Starting Points: Kantian Constructivism Reassessed

• Author: Carla Bagnoli
• Date: 01 September 2014
• Published date: 01 September 2014
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12047

Starting Points: Kantian Constructivism

Reassessed

CARLA BAGNOLI

Abstract. G. A. Cohen and J. Raz object that Constructivism is incoherent because

it crucially deploys unconstructed elements in the structure of justification. This

paper offers a response on behalf of constructivism, by reassessing the role of such

unconstructed elements. First, it argues that a shared conception of rational agency

works as a starting point for the justification, but it does not play a foundational

role. Second, it accounts for the unconstructed norms that constrains the activity

of construction as constitutive norms. Finally, on this basis, it draws a contrast

between constructivist and foundational methods of ethics, such as deontology and

teleology.

The prospects of political liberalism depend heavily on the viability of construc-

tivism. Constructivism promises an objectivist conception of rational justification

that avoids the well-known epistemological and ontological difficulties of moral

realism. Constructivists purport to avoid such difficulties by embracing two dif-

ferent strategies. On the one hand, some simply bracket metaethical issues and

defend constructivism as a first-level normative account of the principles of justice.

This strategy is best exemplified by John Rawls’ conception of “political construc-

tivism” (Rawls 1993).1On the other hand, some constructivists conceive of con-

structivism as a distinct metaethical doctrine, positively opposed to standard forms

of realism and relativism. This is the Kantian constructivist position that Onora

O’Neill (1988, 1; 1999, 2003a) advocates in contrast to Rawls. Kantian constructiv-

ism is more ambitious than political constructivism in two important respects. First,

it responds to the need to take a stand in metaethics, and particularly to claim a

distinctive place in the debate about the ontological status of normative proposi-

tions. Second, it is not limited to political principles of justice or moral obligations,

but it concerns all sorts of normative propositions about reasons. Third, it has

1As I make clear in Section 1, constructivism as a first-level normative account can be

motivated also with the metaethical conviction that constructivism fails as a general view of

normative propositions. I call this “moral constructivism,” since its supporters are especially

concerned with moral obligations. For reasons that will be apparent, I do not regard Rawls’

“political constructivism” as a metaethical position. In this sense, I disagree with Tampio

(2012).

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Ratio Juris. Vol. 27 No. 3 September 2014 (311–29)

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significant consequences for the issue of political legitimacy, which is at the core of

political liberalism. This is because it claims that the results of constructions have

unrestricted authority, rather than being authoritative only for “reasonable people”

already interested in justice.

The most threatening objections to political liberalism come from metaethics,

even though they are rarely addressed as such. Debates on political legitimacy and

debates about the prospects of constructivism as a distinct metaethical option have

only recently merged (see Street 2010; Bagnoli 2011a). Critics argue that construc-

tivism is not a suitable basis for liberalism because it cannot avoid arbitrariness

without relying on an unconstructed foundational basis (see Cohen 2003; Raz 1990,

15; 2003; Timmons 2003).2In short, it is not a coherent, stable, and self-standing

metaethical doctrine. If these critics are right, the agenda of constructivist liberalism

is self-defeating and liberals should look elsewhere for resources to ground their

conception of political legitimacy. Indeed, some liberals undertake this path exactly

because they share this criticism and argue that liberalism should espouse realism

(Larmore 2008; Bagnoli 2009).

In this article, I endeavor to reassess the prospects of Kantian constructivism as

a metaethical basis of political liberalism. The scope of my argument is limited in

two ways. First, it does not engage in a defense of political liberalism. Second, the

argument is meant to establish the coherence of a thoroughly constructivist rational

justification. Rather than a complete defense of constructivism or an attack on

realism, this is an attempt to show that some common objections from metaethics

are insufficient to defeat constructivism as a general approach to rational

justification.

This is how I shall proceed. In Section 1, I identify the basic claims of Kantian

constructivism understood as a metaethical doctrine. The main body of the article

is devoted to discussing the nature and role of unconstructed elements that feature

in the constructivist account of rational justification. In Section 2, I consider the

basis of construction, which is a conception of rational agency, showing that its role

is not foundational. In sections 3–5, I focus on the status and scope of procedural

constraints, which are formal and constitutive rather than material. By clarifying

the nature of constraints, I draw a contrast between constructivism and founda-

tional methods of ethics, such as deontology and teleology. Finally, in Section 6, I

respond to the objection that Kantian constructivism necessarily presupposes the

value of humanity, by proposing a dialogical view of respect and mutual recog-

nition. I conclude that Kantian constructivism survives current objections from

metaethics and represents a viable basis for political liberalism.

1. Varieties of Kantian Constructivism

Kantian constructivism entered the debates in political philosophy with Rawls’

Dewey Lectures: Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, where he traced the roots of

his theory about justice as fairness back to Kant’s moral theory (Rawls 1980, 1993,

1999a, 1999b). Rawls’ interest in reviving Kant’s moral theory arises out of a specific

2Larmore (2008) criticizes constructivism in general, aiming specifically at Korsgaard and

Rawls. Similarly, Budde (2009, 199) focuses on O’Neill’s account of justice but she points to

the incoherence of constructivism in general.

312 Carla Bagnoli

© 2014 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Ratio Juris, Vol. 27, No. 3