SOX and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy: South African Auditing Developments through the Lens of Modernity Theory

AuthorWarren Maroun,Milton Segal,David Coldwell
Date01 November 2014
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12025
Published date01 November 2014
SOX and the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy: South African Auditing
Developments through the Lens of Modernity Theory
Warren Maroun, David Coldwell and Milton Segal
University of the Witwatersrand,South Africa
This paperuses South Africa as an example to explore how crises of trust – stemming from the legacy of Apartheid,
local and international corporate failures and the changing regulatory framework in the United States – have
contributed to shaping aspects of South African corporate governance. Using Giddens’ theory of modernity, the
research considers how the country’s racist past and recent corporate scandals have converged to shape South
Africa’s corporate governance landscape. In turn, mechanisms of modernity explain why South Africa has
developed a highly sophisticated system of corporate governance.
Key words: Auditing regulation, Apartheid, corporate governance, crises of trust, modernity, SOX, South Africa
1. INTRODUCTION1
For decades, external audit has been a primary means of
ensuring confidence of non-experts in financial reporting
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1983; Power, 1994). As a rational
technical process, grounded in prudential professional
judgement, the audit opinion has served as a powerful
symbolic token in which stakeholders automatically place
their trust (Pentland, 2000; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2004).
To, ‘generate trust in financial statements’, however,
‘audit practice must generate trust in itself’ (Power, 2003,
p. 380). Self-regulatory measures – including the
codification of audit practice, systems of peer review and
development of codes of professional conduct – have,
historically, played an important role in this regard
(Humphrey & Moizer, 1990; MacLullich, 2003; Wyatt,
2004). A host of corporate failures have, however,
precipitated a diminution of confidence in the
profession’s largely self-regulatory franchise (Malsch &
Gendron, 2011).
In the context of a global economy, where information
exchange is instantaneous, a crisis of trust in one
jurisdiction, and at one point in time, has significant
ripple effects leading to a reflexive withdrawal of
confidence in the expert system (Unerman & O’Dwyer,
2004; Bazerman & Moore, 2011). Traditional models of
self-regulation are, therefore, unable to secure the
continued credibility of the audit process, leading to the
use of ever more sophisticated systems for monitoring
audit practice. The promulgation of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX, 2002) – and resulting formation of the Public
Company and Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) – is
an example which commonly springs to mind (see
Canada, Kuhn & Sutton, 2008; Carcello, Hollingsworth &
Mastrolia, 2011; Church & Shefchik, 2011). Renewed
interest in the structure of the European auditmarket and
nature of professionalservices provided to clients, on the
back of the ongoing financial crisis, is another (Sikka,
2009; European Commission, 2010; Humphrey et al.,
2011).
While the institutionalisation of external regulation
of the audit profession in the United States and Europe
has been studied in detail, we know relatively little
about how crises of trust have impacted regulatory
developments in developing economies (Brennan &
Solomon, 2008; Humphrey et al., 2011; Malsch &
Gendron, 2011). As explained by Cooper and Robson
(2006), most of the prior auditing research is specific to
the Anglo-American context. This research addresses this
deficiency by exploring the change in certain corporate
governance systems, including select audit-specific
regulations, in South Africa. The theory of modernity as
developed by Giddens is used as a framework to help
understand how SouthAfrica’s transition from Apartheid
to democracy, local and international audit failures,
and a proliferation of external regulation in leading
international economies, have resulted in the gradual
erosion of South African auditors’ traditional
self-regulatory franchise. These events have also
contributed to South Africa being regarded as a world
leader in terms of the quality of its auditing and other
governance standards (Independent Regulatory Board
for Auditors (IRBA), 2010b, 2012b; Solomon, 2010;
Solomon & Maroun, 2012).
At this point it should be noted that the research
concentrates specifically on select audit-focused statutory
provisions in South Africa and how these might have
been influenced by SOX and the country’s transition from
Apartheid to democracy.2The remainder of this paper is
organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview
of modernity theory and its relevance for explaining the
shift from arm’s-length to external regulation of the audit
profession. Section 3 discusses how South Africa’s
political past contributed to corporate governance
reform. This is followed by Section 4 which highlights
how certain audit-specific regulations in South Africa
have been informed heavily by comparable provisions in
SOX. The research focuses specifically on SOX because it
is possibly one of the most significant and well-known
examples of external regulation of corporate governance
systems, including external audits, introduced by the
world’s largest economy, the United States (Canada et al.,
2008). (As discussed in Sections 3 and 4, it has also been
specifically referred to by the South African legislature
when developing local audit-specific prescriptions.)
Section 5 concludes and identifies areas for additional
research.
Correspondence to: Warren Maroun,University of the Witwatersrand, 1
Jan Smuts Avenue, Brammfontein, Johannesburg 2002, South Africa.
Email: warren.maroun@wits.ac.za
International Journal of Auditing doi:10.1111/ijau.12025
Int. J. Audit. 18: 206–212 (2014)
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd ISSN 1090-6738

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