literature, especially for a developing economy like
China. These issues are surely worthy of empirical investigation.
At the same time, it is an unsolved puzzle about what is the optimal level of
R&D investment. German scholar Dr. Von Braun (1999) argues that, when
R&D investment reaches a certain level, further investment might slow down
the growth of sales revenues and profits, so there is a possible R&D investment
“acceleration trap.”
1
In China, although some researchers believe that R&D in-
vestments by Chinese firms remain insufficient, others hold the opposite views.
For example, Zhang et al. (2008) find some evidence to support the existence of
such a R&D investment acceleration trap and Lu et al. (2013) query of whether
more R&D investments can result in better investment performance. Thus, a
series of questions remain unanswered, such as (i) whether the conclusion drawn
up by comparing R&D investment intensity in China and in the western
countries is valid?; (ii) what should be the optimal level of R&D investment by
firms in China?; (iii) have Chinese firms reached the optimal level of R&D
investment at present?; and (iv) how to measure the gap between the actual
and optimal levels of R&D investment by Chinese firms? These questions are
highly important and should be further explored theoretically and empirically.
Driven by such study motivations, we conduct a research to analyze the
association between corporate R&D investment and financing constraints or
agency costs by using a two-tier stochastic frontier model initially developed
by Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009) with panel data of the annual reports of
Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2012 and further measure the magnitude of
the deviation of the actual (real) R&D investment level from the optimal level
(i.e., R&D investment inefficiency) caused by financing constraints and agency
costs, respectively, even taking the impact of government subsidies into
consideration.
Compared with the literature, our study has the following originality and con-
tributions: (i) instead of using the traditional analysis model proposed by
Schiantarelli (1996), we adopt the two-tier stochastic frontier model proposed
by Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009), which can not only overcome the subjectiv-
ity of artificially grouping sample firms but also mitigate the endogenous prob-
lem that is caused by using multiple financial indicator variables. Differing
from the analysis model proposed by Vogt (1994) that relies upon the direction
of the coefficients for the interaction terms of free cash flows and Tobin’sQ
(i.e., either positive or negative) to determine R&D underinvestment or overin-
vestment, we apply the two-tier stochastic frontier model to enhance the validity
of study findings by statistically simulating the inherent relationships among the
explained and explanatory variables; (ii) in order to make our study more in line
1 Dr.Brown firstly uses the concept of R&D investment “acceleration trap”in his book of The War
of Innovation. He examined R&D investments, sales revenues, and profits for 30 electrical and
electronic companies from America, Europe, and Japan and found that, during the period
1978 to 1990, the R&D expenditures of these high-tech companies increased three tofive times,
but their total sales rose only 10%. He therefore suggests that R&D investment “acceleration
trap”might produce high costs, great risk, and unpredictable investment results.
Financing Constraint/Agency Costs and R&D Investment
© 2016 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2016 5
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