A snapshot of company voluntary arrangements: Success, failure and proposals for reform

Date01 June 2020
Published date01 June 2020
AuthorLézelle Jacobs,Chris Umfreville,Peter Walton
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/iir.1381
RESEARCH ARTICLE
A snapshot of company voluntary
arrangements: Success, failure and proposals
for reform
Peter Walton
1
| Chris Umfreville
2
| Lézelle Jacobs
1,3
1
Wolverhampton Law School, University
of Wolverhampton, Wolverhampton, UK
2
Aston University, Birmingham, UK
3
University of the Free State,
Bloemfontein, South Africa
Correspondence
Peter Walton, Wolverhampton Law
School, University of Wolverhampton,
Wolverhampton, UK.
Email: p.a.walton@wlv.ac.uk
Abstract
Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs) are
designed to be used in the UK to rescue a company as a
going concern. They are under used in practice and
have a reputation for high failure rates. This article,
based upon a longer report funded by the UK insol-
vency profession, considers the nature of success or
failure of CVAs. It considers empirical evidence to
identify the weak points of CVAs in practice. It looks at
quantitative data as well as taking into account views
of practitioners and other stakeholders. Key elements
of the CVA procedure are considered in light of recent
national reform proposals and approaches and reforms
internationally. Domestic reforms in the Netherlands
and South Africa are considered to determine whether
any lessons might be learnt from other jurisdictions.
Recommendations are made including changes to the
suggested amendments to the legal framework and to
professional practice guidance.
1|INTRODUCTION
The Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA), introduced by the Insolvency Act 1986, was
born out of the Cork Committee, which in 1982 identified the need for a simple procedure
Received: 27 February 2020 Revised: 15 April 2020 Accepted: 20 May 2020
DOI: 10.1002/iir.1381
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Authors. International Insolvency Review published by INSOL International and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Int Insolv Rev. 2020;29:267284. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/iir 267
where the will of the majority of creditors in agreeing to a debt arrangement could be made
binding on an unwilling minority.
1
Despite the availability of this flexible restructuring tool for
over three decades, the frequency of CVAs is reasonably low when compared with alternative
corporate Insolvency Act 1986 procedures and it has been commented that CVAs have a high
failure rate.
2
The CVA has risen to prominence recently with a number of high-profile cases
drawing media attention and, at times, creditor criticism.
3
It is in this context that the authors were commissioned by R3, the Association of Business
Recovery Professionals, and the ICAEW, to consider the reasons for the successor failure
of CVAs and investigate the outcomes where CVAs fail. The aim of the project was to identify
key characteristics which will allow practical guidance to be provided to insolvency practi-
tioners (IPs) and also inform policy recommendations to Government. This led to the publica-
tion in May 2018 of Company Voluntary Arrangements:Evaluating Success and Failure (the
Report).
4
This article represents a summary of the key findings of the Report as presented at
the INSOL International Academic Colloquium in July 2018. The findings and recommenda-
tions of the Report are of continuing importance in light of the continued negative publicity
surrounding CVAs, developments in judicial interpretation and the reform proposals subse-
quently published by the Government in August 2018 (discussed below in Section 7.3) but yet
to be implemented at time of writing.
2|CVA MECHANICS
In order to consider how effective or otherwise CVAs are in practice, it is necessary to under-
stand the legal and procedural rules which govern them. The following is designed to provide
only an outline guide. For more detailed consideration of the law relating to CVAs, readers are
directed to more specialist publications.
5
The Cork Committee identified in 1982 a need for a simple procedure to be introduced,
where the will of the majority of creditors in agreeing to a debt arrangement could be made
binding on an unwilling minority.
6
This gave rise to the CVA. Sections 17B of the Insolvency
Act 1986 contain the primary legislation governing CVAs. Part 2 of the Insolvency Rules 2016
7
contains most of the relevant secondary legislation.
It is most commonly the directors of a company who propose a CVA. Where the directors
propose a CVA they must approach an insolvency practitioner to act as nominee. The nomi-
nee's role is to opine on the proposal (and will frequently assist with its drafting in the role of
adviser as distinct from nominee). If the nominee's opinion is that the proposal has a reason-
able prospect of being approved and implemented
8
that opinion will be filed at court and the
proposal will be put to the members and creditors of the company. If the unsecured creditors
agree to it by a majority of at least 75% in value of those creditors voting, the CVA becomes
binding upon the company and all the unsecured creditors (even those who voted against the
proposal). Secured creditors are only bound if they agree to be bound. Creditors may apply to
the court if the CVA's terms are unfairly prejudicial or if there was some material irregularity in
the procedure leading up to its approval.
Once approved, the CVA is given effect to under the supervision usually of the nominee
who becomes the supervisor upon the CVA being approved.
9
Its terms are then carried out in
much the same way as any other commercial contract. If all creditors are paid what the CVA
has promised, the CVA will complete. If the company does not satisfy the terms of the CVA, for
example, if it is unable to keep up with monthly payments, the CVA's terms will often have
268 WALTON ET AL.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT