Russia's Vision of the Belt and Road Initiative: From the Rivalry of the Great Powers to Forging a New Cooperation Model in Eurasia

• Date: 01 September 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/cwe.12214
• Author: Liudmila Filippova,Yaroslav Lissovolik,Ivan Timofeev
• Published date: 01 September 2017

©2017 Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

China & World Economy / 62–77, Vol. 25, No. 5, 2017

62

Russia’s Vision of the Belt and Road Initiative:

From the Rivalry of the Great Powers to Forging a

New Cooperation Model in Eurasia

Ivan Timofeev, Yaroslav Lissovolik, Liudmila Filippova*

Abstract

The article aims to highlight Russian approaches to Chinese One Belt-One Road

initiative. It examines possible opportunities and challenges for co-development of the

Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt project. Both projects and their co-development

may reduce the uncertainty in Eurasia, caused by significant structural changes in

international relations and the world economy, the emergence of new trade regimes

and the erosion of leadership in international aairs. Russian interests in this regard

are determined by the need for modernization and long-term development, which could

also help to address acute security issues. These particular factors encouraged Russia

to come up with an ambitious plan of the Extensive Eurasian Partnership, although the

prospects of its implementation currently are uncertain. The present article argues that

the success of Russia-China collaboration in Eurasia will depend crucially on the future

dynamics of the Eurasian integration, as well as on the agreement to co-develop the

Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt Initiative with concrete and mutually benecial

projects.

Key words: China, co-development, Eurasia, Eurasian Economic Union, integration,

Russia, The Belt Initiative

JEL codes: D74, F02, F5, H56

I. Introduction

Since 2013, when Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech in Kazakhstan titled

“Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better Future,” the concept of the

Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB, or the Belt Initiative), and later of the overall Belt and

*Ivan Timofeev, Associate Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Ministry of

Foreign Aairs of Russia, Russia. Email: itimofeev@russiancouncil.ru; Yaroslav Lissovolik, Chief Economist,

Eurasian Development Bank, Russia. Email: lisovolik_yd@eabr.org; Liudmila Filippova, Program Manager,

the Arctic and Asia Pacic, Russian International Aairs Council (RIAC), Russia. Email: lippova.lyudmila@

gmail.com.

©2017 Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Russia’s Vision of the BRI 63

Road Initiative (BRI), has been widely investigated. The BRI oered the prospect of

infrastructure upgrading, new investment ows, deepening trade and increased economic

connectivity throughout the Eurasian continent: from the European Union to Northeast

Asia, from Russia to Central Asia and further to the Middle East. The idea could

not have been announced at a better time: the world order, and the globalization and

regionalization processes are undergoing tectonic changes. However, notwithstanding

the substantial benefits that the initiative has promised, many countries along the

BRI have viewed it with strong suspicion. The Russian academia, who demonstrated

particular interest in the land-based initiative, likewise expressed initial skepticism about

the new idea.

Although a strategic friendship between the two countries was already established

in 2013, the public discussions placed a huge emphasis on Russia’s and China’s

competing interests in Central Asia, particularly in the economic domain (Malashenko,

2013; Zeleneva, 2014). Meanwhile, since the very announcement of the Belt Initiative

up till now, the Russian expertise has mainly centered on the transport, infrastructure

and investment-related aspects of the idea (Luzyanin and Sazonov, 2015; Luzyanin

and Semenova, 2016; Sazonov, 2016). There were fears that the SREB could further

increase China’s trade and investment presence in former Soviet Republics and

eventually replace Russia’s role in the region. In particular, some authors claimed that

the SREB intended to hinder the advancement of the Eurasian integration backed by

Russia (Alferova and Kotelnikova, 2014). The SREB was described as an openly anti-

Russian initiative designed to undermine the competitiveness of the Trans-Siberian

Railway (Karaganov, 2014) and the Northern Sea Route (Khramchikhin, 2014). For

these reasons, the rivalry between Russia and China for Eurasia was widely perceived as

inevitable.

Nevertheless, the US policy at that time was set against both Moscow and Beijing,

which motivated the two countries to approach each other and identify new areas of

collaboration. On the one hand, the BRI seemed to be a reaction to Obama’s “return to

Asia” (Berger, 2014). On the other hand, in light of the worsening relations between

Russia and the West, the SREB could become a valuable contribution to Russia’s “turn

to the East” policy (Filippova and Veleva, 2015). As to the Central Asian Republics,

they saw potential benets in cooperating both with China within the SREB and Russia

as part of the Eurasian integration process. It is worth noting that the assumed benets

were not economic only: balancing the interests and involvement of big global powers

in the region makes the policies of regional states more diversied and certainly gives

those nations extra bargaining power. What particularly suited all Central Asian parties

is that neither the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) nor the SREB made political