Special Issue 2018 – Call for Papers Sustainable Corporate Governance

• Date: 01 January 2017
• Published date: 01 January 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/ijmr.12134

International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 19, 125–127 (2017)

DOI: 10.1111/ijmr.12134

British Journal of Management

Special Issue 2018 – Call for Papers

Sustainable Corporate Governance

Submission deadline: 1st April 2017

The financial crisis of 2008 has typically been blamed on weakcor porate governancemechanisms and excessive

risk-taking by financial institutions (Walker, 2009; Turner, 2009). In the aftermath of the crisis, there have been

a number of piecemeal regulatory responses around the world, such as caps on bonuses, that have attempted

to patch up the perceived inadequacies of current governance structures. These responses have often focused

on the banking sector (e.g. FCA Remuneration Code), with spill-over effects onto other organisations through,

for example the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2016). Say-on-pay legislation

allowing a firm’s shareholders the right to vote on the remuneration of executives has been enacted in some

countries (e.g. Dodd-Frank Act 2010 in the USA).

There is increased scepticism of the role of bankers, traders and other high-paid individuals in the financial

services industry (Calhoun, 2013; Marti and Scherer, 2016) and executive pay and behaviour more generally

(Bebchuk and Fried, 2006; Kaplan and Rauh, 2010). The frustration with the slow regulatory response to the

2008 crisis can in part explain the “Shareholder Spring” investor activism and the growth of the “Occupy Wall

Street” protest movements around the globe in 2012. Initial work examining the effects of these governance

reforms have found that firm value increased in response to say-on-pay adoption (Ferri and Maber, 2013;

Cu˜

nat, Gin´

e, and Guadalupe, 2016). Kleymenova, and Tuna (2016) report that, although the adoption of the

UK Remuneration Code had a positive effect on firm value, the EU bonus cap had a negative effect. Murphy

(2014) warns about perverse incentives of bonus caps in terms of increased incentives for excessiverisk taking,

and a significant increase in fixed remuneration. Interests of executives and shareholders may be better aligned

through insider ownership, but Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) find no evidence that bank resilience to the crisis

depended on this relationship. More generally, Erkens, Hung and Matos (2012) show that financial institutions

with greater board independence and institutional ownership performed worse during the financial crisis,

thereby questioning the effectiveness of two mechanisms typically associated with good corporate governance.

Iliev, Lins, Miller, and Roth (2015) suggest that shareholder voting is an effective mechanism for exercising

governance around the world. On a different note, Li, Leung, Young, Xin, Cai and Huang (2012) argue that the

reaction to the financial crisis and how well it wasmanaged at a national level depend on a country’s culture and

philosophical approaches to crisis management. Hence, questions remain as to how effective variouscor porate

governance mechanisms are in terms of preventing future crises and whether current regulatory approaches

create more harm than good.

The British Journal of Management will publish a special issue on “Sustainable Corporate Governance” in

2018 with a short collection of research papers that assesses the state of corporate governance and governance

reforms in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Papers in the special issue will focus on how firms have

responded to the perceived weakness in their governance structures, how the regulatory regimes have changed,

and what has been the effect of these changes on firm structures and performance.

The Call for Papers welcomestheoretical, conceptual, review,comparative and empirically-based submissions

around the theme of “Sustainable Corporate Governance”, with an emphasis on changes to practices and

policies since the financial crisis of 2008. Empirical papers should be theoretically grounded and be based on

data from one or more countries; papers that address comparisons across countries are particularly welcomed.

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