The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional damage to human rights

• Author: Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo
• Position: Graduate of the Law School of the Universidad Externado de Colombia (Bogotá D.C, Colombia)
• Pages: 47-70

Licenciado bajo Licencia Creative Commons

Licensed under Creative Commons

Revista Eurolatinoamericana

de Derecho Administrativo

ISSN 2362-583X

47

The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional

damage to human rights

La captura corrupta del estado como daño multidimensional a los

derechos humanos

ALEJANDRO SANABRIA RODELO I,*

I Universidad Externado de Colombia (Bogotá D.C, Colombia)

sanabria.rodelo@gmail.com

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7716-0940

Recibido el/Received: 27.09.2021 / September 27th, 2021

Aprobado el/Approved: 14.11.2021 / November 14th, 2021

Resumen:

Este artículo se reere a los tres problemas principales del

estudio de la corrupción desde un enfoque de derechos

humanos. Así, en primer lugar, se pretende comprender

la magnitud de los efectos nocivos de la corrupción en la

administración pública y la captura corrupta del Estado,

clasicandola en sus diferentes dimensiones a lo largo

del tiempo y su impacto en la Sociedad; en segundo lu-

gar, se tiene por pretensión, construir la relación de estos

daños con la violación contra los derechos humanos, y

en tercer lugar, se busca fundamentar la responsabilidad

del estado que trae dentro del espectro de la responsa-

bilidad subjetiva y especícamente, la falla del servicio.

Palabras clave: corrupción; responsabilidad del estado;

captura corrupta; derechos humanos; daños; víctimas.

Abstract:

This article emphasizes the three main problems of the cor-

ruption study from a human rights approach. Therefore, in

the rst place, it wants to understand the magnitude of the

corruption harmful eects in the public administration and

the corrupt capture of the State, classifying its dierent di-

mensions over the time and its coverage in the society, sec-

ondly, it wants to build the relationship of these damages

with violation against human rights, and thirdly, it wants

to support the State Liability that it brings within the spec-

trum of subjective liability and specically, the failure of the

service.

Keywords: corruption; state liability; corrupt catch; human

rights; damage; victims.

Como citar este artículo | How to cite this article: SANABRIA RODELO, Alejandro. The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional

damage to human rights. Revista Eurolatinoamericana de Derecho Administrativo, Santa Fe, vol. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic.

2021. DOI 10.14409/redoeda.v8i2.11046.

* Graduate of the Law School of the Universidad Externado de Colombia (Bogotá D.C, Colombia), participant in the research

group of the UNESCO Chair at the same university. E-mail: sanabria.rodelo@gmail.com.

DOI 10.14409/redoeda.v8i2.11046

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21.

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21.

48

Contents:

1. Introduction; 2. The corrupt capture of the State as a failure of public administra-

tion; 2.1. Corruption of the public administration; 2.2. Corrupt capture of the State and

co-opted reconguration; 3. Corruption in violation of human rights; 3.1. The classical

damages of corruption in public administration: the relative and occasional dimension;

3.2. Damages resulting from the capture of the State: the generalized and systematic

dimension; 3.3. State capture as a systematic violation of human rights; 4. Foundations

of the liability of the State for corruption in violation of human rights; 4.1. The causal

relationship between corruption and State responsibility; 4.2. State liability for the acts

of its agents or institutions; 5. Conclusions; References.

1. INTRODUCTION

The public administration is endowed with a great number of powers and duties to

comply with the guidelines and principles of the State. In the exercise of these powers,

undoubtedly the greed to acquire personal benets has been interposed, which breaks

with the fundamental values of the human being since he lives in society, leaving aside

the general interest and the spirit of joint creation of community to acquire inequitable

forms of wealth and power.

Thus, corruption is perhaps one of the most abstract and real concepts with which

we try to explain the deciency of governments in the fulllment of the purposes

of Public Administration. However, in several cases, corruption has transcended to a

capture of the structure of states in which its eects permeate the entire society. This

capture is particularly harmful since, as the rules are permanent in nature, their conse-

quences will be long term and their coverage is incalculable. 1

This phenomenon has had a major impact on trust in public institutions, which is

almost non-existent in Latin American countries. This has been identied by the Latino-

barometro demonstrating the great distrust in the dierent institutions of Latin Amer-

ican States, in this way, in the judiciary distrust in judicial bodies was found at around

33%, for its part distrust in the congress was found at 28%, and in political parties at

19%. Similarly, the survey found that 13% of the subjects surveyed expressed: “distrust

in all persons and institutions, a pattern that is accentuated among people of indige-

nous origin -even more so among women than men and the poorest.” 2

1 GARAY, Luis Jorge. et al (Ed.).La Captura y Reconguración Cooptada del Estado en Colombia.Bogotá

D.C: Grupo Método, 2008. 118 p.

2 LATINOBARÓMETRO. LA CONFIANZA EN AMÉRICA LATINA 1995 – 2015:20 años de opinión pública

latinoamericana. Santiago de Chile: Corporación Latinbarómetro, 2015. Available in:

latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp>. Access in: 23 May 2018.

The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional damage to human rights

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In this way, three dierent aspects stand out that in my opinion have greater magni-

tude for the study of this problematic phenomenon. The rst is the possible magnitude

of the harmful eects of corruption in public administration and corrupt capture of

the State; the second refers to the relationship of these damages with real violations

of human rights; and the last has to do with the possible responsibility of the State for

these damages resulting from its corrupt actions or corrupt capture. Therefore, in the

following dissertation I will demonstrate how corrupt capture of the State is a multi-

dimensional harm to human rights and what grounds exist within the philosophy of

responsibility to hold the State accountable for them.

Accordingly, the objectives of this article are, rst, to identify the complexity and

scope of corruption in public administration and corrupt capture of the State, second,

to recognize the multidimensionality of the harm to human rights that comprises cor-

rupt capture of the State, and nally, to establish the grounds for the duty to make rep-

arations. For this dissertation, I will address the doctrine and jurisprudence concerning

the analysis of the categories of public administration, corruption, human rights and

philosophy of responsibility.

2. THE CORRUPT CAPTURE OF THE STATE AS A FAILURE

OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Corruption in governmental actions has been the chain that binds the citizens of

dierent countries and societies. They suer the diculty of overcoming the conditions

of vulnerability of their people and prevent them from moving towards the progressive-

ness of their rights. This scourge has been seen to a greater extent in “developing” coun-

tries or countries with social and economic problems that require greater attention. 3

The phenomenon of corruption creates widespread distrust and this, in turn, creates

dierent levels of indierence that allow the chain to be maintained. In other words,

corruption in public administration creates a cycle that circumnavigates between ad-

ministrative immorality, which takes the form of corrupt acts, and distrust in institutions

on the part of the population, which takes the form of social and political indierence,

creating an autopoietic system that maintains itself.

A little explored consequence of this vicious cycle is the invisibility that gathers in

its veil the factors and subjects responsible, accepting corrupt practices as an inevitable

pathology in our society, and remaining unscathed by institutional attempts to purge

or prevent them.

Thus, in this chapter, I will explore the primary facet of corruption in public admin-

istration and its scope, and then relate it to the implications of the category of capture

3 HUNTINGTON, Samuel.Political order in changing society.New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

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50

or co-optation of the State and likewise identify the multidimensionality of the damage

resulting from them.

2.1. Corruption of the public administration

The concept of corruption is so complex that dierent authors have created notions

that help us to circumscribe it. Thus, “Latimbarómetro” understands corruption as any

act or omission that a public servant performs in exchange for a benet, and that is

not permitted by law. 4 With this, it is understood that not only the action is proscribed,

but also the omission in the application of norms within the framework of legal and

previous duties.

Although traditional notions highlight public servants as the central axis of admin-

istrative corruption, reality surpasses this notion, thus, we observe that corruption is

also found in the private sector, where we nd that in most situations in which public

servants have the opportunity to go against the law with transactional conducts, there

is a direct relationship with private parties, widening the spectrum of harmful reper-

cussions that already existed. 5 The linking of private subjects, in this broader notion, is

manifested in the creation of corrupt pacts of all kinds. For example: pacts in electoral

campaigns, pacts in contractual concessions, or even pacts in macro scal and mone-

tary policies.

In addition, the exercise of public oce for transactional purposes does not only

seek pecuniary gain, but may also have benets in terms of personal or institutional

loyalty, electoral support, family, caste or friendship, social or political position, etc.6

Thus, as stated by Nye, administrative corruption can be dened as: “any violation of the

public interest to obtain special advantages” or “any illicit conduct used by individuals

or groups to obtain inuence over the actions of the bureaucracy”.7

With the above, it is possible to recognize not only the complexity that protects the

plurality of actors in the acts of corruption, but also the variety of motives8 they have to

execute their illegal acts. Similarly, the doctrine manages to identify some factors

that present themselves as opportunities for corrupt behavior; these are, among oth-

ers: excessive discretionary power, deciencies of information and controls over the

4 LAPALOMBARA, Joseph.Structural and institutional aspects of corruption. 2. ed. Maryland: structural and

institutional aspects of corruption, 1994. 350 p.

5 KLIGART, Robert.Controling corruption.California: University Of California Press, 1988.

6 PÉREZ, Rogelio.Corrupción y ambiente de los negocios de Venezuela.Caracas: Ediciones IESA, 1991.

7 NYE, Joseph.Corruption and political development: a cost-bent-analysis. Washington DC: American

Review N51, 1967.

8 Los motivos que se destacan entre muchos otros son los bajos salarios y la falta de incentivos de los

empleados públicos, estos en las etapas primigenias del actuar corrupto pueden desenlazar en otros motivos

como el cumplimiento de pactos criminales y la captura de posiciones políticas.

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administrative acts of public servants. For the same reason, this poses a propitious sce-

nario for public servants to divert their probity towards corrupt behavior. 9

Public servants have an evident discretionary power to accumulate private capital,

the accumulation usually occurs by taking advantage of their position and profession,

which is almost always poorly and irregularly paid. As a consequence of this, corruption

takes place mainly in societies where public servants are sporadically and less account-

able, where there is little transparency in administrative and government transactions,

and where there are ocials who are dissatised with their working position. 10

It is important to note that it is the personal sphere of corrupt subjects the most ba-

sic cause of corruption, since in addition to the factors of “motives and opportunities”,

an essential factor is that the corrupt subject does not have or ignores a strong and

cohesive organizational culture congured on public values as maxims to follow in his

oce, namely the general interest. 1112. This situation of cultural weakness about the

public makes the ocial chooses to entrench in their motives for personal benets and

take advantage of the opportunities granted by his investiture13.

In this sense, Laporta & Alvarez point out that:

“la causa inevitable y, en último término irreductible de la corrupción es la conducta des-

honesta del actor público. En último término la corrupción se da única y exclusivamente

porque un individuo, sea cual sea su entorno, toma la decisión de realizar una acción

determinada, la acción corrupta (…)”14

This diversity of subjects and motives are congured through dierent strategies

with which the corrupt scheme is used. In this sense, the strategies identied by Bau-

tista15 provide the analysis of the category with useful elements to identify the depth

9 RICO, José María et al. La corrupción pública en américa latina: Manifestaciones y mecanismos de

control.Miami: Centro Para La Administración de Justicia, 1996.

10 LAPORTA, Francisco et al.La corrupción política.Madrid: Alianza, 1997. p. 20.

11 La motivación principal de los funcionarios debe ser el cumplimiento del deber como manifestación de su

compromiso con lo público en palabras de Max Weber, “para el funcionario es un honor su capacidad para

ejecutar a conciencia y con precisión una orden, poniendo toda la responsabilidad en quien se la manda, y para

ejecutarla como si respondiera a sus propias convicciones si esa autoridad jerárquicamente –a pesar de las

ideas del funcionario- le insistiera en esa orden que a éste le parece equivocada. Sin esa negación de sí mismo

y sin esta disciplina moral en su más alto sentido se desmoronaría todo el aparato. En: WEBER, Max. La ciencia

como profesión. La política como profesión. Madrid: Alianza, 1994. 118 p.

12 CHAMPS, Victoria. La ética en una cultura poslosóca.Leviatán: Revista de hechos e ideas, Madrid, n. 20,

p.79-83, jun. 1985. Trimestral. Available in: . Access in: 20 May 2018.

13 MATAS, Carles. Los problemas de la implantación de la nueva gestión pública en las administraciones

públicas latinas: modelo de Estado y cultura institucional.Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia, Caracas,

n. 021, p.1-28, out. 2001. Available in: ext/000000/RAMIO MATAS, Carles -

Los problemas de la implantacion de la nueva gestion.pdf>. Access in: 22 jun. 2018.

14 LAPORTA, Francisco et al.La corrupción política.Madrid: Alianza, 1997. p. 20.

15 DIEGO, Oscar.La ética y la corrupción en la política y la administración pública.2005. 163 f. Dissertação

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21.

52

and multidimensionality of the harmful repercussions it causes. In order to have a more

concentrated analysis of these strategies, they will be divided into three categories:

a) Intellectual or cultural corruption: It is when either people with academic prestige

are induced to be the guarantee of the ideology behind the corrupt plan, or to

inuence through economic incentives the research with the useful approaches

to produce the plan.

b) Economic cohesion as a method of persuasion: This is when the dierent subjects

receive the support of dierent nancial agencies and international resonance,

with this pressure is put on governments to assume dierent policies aimed at

facilitating the incursion of the private sector in public administration. The tac-

tics used for this strategy range from threats of denial of credit, to economic

blockades and the discrediting of countries in the international community.

c) Political corruption: This is the transaction to obtain control over the actions of

public servants such as presidents, senior ocials, parliamentarians, social or

union leaders, through bribery, swindling, extortion, favoritism, electoral nan-

cing, fraud, embezzlement of public funds, nepotism, etc.

For some authors there is a substantial dierence between political corruption and

administrative corruption, however, for Manuel Villoría:

“La corrupción administrativa o de los empleados públicos no puede separarse de la

corrupción política, ya que se alimentan una a otra. De tal manera, de los políticos cor-

ruptos surge la corrupción administrativa, aun cuando la profesionalidad del servicio

público pueda atenuar la expansión del fenómeno.” 16

Political corruption is therefore a macro category that groups together the other

types of corruption. Therefore, these behaviors manage to permeate the decision-mak-

ing spheres of public power, making all rules and administrative acts arising from illegal

transactions, born corrupt. Likewise, corruption is not limited to a transactional exer-

cise of alienation of benets, but in some scenarios, it becomes a contamination of the

entire system and its products, this contamination has been called by a sector of the

doctrine as capture or co-opted reconguration.

(Mestrado) - Curso de Derecho, Derecho, Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, Huelva, 2005. Available in:

. Access in: 23 jun. 2018.

16 VILLORIA, Manuel. Combate a la corrupción y fomento de la ética en la gestión pública. In: VII Congreso

Internacional del CLAD sobre la reforma del estado y de la administración pública, 2002, Lisboa.La corrupción

judicial: razones de su estudio, variables explicativas e instrumentos de combate en España.Lisboa: Upan,

2002. p. 1 - 24. Available in: . Access in: 23 jun. 2018.

The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional damage to human rights

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2.2. Corrupt capture of the State and co-opted re-

configuration

State capture has been understood as the illicit participation of private sector ac-

tors in the creation and consolidation of all types of norms (laws, decrees, administra-

tive acts, execution of public contracts, etc.), with the aim of obtaining benets of all

kinds. This means that there are invasive levels of corruption that can permeate state

institutions consolidated in legality in order to instrumentalize them and then co-opt

decision-making spheres at the local and central levels. 17

Likewise, in order to advance illegitimate purposes, illegal groups can permeate

and even create legitimate institutions to capture them in instrumental terms and then

take advantage of them to co-opt state decision-making bodies at the local or even

central level. In view of this situation and its magnitude, it should be noted that it is not

simply a matter of the inuence of subjects outside the public administration who have

a monetary interest, but of a systematic plan that seeks to permeate decision-making

spheres so high that they generate consequences that aect the entire social order.

Likewise, the subjects and structures that participate in this strategy no longer perme-

ate only the individual ethical sphere, but alter the very duties of the public function,

collective interests, and social morality, which is why this co-optation ceases to be a

problem that occupies only the sphere of public administration and becomes a case of

“normative illegality”.18

In this context, it is possible to arm, as Suárez, Jabbaz and Isuani19 have pointed

out, that there may exist a system of institutionalized corruption in which there are

structures and processes that have been installed in society as ways of continuously

achieving some particular benets, establishing a “social permissiveness” with the typi-

cal and generalized idea of “everybody does it ”.20

This permissive and somehow complicit attitude has allowed macro criminal struc-

tures that were previously counterparts of the State’s coercive apparatus, to create al-

liances giving the message that public service is a kind of market where you can enter

for the right price. This is how the capture of the State diversies the subjects that are

immersed in the corrupt relationship, since maas, illegal cartels, organized criminal

17 GARAY, Luis Jorge. et al (Ed.). La Captura y Reconguración Cooptada del Estado en Colombia.Bogotá

D.C: Grupo Método, 2008. 118 p.

18 OLIVERA, Mario. Hacia una sociología de la corrupción.Alma Mater, Lima, v. 17, p.1-15, out. 1999. Available

in: . Access in:

23 jun. 2018.

19 SUAREZ, F, et al. La corrupción organizacional: aportes para el desarrollo teórico-conceptual. Revista

Probidad, Lima, v. 14, mayo 2001.

20 GROPPA, O; BESADA, M.Cultura y Corrupción política (orden institucional): Corrupción en el campo

político y el económico. 2001. Available in:

publicaciones/docs/ CYCP _04.pdf>. Access in: 23 junio 2018.

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

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54

organizations, paramilitary and subversive groups and legal groups such as political

parties, traders, politicians, businessmen and transnational corporations can be part

of it.21 These criminal subjects have been denominated by the doctrine as “interest

groups”.22

It is because of this complex macro structure that the eects of the co-optation of

the public function have a plurality of damages of dierent natures, which makes it im-

perative to identify their depth, not only to prevent them, but also to make visible their

multidimensional eects and recognize the relevant responsibilities, including that of

the State.

3. CORRUPTION IN VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Traditionally, the legal assets violated by corrupt practices are related to the deterio-

ration of the public treasury or the appropriation of public assets of the State. However,

with the evolution of these practices, there is a change that creates situations of struc-

tural violations, this is possible when there is an unequal and precarious system in the

culture of the public. 23

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights arms that these violations are

generated:

de cierta indiferencia o incluso justicación por parte de la opinión pública. Tampoco se

trata de violaciones aisladas. Por el contrario, se trata de violaciones generalizadas de

derechos, enfocadas en personas que pertenecen a grupos determinados, y cuyos dere-

chos se violan precisamente en función de dicha pertenencia.” 24

Thus, it is imperative to analyze the dierent levels of harm that corrupt cap-

ture of the state generates within complex macro-criminal networks. Therefore, in this

chapter, I will identify the harms that come from the traditional conception of corrup-

tion, and the harms that come from the corrupt capture of the State, in order to analyze

whether these harms represent eective violations of human rights.

21 GARAY, Luis Jorge et al.La reconguración cooptada del Estado: más allá de la concepción tradicional

de captura económica del Estado.Bogotá: Fundación AVINA, 2008.

22 Denición introducida en los informes de consulta al Banco Mundial preparado como parte del análisis

sobre el Estado del arte de la corrupción en Colombia. La captura del Estado: corrupción o ardid político.

23 GONZÁLEZ, Marianne et al (Ed.).Transparencia, lucha contra la corrupción y el Sistema Interamericano

de Derechos Humanos. Santiago de Chile: Centro de Derechos Humanos, 2011. 188 p. Available in:

pdf?sequence=2>. Access in: 27 jun. 2018.

24 CIDH. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas nº

220. San José de Costa Rica, 26 de novembro de 2010.Caso Cabrera García y Montiel Flores vs. México. San

José de Costa Rica, . Available in: .

Access in: 25 jun. 2018.

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3.1. The classical damages of corruption in public

administration: the relative and occasional

dimension

As mentioned above, corruption creates highly complex harmful repercussions.

First, because of its invisibility or dicult perception, which is also related to the high

permissiveness of society in the face of corrupt acts, and second, because being im-

mersed in the regulation of norms, it involves the entire system, creating a vicious cycle.

Corruption has generally been understood as a phenomenon that aects only the

economic dimensions of a society’s values, 25 however, as Bautista (2005) states, corrup-

tion has costs that impact the political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of a

community. 26

This is important to point out, because traditionally it has been seen how the detri-

ment of the public coers is used as an excuse to justify the regressiveness of the eco-

nomic and social development of a country. In this sense, Shang-Jin Wei states:

“la corrupción hace disminuir el crecimiento económico, sesga el sistema scal para fa-

vorecer a los ricos y bien relacionados, reduce la ecacia del establecimiento de objetivos

en los programas sociales, sesga las políticas del gobierno favoreciendo la inequidad en

la propiedad de los bienes disponibles, hace disminuir el gasto social, reduce el acceso

a la educación de los pobres e incrementa el riesgo en las inversiones de los pobres”.27

These damages, in particular, are the result of alterations at high levels of the State’s

decision-making powers, since corruption has an impact on the country’s economy,

directly altering the budgets of territorial and administrative entities, unbalancing

trade, driving changes in monetary policy and creating a scal decit that is dicult

to overcome.

On the other hand, corruption in public administration has signicant social im-

pacts. These eects are manifested in the increase of inequality in the indexes (GINI),

diverting the eective destination of public funds, and increasing bureaucracy and

commercializing public service.

25 HELLMAN, Joel; KAUFMANN, Daniel. La captura del Estado en las economías en transición.Finanzas &

Desarrollo.Washington D. C, p. 31-35. set. 2001. Available in: .org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/

spa/2001/09/pdf/hellman.pdf>. Access in: 23 jun. 2018.

26 DIEGO, Oscar.La ética y la corrupción en la política y la administración pública.2005. 163 f. Dissertação

(Mestrado) - Curso de Derecho, Derecho, Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, Huelva, 2005. Op. cit. p. 86.

27 WEI, Shang-jin. La corrupción en el desarrollo económico: ¿lubricante benecioso, molestia menor u

obstáculo importante?.Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas, [s.l.], n. 21, p.83-94, 20 mayo 2011. Instituto

Nacional de Administracion Publica. http://dx.doi.org/10.24965/gapp.vi21.265.

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

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56

In this sense, Ackerman highlights among many eects, some specic social dam-

ages, such as the structural impossibility for the poor to receive essential public services

(social security, health, education), increase in taxes and fees to acquire these services,

violent imbalances in the market for small producers, among others. 28 This ultimately

manifests itself in the practical impossibility of overcoming poverty and high inequality

in a country.

On the cultural side, the “everybody does it ” attitude and the permissiveness men-

tioned in the previous chapter generate perverse attitudes of indierence. These atti-

tudes alter the ethical values of the community, creating a generalized distrust, and the

belief that corruption is a permanent problem that is impossible to combat. 29

Perhaps the most invisible and serious damage caused by corruption is the polit-

ical damage. This damage causes the social pact to lose strength and the entire state

establishment to lose all legitimacy. Similarly, they cause negative eects of violence,

creating a Hobbesian state of nature30.

In the same aspect, there are the damages to the fundamental principles of the

rule of law, in the rst place, the democratic principle loses all validity, a clear exam-

ple of this is a buying and selling of votes. Secondly, we can observe the frustration

of any expectation of governability, and any impulse to act under legality. Bautista

concludes that:

(...) en lo político los gobiernos pierden autoridad, incluso la soberanía, al llegar a con-

vertirse en simples administradores de sucursales, agencias u ocinas de comercio de las

grandes empresas transnacionales. Al ser incapaces de gobernar brotan los síntomas

de ingobernabilidad. Gobiernos con estas características son usados desde el exterior

mientras que en el interior los hombres que ocupan estos cargos han dejado de ser los

grandes estadistas de antaño para convertirse en gerentes o encargados quienes solo

administran pero no deciden aunque lo hagan con ecacia.31

Thus, it can be said that there is a set of common damages in the traditional levels

of corruption in public administration, these damages have a great complexity and

28 ROSE-ACKERMAN, Susan.La corrupción y los gobiernos: causas, consecuencias y reforma.Madrid: Siglo

XXI de España, 2001. 366 p.

29 GROPPA, O; BESADA, M.Cultura y Corrupción política (orden institucional): Corrupción en el campo

político y el económico. 2001. Available in:

publicaciones/docs/ CYCP _04.pdf>. Access in: 23 junio 2018.

30 OLIVERA, Mario. Hacia una sociología de la corrupción.Alma Mater, Lima, v. 17, p.1-15, out. 1999. Available

in: . Access in:

23 jun. 2018.

31 DIEGO, Oscar. La ética y la corrupción en la política y la administración pública. 2005. 163 f.

Dissertação (Mestrado) - Curso de Derecho, Derecho, Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, Huelva,

2005. Op. cit. p. 93.

The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional damage to human rights

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21. 57

the way to repair them will vary with their nature. This set of damages is found at

the primary levels of the corrupt act and its repercussions are observed in the close

circles of political, social and cultural relations of the administration. An example of

this may be corruption arising from local public administration contracting, or the

illegal failure of administrative authorities to comply with a rule, say, bribery to avoid

a trac ticket.

Therefore, we can highlight a rst dimension of the damages resulting from cor-

ruption that I will call relative and occasional level, alluding to the damages generated

in the short term and that generate their main eects in the close circles of the cor-

rupt relationship. In this type of damage, liability is more evident in public ocials as

individuals, than in the state as a legal person under public law, subject of rights and

obligations.

Damages occurring in the relative and occasional dimension, can be of all kinds

(cultural, economic, social and political) but have a smaller coverage due to the number

of people potentially violated. In this relative and occasional dimension we can nd,

for example, the conducts of undue celebration of contracts, peculation of a certain

amount, bribery at low levels of the administration and prevarication in minor judicial

conicts.

However, when the levels of corruption are higher, the damages are more complex

and aect more people over a prolonged period of time. This is why I will now investi-

gate the damages that occur from the corrupt capture of the State, as a macro represen-

tation of corruption in public administration.

3.2. Damages resulting from the capture of the

State: the generalized and systematic dimen-

sion

Corrupt acts, regardless of their type or dimension, have highly damaging conse-

quences for a society founded on the rule of law. Thus, what could distinguish one cor-

rupt act from another is the consequence of its commission, since in those that are

recognized by anti-corruption measures as corrupt acts, they could be prosecuted, but

in those that are not, there would be no such possibility, generating an inevitable feel-

ing of impunity.

This symptom of impunity is what generates the corrupt capture of the State, since

in these dimensions of corruption, the methods employed are so innovative and invisi-

ble that their existence seems impossible.

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21.

58

Corruption impacts on such high levels of administration that, as Alan Doig and

Stephen Riley put it, it contributes to political instability, arbitrary intervention of gov-

ernment economic and scal institutions and the provision of public services. 32

The damages resulting from these levels of corruption, in turn, will be called the

generalized and systematic dimension. The damages of this dimension are a conse-

quence of the co-opted reconguration of the State, 33 and include damages that im-

pact society in general, causing permanent detrimental eects. This co-optation rep-

resents a level of corruption that produces the chain of indierence-corruption men-

tioned at the beginning of this dissertation, making it autopoietic and resistant to the

dierent state measures to prevent and counteract it. As stated by Cartier:

“con el auge de la corrupción social y su institucionalización no sólo se agravan las im-

plicaciones y efectos negativos sobre el sistema social sino que se amplían las instancias

de afectación (i) morales (el malestar producto de la apatía), (ii) políticos (el cuestiona-

miento de la democracia parlamentaria y la avanzada del populismo o de la extrema

derecha), (iii) económicos (el despilfarro de los fondos públicos y el desarrollo de rentas

parasitarias, costosas para las empresas excluidas de las redes y para los contribuyentes)

y (iv) sociales (desigualdad en el tratamiento de los actores).34

The impact of the generalized and systematic dimension of corruption diers from

the relative and occasional one, in that it is exploited by dierent subjects to reestab-

lish the institutional framework for the illegal appropriation of resources, incursion into

democratic scenarios, and redirection of the public budget. These are essential values

for the normal development of the administrative activity. 35 That is to say, the gen-

eralized and systematic dimension, co-opts such basic principles of our society, that

it spreads to all the others, allowing precisely the poisoning of all the products that

are derived from its co-opted action (norms, public policies, administrative acts, etc.):

(norms, public policies, administrative acts). 36

32 DOIG, Alan et al. La corrupción y estrategias anticorrupción: algunas cuestiones y estudio de casos de países

en vías de desarrollo.Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas, Madrid, v. 21, p.117-130, nov. 2001. Available in:

.

Access in: 23 jun. 2018.

33 GARAY, Luis Jorge. Crimen, captura y reconguración cooptada del Estado: cuando la descentralización

no contribuye a profundizar la democracia. In: FUNDACIÓN KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG (Bogotá).25

años de la descentralización en Colombia.Bogotá D.C: Fundación Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010. p. 48.

34 CARTIER-BRESSON, Jean. Corrupción institucionalizada y neocorporativismo, con ejemplos del caso

francés.Nueva Sociedad, Buenos Aires, v. 145, p.110-125, out. 1996. Available in:

articles/downloads/2536_1.pdf>. Access in: 23 jun. 2018.

35 GARAY, Luis Jorge. Crimen, captura y reconfiguración cooptada del Estado: cuando la descentralización

no contribuye a profundizar la democracia. In: FUNDACIÓN KONRAD ADENAUER STIFTUNG (Bogotá).25

años de la descentralización en Colombia.Bogotá D.C: Fundación Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2010.

p. 48.

36 ARIAS, Julio et al.Identidades culturales y formación del Estado en Colombia: Colonización, Naturaleza

The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional damage to human rights

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21. 59

In the face of this Garay 37 has highlighted what he calls: the instrumental capture

of political parties: from the complexication of State Capture to the Coopted Recon-

guration of the State. In this category he outlines what would be the systematic di-

mension of corruption, identifying that the capture of political parties as instruments to

reach power is a programmatic plan in which interest groups manage to permeate the

State at the moment of its consolidation. This complexization of state capture can have

dierent eects over time and its criminal exposure can change depending on its level.

Thus, bribery and violent coercion of political candidates and voters has eects

in the “short term and has a high criminal exposure”, campaign nancing and crimes

against surage is of “medium term and medium criminal exposure” and the creation of

political parties has “long term eects and has a low criminal exposure”.38

Based on the above, we can directly relate the eects of the corrupt capture of

the State and its subsequent co-opted reconguration, in the generalized and sys-

tematic dimension of corruption in public administration. This dimension presents

us with a panorama in which acts of corruption are not simply isolated acts that have

poly-lesive eects but are limited to a specic space or sphere. Rather, they are a se-

ries of generalized eects that compromise dierent types of rights. An example of

the damage caused by this capture can be found in the Colombian armed conict, in

which paramilitary groups permeated dierent spheres of power with the aim of re-

founding the State, 39 reconguring it and taking control of a large part of its activity.

40 In this particular case, armed groups achieved economic and military advantag-

es and political41 co-optation that violated the rights of thousands of victims of the

armed conict.

So far, we have been able to recognize two dimensions of harm that aect thou-

sands of people in dierent countries and aect their institutions, compromising the

eectiveness of the law and its application. 42 Although these damages are typied

in the framework of domestic legal systems, we can also identify a perspective that

y cultura. Bogotá: Universidad de Los Andes, 2006. 281 p.

37 GARAY, Luis Jorge et al.La reconguración cooptada del Estado: más allá de la concepción tradicional

de captura económica del Estado.Bogotá: Fundación AVINA, 2008.

38 Idem

39 COLOMBIA. Tribunal Superior Sala de Justicia y Paz. Apelación nº 2007-82701. Relator: Uldi Teresa Jiménez

López.Condena Contra Freddy Rendón Herrera: Reclutamiento Ilícito de menores. Bogotá, 30 abr. 2015.

40 GARAY, Luis.Construcción de una nueva sociedad.Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1999.

41 CENTRO NACIONAL DE MEMORIA HISTÓRICA (Bogotá D.C). Justicia y paz, tierras y territorios

en las versiones de los paramilitares. Bogotá D.C: CNMH, 2012. 234 p. Available in:

centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/justicia-y-paz/tierras-y-territorios-en-las-versiones-de-los-paramilitares>.

Access in: 24 jun. 2018.

42 CIDH. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas nº

220. San José de Costa Rica, 1 de julio de 2006.Caso de las masacres de Ituango vs. Colombia. San José de

Costa Rica, . Available in: < http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_148_esp.pdf>. Access in: 25

jun. 2018.

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21.

60

includes the generalized and systematic dimension of international law; rights that are

violated by acts of corruption, generating responsibility.

3.3. State capture as a systematic violation of hu-

man rights

Having already analyzed the dimensions of the damage caused by corrupt acts, it is

undeniable that they are related to serious human rights violations. Thus, the question

arises: Is the corrupt capture of the State a harm to human rights?

To analyze this, we must look at the unlawfulness of the harm. In other words, we

must determine the general obligations to respect and guarantee human rights that a

State has ratied. Then, it will be possible to analyze if the State eectively violates the

IHRL through the acts of its captured administration.

To be more precise and nd an accurate conclusion about the violation of a certain

human right, a case study would have to be made; however, this dissertation does not

seek to examine the scope of a specic right, but rather a general analysis of how large-

scale corruption (corrupt capture of the State) can violate human rights.

Within the present analysis we will take the distinction of Bascuñám, Bascur e Rojas

(2014) that separates: “corrupt practices that directly violate a human right, and corrupt

practices that lead to human rights violations, but which, considered in themselves, do

not violate a right”.43

In this way we will focus on the rst distinction concerning practices that directly

violate a human right. Therefore, it should be noted that the State’s obligations under

international law are threefold: the obligation to respect, the obligation to protect and

the obligation to guarantee human rights. These obligations can be breached at any

time during the occurrence of a corrupt act, for example: the capture of the State by an

armed group would undoubtedly violate these three obligations. 44

C. Maldonado45 cited by Castañeda proposes three ways in which the administra-

tion, by action or omission, violates human rights through corruption:

“La primera forma es la exclusión en la que, especialmente en gobiernos republicanos,

se elige a unos cuantos para que actúen en representación de la mayoría generando

43 NASH, Claudio et al. Corrupción y derechos humanos: Una mirada desde la jurisprudencia de la

corte interamericana de derechos humanos.Santiago de Chile: Centro de Derechos Humanos, 2014. 28

p. Available in:

pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>. Access in: 24 jun. 2018.

44 CONSEJO INTERNACIONAL PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS et al.La Corrupción y los

Derechos Humanos: Estableciendo el Vínculo.Monterrey: Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey, 2009. 136 p.

Available in: . Access in: 23 jun.

2018.

45 MALDONADO, Carlos. Corrupción y Derechos Humanos: El malestar general del Estado. Bogotá:

Universidad Libre de Colombia- Facultad de Filosofía, 2001. 112 p.

The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional damage to human rights

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21. 61

supresión de mecanismos de control ciudadano y ocultamiento en la toma y justica-

ción de decisiones. La segunda es la ausencia de oposición política la cual permite la

adquisición ilegal de contratos, venta cticia de bienes, concesión de puestos públicos y

maniobras secretas para perpetuarse en el poder, entre otros. Finalmente, la impunidad,

ya que el crimen organizado, narcotráco, corrupción y violaciones a derechos humanos

son posibles debido a la inoperancia de la justicia, que a través de coacción o incentivos

manipula la actuación de la justicia a favor de determinados intereses.” 46

These are examples of how structured and programmatic corruption schemes can

be considered direct violations of human rights, in the same sense we can identify in

general terms how State capture violates specic rights enshrined in international hu-

man rights instruments, for this dissertation we will take two rights, one recognized in

the American Convention on Human Rights, and another enshrined in the Protocol of

San Salvador as an example to illustrate the relationship.

The right to political participation enshrined in Article 23 of the American Conven-

tion on Human Rights. In the event of co-optation of institutional bodies, it could bring

harm in two ways: rst, the abuse of power through arbitrarily imposed positions, and

second, the right of access to public positions that all citizens have based on the uni-

versal principle of equality. 47

Also, the right to education referred to in article 26 of the American Convention on

Human Rights as a promotional right and in article 13 of the “Additional Protocol to

the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cul-

tural Rights” (Protocol of San Salvador). In this sense, corruption aects education to

the extent that the embezzlement of funds allocated for this purpose could deny ef-

fective access to education, thus directly violating the right. At the same time, it also

indirectly aects the right when the conditions in which people study are hindered. In

other words, corruption in all its magnitude can violate the principles of accessibility,

adaptability and acceptability that govern it. 48

Based on the above analysis, the clear relationship between the corrupt capture of

the State and the violation of human rights is shown, these evident violations are the

representation of one of the damages of the generalized and systematic dimension

of the capture of the State. In this way, we can observe the poly-oensive character of

46 CASTAÑEDA, Angélica Sofía Clavijo. Actos de corrupción como violación a los derechos humanos.Saber,

Ciencia y Libertad, Bogotá, v. 12, n. 7, p.35-45, 2012.

47 CIDH. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas

nº 112. San José de Costa Rica, 23 de junio de 2005.Caso Yatama vs. Nicaragua. San José de Costa Rica,

. Available in: < http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_127_esp.pdf>. Access in: 25 jun. 2018.

48 CIDH. Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Excepción Preliminar, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas

nº 220. San José de Costa Rica, 2 de septiembre de 2004.Caso “Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” vs.

Paraguay. San José de Costa Rica, . Available in: < http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_112_

esp.pdf >. Access in: 25 jun. 2018.

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21.

62

large-scale corruption, highlighting the importance of recognizing not only the plurali-

ty of actors involved in these damages, but also the plurality of perpetrators to be held

accountable. 49

Within the corrupt capture of the State, as mentioned above, there is a plurality

of subjects belonging to the public and private sector. For this dissertation, the per-

formance of the State will be highlighted, establishing the grounds from the philoso-

phy of responsibility for which it must be declared responsible for the widespread and

systematic dimension of the damages resulting from the corrupt capture of the state,

including serious violations of human rights.

4. FOUNDATIONS OF THE LIABILITY OF THE STATE FOR

CORRUPTION IN VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

In an a priori analysis, it can be armed that the corrupt capture of the State

violates the three obligations that each State has under international law: the obliga-

tion to respect, the obligation to protect and the obligation to guarantee human rights.

This would be sucient to hold a State responsible under international human rights

law.

However, two obstacles can be distinguished in order to correctly establish

this imputation. The rst obstacle has to do with the causal relationship between the

corrupt act that violates a human right and the responsibility of the State for this viola-

tion, and the second refers to the legal imputation that could fall on the State as a result

of the acts of its agents or its institutions. Resolving these two obstacles will contribute

to the hypothesis that the State must respond for the multidimensional damages re-

sulting from acts of corruption and corrupt capture in which it is involved.

4.1. The causal relationship between corruption

and State responsibility

The connection between human rights and acts of corruption lies in their cause-ef-

fect dependence, which is why the State could be included in the nexus by action

and omission, since in any case it is the State that must prevent the occurrence of the

damage.50-51

49 GARAY, Luis Jorge. et al (Ed.). La Captura y Reconguración Cooptada del Estado en Colombia.Bogotá

D.C: Grupo Método, 2008. Op cit. p. 40.

50 UNITED NATIONS. Comisión de Reclamaciones Eecc Eritrea-etiopía. Guidance Regarding Jus Ad Bellum

Liability nº 7 párrafo 8. 27 de julio de 2007.

51 CASTAÑEDA, Angélica Sofía Clavijo. Actos de corrupción como violación a los derechos humanos.Saber,

Ciencia y Libertad, Bogotá, v. 12, n. 7, p.35-45, 2012.

The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional damage to human rights

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21. 63

In the face of this causal nexus, the doctrine has identied at least three relationships

in which the corrupt actions of the State violate or help to violate human rights. Thus,

the International Council on Human Rights Policy establishes three types of violations:

d) Direct violations: corruption can be linked to the corrupt actions of the State,

when the captured State is used to obtain a benet, 52 regardless of the viola-

tion of rights it represents. For example, in the case of political co-optation of a

public oce, not only political rights are directly violated, but also labor rights,

equality and even human dignity.

e) Indirect violations:

this type of violation is posed as a sine qua non condition,53 that is

,

as a necessary condition to perpetuate the right. Thus, corruption can be an es-

sential factor within a set of factors “contributing to a chain of events that even-

tually leads to the violation of a right”.54 This is the case, for example. Violations

to the eective provision of health and education services, given the lack of re-

sources, the accessibility of these services would drop signicantly, violating the

right of many people.

f) Remote violations: Faced with this type of violations, says the author, is when the

corrupt action of the state is one factor among a set of factors. 55 In turn, another

sector of the doctrine explains this same type of violations under the title of

“cumulative causation”. 56

In the same way, Peters establishes certain conditions that must exist to recognize

this causality. 57 In this way he establishes that there must be necessity between the

corrupt act and the violation of the right, secondly there must be immediacy, 58 be-

tween the antijuridical normative breach and the damage.59

52 PÉREZ, Rogelio.Corrupción y ambiente de los negocios de Venezuela.Caracas: Ediciones IESA, 1991. p. 28.

53 PETERS, Anne. Corrupción y Derechos Humanos.Basilea: Basel Institute Of Governance, 2015. p. 42.

Available in:

human_rights_spanish.pdf>. Access in: 24 abr. 2018.

54 CONSEJO INTERNACIONAL PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS et al.La Corrupción y los Derechos

Humanos: Estableciendo el Vínculo.Monterrey: Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey, 2009. 136 p. Available in:

. Access in: 23 jun. 2018.

55 Idem

56 PE TERS, Anne. Corrupción y Derechos Humanos.Basilea: Basel Institute Of G overnance, 2015. p.20

Available in:

human_rights_spanish.pdf>. Access in: 24 abr. 2018.

57 PE TERS, Anne. Corrupción y Derechos Humanos.Basilea: Basel Institute Of G overnance, 2015. p.20

Available in:

human_rights_spanish.pdf>. Access in: 24 abr. 2018.

58 Corresponde a un Comentario de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional (CDI) relacionado con el artículo 31,

párr. 10 (ILC YB 2001/II vol. 2, Doc. A/56/10, Informe de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional sobre el trabajo

de su quincuagésima tercera sesión [23 de abril–1 de junio y 2 de julio–10 de agosto, todos de 2001], Parte E:

Proyecto de Artículos sobre Responsabilidad del Estado por Hechos Internacionalmente Ilícitos, 93).

59 PETERS, Anne. Corrupción y Derechos Humanos.Basilea: Basel Institute Of Governance, 2015. p. 24

Available in:

human_rights_spanish.pdf>. Access in: 24 abr. 2018.

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21.

64

In this way dierent paths of factual imputation are traced by which the state would

have to respond for corrupt acts in their actions are generated. Having made this clear,

I will proceed to discuss the elements within the philosophy of liability that are related

to the basis of the duty to repair damages. 60

4.2. State liability for the acts of its agents or ins-

titutions

After elucidating certain elements on causality, the following question arises Should

the state be liable for the acts of the agents or institutions that compose it? Faced with

this, Peters states that normally the corrupt conduct of agents could be attributed to

the State by applying the principles of liability since:

“El funcionario utiliza su posición para llevar a cabo u omitir una medida que el funcio-

nario no podría realizar como una persona privada, como otorgar una autorización o

licencia, evitar procesos judiciales o imponer una multa.”61

Thus, the violation of the duties of prevention and protection of the institutions of

the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the State that fail to comply with the

obligations, 62 since the ocials are endowed with an institutional veil that would not

allow them to carry out their corrupt acts if they did not have it.

Therefore, it will be the failure with the service the legal title by which the State

would respond for the damages resulting from its corrupt capture, since in the cases of

Corrupt Capture there are usually fraudulent programmatic agreements, as stated by

Libardo Rodriguez:

“debe tenerse en cuenta que en la responsabilidad por culpa, falta o falla del servicio, la

culpa exigida se diferencia sustancialmente de la culpa del derecho común. En efecto,

mientras esta es eminentemente subjetiva, es decir, imputable a un individuo, aquella

puede ser una culpa o falla funcional, organiza o anónima, es decir atribuible a la admi-

nistración y no necesariamente a un funcionario en particular” 63

The second reason arises from the fact that in the modern State the administration

is seen as a subject in which the State distributes competences and duties. In global

60 HENAO, Juan Carlos. Las formas de reparación en la responsabilidad del Estado: hacia su unicación

sustancial en todas las acciones contra el Estado.Revista de Derecho Privado, [s.l.], n. 28, p.277-366, 18 jun.

2015. Universidad Externado de Colombia. http://dx.doi.org/10.18601/01234366.n28.10.

61 PETERS, Anne. Corrupción y Derechos Humanos.Basilea: Basel Institute Of Governance, 2015. p. 24

Available in:

human_rights_spanish.pdf>. Access in: 24 abr. 2018.

62 Idem.

63 RODRÍGUEZ, Libardo.Derecho Administrativo general y colombiano.8. ed. Bogotá D.C: Temis, 2002. 228 p.

The corrupt catch of the state as multidimensional damage to human rights

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21. 65

administrative law there is a tendency that when there is a breach of legal norms with a

damaging eect, the State must be held liable. 64

Based on the above elements it can be said that there is imputation of the State

for the acts that its agents have maliciously performed, covered by the veil of its insti-

tutionality. We can highlight the theory of the nexus with the service that arises from

the theory of the failure of service to explain this phenomenon. Regarding this theory

Botero states that:

(…) para imputar responsabilidad por acción del agente es necesario, tener en cuenta

los nexos con el servicio, es decir, la relación agente-servicio a través de sus variantes

temporales, instrumentales o especiales; o además el grado de inuencia que en la pro-

ducción del daño tuvo el servicio (…)65

In this way it is possible to demonstrate through the position of subjective liability

for failure and the theory of the nexus with the service, the foundations in the eld

of legal imputation with which the State would respond for the corrupt actions of its

institutions and ocials, and also for the damages resulting from its corrupt capture.

We can conclude from the above dissertation that there are legal and factual

grounds for the State to respond for the damages caused by its corrupt actions. This

analysis contributes to make the State’s responsibility for acts of corruption that pro-

duce multidimensional damages and damages to human rights viable, reducing the

feeling of impunity and elucidating the complexity of the problem, for its prevention

and remedy.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In the previous dissertation it was possible to recognize the plurality of subjects of

dierent natures that participate in corrupt acts, demonstrating how the analysis of the

harmful eects of corruption and the corrupt capture of the state have high levels of

complexity.

Similarly, based on the analysis of the multidimensionality of the damages resulting

from large-scale corruption, the categories of relative and occasional dimension and

generalized and systematic dimension of the damages were constructed as concepts

that encompass the complexity of the damages, taking into account their passive sub-

jects and their duration over time. And based on this, we nd that human rights vio-

lations are a manifestation of damages of the systematic and generalized dimension.

64 OSPINA, Andrés (Ed.). Responsabilidad frente a la solidaridad: El fundamento abstracto del deber de

responder. In: HENAO, Juan Carlos et al.La responsabilidad Ex tracontractual del Estado.Bogotá: Universidad

Externado de Colombia, 2015. p. 121.

65 GIL, Enrique.Tesauro de la Responsabilidad Extracontractual del Estado.Bogotá: Temis, 2013. p. 37.

Alejandro Sanabria Rodelo

Rev. Eurol atin. de Derecho A dm., Santa Fe, vo l. 8, n. 2, p. 47-70, jul./dic. 20 21.

66

In this way, and based on the study of the damage, the way it is generated and the

impact it has on society, it was possible to identify the foundations in the philosophy

of liability, to impute liability to the State for the corrupt actions of its agents and for

the harmful products of its corrupt capture. Finding that in any case the State would re-

spond for failure, as a legal and social reproach in the framework of subjective respon-

sibility, for the fraudulent actions of its agents and institutions to reach macro-criminal

agreements.

This analysis contributes to provide an answer to the problem of invisibility and

impunity inherent to acts of corruption on a large scale. To the extent that eective

mechanisms are created to recognize responsibilities and identify the obstacles to pre-

vent the failures of the administration that allow its corrupt capture, we will be able to

advance towards the eective use of public goods and the guarantee and respect for

human rights.

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