The impact of audit quality on real earnings management in the UK context
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-10-2020-0156 |
Published date | 19 March 2021 |
Date | 19 March 2021 |
Pages | 368-391 |
Subject Matter | Accounting & finance,Accounting/accountancy,Accounting methods/systems |
Author | Syed Numan Chowdhury,Yasser Eliwa |
The impact of audit quality on real
earnings management in the
UK context
Syed Numan Chowdhury
School of Business and Entrepreneurship, Independent University,
Bangladesh (IUB), Dhaka, Bangladesh, and
Yasser Eliwa
School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK
and Faculty of Commerce, Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt
Abstract
Purpose –The purpose of this paper is to examine whether audit quality influence real earnings
management activities using a sample of UK listed firms that have strong incentives to manage earnings
upward through meeting past year’s earningsas a benchmark in the post-adoption period of International
FinancialReporting Standards (IFRS).
Design/methodology/approach –The authors use a sample of 4,774 firm-year observations of UK
listed firms during the period 2005–2018.Univariate and multivariate analyses have been conducted to test
the associationafter controlling for firm characteristics and institutionalvariables.
Findings –The study reportsthat the presence of Big 4 auditors is significantly andpositively related with
greater levels of sales and discretionary expenses manipulation. Though the authors do not find any
conclusive evidenceon production costs manipulation, the aggregated measure of real earnings management
shows a significantpositive association with the presenceof Big 4 auditors.
Practical implications –The study implies that managers who have incentives to manage earnings
upward around the UK firms take advantageof the accounting flexibility in defining policies while reducing
information asymmetry among the investors to signal better future performance. The approach to detect
earningsmanipulation as described in the auditing standards fails to limit the managerial use of real activities
due to limited scope and unclear guidance.Thus, due to the significant impact on public policies, the results
should, therefore,be of interest to the regulators and standard setters.
Originality/value –To the best of the authors’knowledge, this is the first study that examines the
association betweenaudit quality and real earnings management for the UK all-purposeoperational firms in
sampled datathat just meet past year’s earnings as a benchmark in the post-IFRS period.
Keywords IFRS, Real earnings management, Audit quality, Earnings benchmark
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the accounting literature by investigating the
relationship between audit quality and real earnings management. Whilst the extant
literature has mostly investigated the impact of audit quality on accruals earnings
management (Becker et al., 1998;Francis and Wang, 2008;Chen et al.,2011;Persakis and
Iatridis, 2016;Houqe et al.,2017;Alzoubi, 2018), a limited number of studies provide
The authors are thankful for the constructive and stimulating comments received from the editor,
Professor Maggie (Chunhui) Liu, and the two anonymous reviewers.
IJAIM
29,3
368
Received2 October 2020
Revised28 December 2020
Accepted22 January 2021
InternationalJournal of
Accounting& Information
Management
Vol.29 No. 3, 2021
pp. 368-391
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1834-7649
DOI 10.1108/IJAIM-10-2020-0156
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/1834-7649.htm
evidence on real earnings management (Chi et al.,2011;Alhadab and Clacher, 2018;Choi
et al.,2018). Even though the findings are consistent in prior studies that the presence of a
Big 4 auditor restricts accruals earnings management, it is unclear whether real earnings
management is also constrained by the Big 4 auditors. In this study, we examine whether
the Big 4 auditors influence the managerial use of real activities when the UK firms have
strong incentives to manage earnings upward (i.e. firms that just meet or beat an earnings
benchmark) post the implementationof International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).
The UK setting inspires this study in two ways. First,the mandatory adoption of IFRS in
2005 is considered as a major regulatory changein the UK capital market. The cost-benefit
analysis of IFRS adoption has been a prevalent area of empirical studies (Jeanjean and
Stolowy, 2008;Khlif and Souissi, 2010;Doukakis, 2014;De George et al., 2016;Oz and
Yelkenci, 2018). Previous work suggeststhat the implementation of IFRS has decreased the
level of reporting discretion and created managerial opportunities to explore real earnings
management. The disclosure requirementpromotes greater flexibility of accounting choices
due to unclear guidance and subjective estimates, leading to an increase in the managerial
use of real activities (Byard et al.,2010;Capkun et al., 2016;Li, 2019). Second,the UK capital
market presents an interestingsetting to evaluate upward earnings management using real
activities for firms that meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Prior studies (Ball et al.,2000;
Brown and Ngo Higgins, 2001;Beaver et al.,2003)find that the UK firms are subject to less
regulatory scrutiny compare to other common law countries, such as the USA, in which
managers are more likely to achieve target earnings through manipulating accruals or real
activities to avoid reporting a loss or a decline in profit(Zalata and Roberts, 2017).
Athanasakou et al. (2009) find insignificant use of accruals in the UK firms that have
incentives to manage earningsupward, indicating a possibility of managerial dependencein
using real activities than to incur the cost of using discretionary accounting choices. Zhao
et al. (2012) report that firms meeting benchmarks to manage earnings upward achieve
better future performance compare to those that miss the targets. This supports the
signalling argument that managersuse real activities to signal better future performance to
the capital market without impairing firms’value or future growth potentials (Bartov et al.,
2002;Jiang, 2008;Taylorand Xu, 2010).
The extant literature provides inconsistent evidence in evaluating the impact of audit
quality on real earnings management.For instance, Alhadab and Clacher (2018) examine the
UK initial public offering (IPO) firms during the period 1998–2008, comprising financial
information from both the UK generallyaccepted accounting principles and IFRS eras. They
report that real earnings management activities are partially constrained where
discretionary expenses manipulation decreases, and sales manipulation increases in the
presence of a Big 4 auditor. Sitanggang et al. (2019) find opposing evidence on the UK
manufacturing firms, suggesting that managerial use of discretionary expenses increases,
whereas sales manipulation decreases in the presence of enhanced audit quality. Further,
Choi et al. (2018) document the jointeffect of the Big 4 auditors and a country’s legal regime
on real earnings management in a cross-countryanalysis. Using data from 22 countries, the
study reports that strongerlegal regimes are positively, and the presence of Big 4 auditors is
negatively related with real earnings management. This suggests that firms’real earnings
management activities in a strong legal regime are constrained by Big 4 auditors. Whilst
extant studies provide mixed evidence, very little research has explored the association
between audit quality and real earnings management, especially for firms that have strong
incentives to manage earnings upward. To the best of authors’knowledge, there is only one
study by Chi et al. (2011) that examines the impact of audit quality on accruals and real
earnings management in a setting involving the US firms with incentives to meet earnings
Impact of audit
quality
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