Terrorism

• Pages: 34-39

34 Volume 20, April–June 2014 international law update

© 2014 Transnational Law Associates, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com

inquiry, as the Court recognizes, would not be

‘`relevant’ to execution in the rst place.’ Ante, at

10 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1)). Yet the

Court permits unlimited inquiry into Argentina’s

property outside the United States, whether or not

the property is ‘used for a commercial activity.’ By

what authorization does a court in the United States

become a ‘clearinghouse for information,’ ante, at 3

(internal quotation marks omitted), about any and

all property held by Argentina abroad? NML may

seek such information, the Court reasons, because

‘NML does not yet know what property Argentina

has [outside the United States], let alone whether

it is executable under the relevant jurisdiction’s

law.’ …. But see Société Nationale Industrielle

Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern

Dist. of Iowa, 482 U. S. 522, 542 (1987) (observing

that other jurisdictions generally allow much more

limited discovery than is available in the United

States).” […]

“Unless and until the judgment debtor, here,

NML, proves that other nations would allow

unconstrained access to Argentina’s assets, I would

be guided by the one law we know for sure—our

own. at guide is all the more appropriate, as our

law coincides with the international norm. See

§1602. Accordingly, I would limit NML’s discovery

to property used here or abroad ‘in connection

with . . . commercial activities.’ §§1602, 1610(a). I

therefore dissent from the sweeping examination of

Argentina’s worldwide assets the Court exorbitantly

approves today.” [Slip. op. 5-6]

citation: Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital,

Ltd., No. 12-842 (U.S. Supreme Court, June 16,

2014).

TERRORISM

Seventh Circuit affirms District Court

orders to have Syrian assets turned

over to one of the groups of Plaintiffs

competing for the assets; Court outlines

procedure for enforcing judgments

under the FSIA in cases of state-

sponsored terrorism, and interprets

28 U.S.C. Section 1610 [Exceptions to

the immunity of a foreign state from

attachment or execution]

In the following case, the Seventh Circuit

interprets 28 U.S.C. Section 1610 [Exceptions to

the immunity of a foreign state from attachment or

execution] where two groups of terrorism victims

claim the same assets of the Syrian Arab Republic.

e U.S. government has designated that country

as a state sponsor of terrorism.

e underlying District Court cases both

originated in the U.S. District Court for the District

of Columbia. e “Baker plaintis” (appellants)

were victims of the 1985 hijacking of EgyptAir

Flight 648 by the Abu Nidal group, which was

supported by the Syrian government. Of the 95

passengers and crew, 58 died during the hijacking.

e “Gates plaintis” (appellees) are relatives of two

civilian contractors who in 2004 were kidnapped

by al Qaeda in Iraq and brutally killed.

Both groups of plaintis obtained large

judgments against the Syrian Arab Republic,

and sought to attach certain Syrian funds in the

Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Section 1610(g) (allowing attachment of assets

in the U.S. belonging to foreign states and their

agencies and instrumentalities to execute judgments

based on state-sponsored terrorism).

e Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

(FSIA) expressly allows civil claims against

foreign governments (including their agencies

and instrumentalities) for acts of state-sponsored

terrorism. See 28 U.S.C. Section 1605A. Should

a judgment result, the successful plainti may