Sovereign immunity

• Pages: 6-16

78 Volume 23, October–December 2017 international law update

© 2017 International Law Group, LLC. All rights reserved. ISSN 1089-5450, ISSN 1943-1287 (on-line) | www.internationallawupdate.com

the arbitrator. See 9 U.S.C. § 10. Our reading of

Section 1650a thus suggests that Congress did not

contemplate federal court “recognition” of ICSID

awards; it contemplated only enforcement. And

enforcement should proceed, the statute directs, “as

if the award were a nal judgment of a [state court]”

for which enforcement were sought in federal court

and which is owed full faith and credit. 22 U.S.C.

§ 1650a.

Section 1650a of Title 22 requires federal

courts to enforce ICSID awards as if they were nal

judgments of state courts. Since the District Court

did not have subject matter jurisdiction under

Section 1650a and that the FSIA governs all aspects

of this action, it follows that the District Court’s

judgment was void. e District Court’s order

denying Venezuela’s motion to vacate is reversed, the

judgment is vacated, and the cause is remanded with

instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice

to renewal in an action commenced in compliance

with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

citation: Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd. v. Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela, 863 F. 3d 96 (2d. Circuit

2017).

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Considering challenges to default

judgments holding Sudan liable for the

injuries suffered by victims of the 1998

al Qaeda embassy bombings in Kenya and

Tanzania, District of Columbia Circuit

interprets FSIA terrorism exception

e following long and detailed opinion of the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit considers Sudan’s challenges to default

judgments holding it liable for terrorist acts of al

Qaeda. After its review, the Court (1) arms the

district court’s ndings of jurisdiction; (2) arms

the district court’s denial of vacatur; (3) vacates

all awards of punitive damages; and (4) certies a

question of state law to the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals: “whether a plainti must be

present at the scene of a terrorist bombing in order

to recover for IIED.”

On August 7, 1998 truck bombs exploded

outside the United States embassies in Nairobi,

Kenya and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. e

explosions killed more than 200 people and injured

more than a thousand. Many of the victims of the

attacks were U.S. citizens, government employees,

or contractors. Starting in 2001 victims of the

bombings began to bring suits against the Republic

of Sudan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, alleging

that Sudan, its Ministry of the Interior, Iran, and

its Ministry of Information and Security materially

supported al Qaeda during the 1990s. From 1991

to 1996, al Qaeda and its leader, Usama bin Laden,

maintained a base of operations in Sudan. During

this time, al Qaeda developed the terrorist cells

in Kenya and Tanzania that would later launch

the embassy attacks. Specically, the plaintis

contended Sudan provided a safe harbor to al

Qaeda and that Iran, through its proxy Hezbollah,

trained al Qaeda militants. In bringing these cases,

the plaintis relied upon a provision in the Foreign

Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) that withdraws

sovereign immunity and grants courts jurisdiction

to hear suits against foreign states designated as

sponsors of terrorism. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).