The Effects of Audit Market Liberalisation and Auditor Type on Audit Opinions: The Iranian Experience

AuthorMohamat Sabri Hassan,Fakhroddin MohammadRezaei,Norman Mohd‐Saleh,Romlah Jaffar
Published date01 March 2016
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12059
Date01 March 2016
The Effects of Audit Market Liberalisation and Auditor Type on Audit
Opinions: The Iranian Experience
Fakhroddin MohammadRezaei, Norman Mohd-Saleh, Romlah Jaffar and Mohamat Sabri Hassan
Audit services were provided exclusively by a state entity in Iran until late 2001, when the audit market was
liberalised. The liberalisation of the audit market resulted in increased competition, as more private auditors
became licensed to operate and provide audit services. The present study examines the effects of audit market
liberalisation and auditor type (i.e., state and private auditors) on audit opinions. It is predicted that increased
competition in the audit market may reduce the relative bargaining power of auditors, which can compromise
auditors’ independence when issuing audit opinions. The present study also investigates whether the process of
issuing audit opinions is influenced by the government, thus resulting in a lower rate of modified audit opinions
issued by state auditors compared to those issued by private auditors. Importantly, this study develops an
explanation based upon a bargaining power view of auditor independence in issuing audit opinions and upon the
limitations of the explanation for the circumstances in which auditorand owner interests are aligned in the case of
government entities. The present study analyses the data of firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange between
1999 and 2010. The findings, after controlling for auditor choice, reveal that modified audit opinions have
decreased following the liberalisation of the audit market in Iran, and compared to private auditors, state auditors
have issued fewer modified audit opinions. The findings suggest that increased competition in the audit market is
more likely to decrease the relative bargaining power of auditors and that there is a significant concern regarding
audit opinions when both auditee and auditor are state-controlled entities.
Key words: Audit opinions, audit market liberalisation, state and private auditors, Iran
1. INTRODUCTION
Prior empirical evidence on the determinants of modified
audit opinions (which include qualified, adverse and
disclaimer audit opinions)1(Rittenberg, Johnstone &
Gramling, 2012) has focused on audit variables (such as
audit conduct quality)and auditor-related variables(such
as auditor independence) (Habib, 2013). The results are
mixed. The issuance of a large number of modified audit
opinions under a regulated market in Iran (Banimahd,
Noorifard & Davoudabadi, 2013; MohammadRezaei,
Mohd-Saleh & Ali, 2015) and the drop in the percentage
after audit market liberalisation has motivated us
to investigate this issue further. We found that
approximately 95 per cent (64 per cent) of firms received
modified audit opinions in 1999 (2010). In this paper, we
argue that audit market factors and auditor type
(referring to the classification of auditors into state and
private auditors) could affect the type of audit report
issued by auditors.
This study uses audit market competition and
bargaining power to explain the decrease in modified
audit opinions. An increase in audit market competition
after liberalisation is likely to decrease (increase) the
relative bargaining power of auditors (client firms)
(Casterella et al., 2004). Consequently, a change in relative
bargaining power could affect the audit opinions issued
by auditors (Barnes, 2004; Barnes & Renart, 2013).
Consistent with the foregoing, the liberalisation of the
audit market in Iran, which occurred in 2001, has resulted
in intense competition. Market liberalisation2resulted in
both state and private auditors offering audit services,
and although many private firms switched from the state
to private auditors, state-controlled firms must retain the
state auditors. The prominent feature of audit market
liberalisation in Iran appears to be the lack of
preparedness of the auditmarket, resulting in an increase
in supply thatwas incongruent with the demand for audit
services, particularly among private auditors and firms.
In contrast to other countries that have a relatively stable
audit market condition with large auditfirms dominating
the market, the unique change in the audit market (and,
hence, the level of competition and bargaining power
experienced by audit firms) provides a somewhat unique
research setting in which to study the relation between
changes in the audit market and a modified audit
opinion. In the absence of large audit firms in the Iranian
market (and significant quality differentiationin the audit
services), competitive pressures on the market might
result in adverse effects on auditorindependence and – as
a result – audit opinions.
However, audit market competition and bargaining
power may not be applicable to the state auditors.
Notably, the interest group stasis theory, as one strand of
political theory, suggests that the auditing process can
be viewed as a symbol – as opposed to substance – that
can lead to the impression that problems within the
public sector are being addressed (hereinafter, the
‘symbol-over-substance’ argument) (Moore et al., 2006).
As such, this view might suggest results that contradict
the bargaining power argument for the state auditors.
In particular, while it is predicted that more modified
audit opinions are issued by state auditors (compared
to private auditors) in the post-liberalisation period
due to less competition in the state audit market, i.e.,
audits characterized by greater independence, the
symbol-over-substance argument suggests that the
strong audit–client relationship established between
well-connected interests within the state entities (state
firms and their auditors) could indicate otherwise. As
such, studying the consequences of such a contradictory
theoretical standpoint from the perspective of audit
Correspondence to: Fakhroddin MohammadRezaei, Faculty of Finance,
Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran. Email: f.mrezaei@khu.ac.ir
International Journal of Auditing doi:10.1111/ijau.12059
Int. J. Audit.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd ISSN 1090-6738
20: 87 100 (2016)

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