Spain and the Nazi occupation of Poland, 1939-44.

• Author: Bowen, Wayne H.

Spain was not a great power in World War II, or even a belligerent, and its ability to influence the course of that conflict was very limited. Given the devastation of its own civil war (1936-39) and its difficult economic and diplomatic situation, Spain was not in a position to play a major role in World War II. The results &the Spanish Civil War had been significant: over 400,000 dead, hundreds of thousands of exiles, destruction of Spain's industry and infrastructure, and victory for a regime that advocated self-sufficiency for a nation that was sufficient in little more than olive oil, oranges, and sunshine. Spain's political isolation ran parallel to its economics, with cool relations with France and the United States, countries that had clearly favored the Spanish Republic, and open hostility toward Great Britain, especially over that government's ongoing occupation of Gibraltar, an irritant to Spain's new Nationalist government. (1)

As a major beneficiary of Nazi aid during the Spanish Civil War, the government of Francisco Franco shared many common ideological imperatives with the Third Reich, as well as many of the same enemies. Spain did not, however, embrace Hitler's anti-Semitism or racism against Eastern European Slavs. Despite being marginalized from the war, the Spanish government was well aware of the results of the conflict as it related to Poland and that nation's Jewish population. Driven by pro-Polish sentiments, individual Spanish diplomats and soldiers protested and worked in small ways to hinder Hitler's vision of genocide against the Poles and the Holocaust of the Jews. While not enough to have a significant impact on the course of World War II or Nazi campaigns of extermination, these efforts stand out as exemplars of how nations and individuals might have acted, and thus could have changed much of the history of this dark period. The failure of Spain to do more to rescue Jews reflects more on the general ambivalence of the Franco government to many political questions of the period, rather than the results of a deliberate policy.

Spain did not have an official policy toward Nazi persecution and extermination of Jews. Anti-Semitism was not part of the official ideology of Spain's Nationalist government, Catholic Church, or fascist Falange, but its expression was tolerated in all three organizations. Ecclesia (Church), the official magazine of the Catholic lay organization Accion Catolica (Catholic Action), condemned Nazi ideology, but it also praised Spain's expulsion of Jews in 1492 as an event that strengthened the Catholic Church by removing a non-Christian element from that country. (2) Franco and other Falangist leaders made occasional negative characterizations of Jews, typically conflating them with the Soviet Union through such references as "Judeo-Bolshevism" or "Judeo-Marxism," but the primary enemies of the Falange, the Spanish government, and the Catholic Church remained communism, liberal democracy, separatism, and capitalism. (3)

Franco's government, despite its reputation as a decisive dictatorship, never adopted a comprehensive plan concerning the Jewish question during the Second World War. At times a place of refuge for Jews, Spain periodically closed its border, interned Jews, ignored their requests for aid at its diplomatic offices, or simply acted in ways that seemed to demonstrate obliviousness to the problem. This lack of planning reflects the general approach of the Franco regime to many problems. Because the Spanish government was a coalition of very disparate interest groups--military officers, conservative Catholics, monarchists, and pro-Nazi Falangists--it often was unable to develop a coherent vision. In addition, Franco, in many ways, was a weak leader, unwilling or unable to make decisions that might alienate a key constituency of his government. While the Nationalists exercised a clear chain of command during the civil war and agreed on the broad outlines of policy during that conflict, once the war ended there was no clear consensus, leaving Franco to muddle through according to his own ideology, vague as it was when he strayed from strictly military issues. Although he could act swiftly when his own hold on power was threatened, in most areas of domestic and foreign policy Franco was inconsistent, unsure of himself, and subject to change depending on the strongest voices around him, and what he saw as the best tactical decision at that moment. On the question of aiding Jews, therefore, Spain's policy was not to have a policy, thus allowing for some flexibility by Spanish diplomats, soldiers, border police, and the Interior Ministry, each of which played a role in the final story of Spain's response to the Holocaust. While this ambivalence prevented a more concerted effort to save Jews, it allowed for significant efforts by individual humanitarians within the Spanish government to rescue Jews, or at least serve as witnesses and mourners of their mass murder by the Nazis and their collaborators in Eastern Europe. (4)

Spain was not the only neutral country during the Second World War. Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Portugal also struggled with some of the same issues as Spain. These neutral states responded in very different ways to the Third Reich, especially Nazi persecution of Jews and the Holocaust. Despite angering the Third Reich and risking invasion, Sweden took the greatest measures to resist Germany and save Jews, aiding in the rescue of nearly the entire Jewish populations of Denmark and Norway. Switzerland, in contrast, not only encouraged Germany to mark the passports of Jews with a "J" to prevent their entry into the country, but also collaborated in laundering gold and other financial assets stolen from Jews. Turkey, Portugal, and Spain acted in ways somewhere between these two approaches. While at times allowing Jewish refugees to pass through their territory, none of these states were willing to offer them permanent havens. Each country, at various times, closed its borders, turned away desperate asylum seekers, and undertook only modest efforts to use their diplomatic offices to protect Jews. Turkey, for example, issued an order prohibiting the entry of Jews, but ignored this decree by allowing scientists and other skilled personnel to enter the country. The Jewish question was not the only issue confronting neutral states, of course, and in other areas, especially trade, there were fewer differences between these countries. All of these neutral states, for example, traded extensively with Germany until they could no longer do so, despite Allied entreaties against such commerce. On the issue of Jewish policies, however, these neutrals received little encouragement from the Allies to do more to rescue Jews, and faced serious opposition from the Nazis against even minor efforts to do so. (5)

The Spanish government demonstrated an ambivalent approach toward Jews and the Holocaust. While the Franco government allowed as many as 40,000 European Jews to escape through its territory, only about 2,000 could be in Spain at any one time. Those Jews who managed to escape into Spain without papers often faced difficult circumstances. Spain interned as many as 8,000 stateless Jews, including several hundred at the concentration camp of Miranda de Ebro, where conditions were very Spartan. By the end of 1943, more than half of them received exit visas to third countries through Portugal. Hundreds more decided to remain in Spain, when granted permission. (6) While nominally protective of Sephardic Jews with claims on Spanish citizenship who descended from Jews expelled from Spain in 1492, the Franco government did not aggressively pursue the rescue of the approximately 4,000 Sephardic Jews who had some citizenship documentation. Similarly, in early 1943, Spain's Foreign Ministry took only half-hearted measures to save 60,000 Sephardic Jews in Greece, even though the German government expressed its willingness to ship many of them to Spain. As a result, nearly the entire Greek Jewish community died at Auschwitz. (7)

While the Spanish government was officially neutral, it did less to save Jews than some states that had more external constraints. The actions of the Franco government compare unfavorably with those of the Bulgarian government, for example, which, despite being an ally of Nazi Germany, protected all of its 50,000 Jews during World War II. Individual Spanish diplomats in Bulgaria, Greece, and Hungary extended diplomatic protection to Sephardic Jews, but did so without the official sanction of their government. The most effective diplomat in this regard was Angel Sanz Briz, consul at the Spanish legation in Budapest, who provided passports, visas, and other travel documents to Sephardic Jews. At minimum, he saved 1,000 Jews; some estimates run as high as 5,000. Spain's treatment of Jews however, should not be labeled as a policy conducted out of malice but more so one that arose from inattention. Falangism, the official ideology of the Franco government, was silent on the Jewish question. Despite the lack of Jews in Spain, absent since their expulsion in 1492, there were a few examples of anti-Semitism among party activists. Despite, or perhaps because of, the lack of a Jewish community in Spain, there remained some latent interest in the history of Spain's past Jewish heritage. During the Middle Ages, especially in the city of Toledo, Jews, Christians, and Muslims coexisted in relative harmony. While not an advocate for religious toleration, based as it was in a state that was officially and exclusively Roman Catholic, the Spanish Ministry of Education encouraged the study of Sephardic history. During World War II, the Spanish government established in Madrid the Instituto Benito Arias Montano de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos (Benito Arias Montano Institute for Arab and Hebrew Studies), named for a sixteenth-century humanist...