Risk Committees and Implied Cost of Equity Capital

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12147
AuthorHamdan Saif Al‐Jabri,Ahmed Al‐Hadi,Syed Mujahid Hussain,Khamis Hamed Al‐Yahyaee
Date01 December 2018
Published date01 December 2018
Risk Committees and Implied Cost of
Equity Capital
AHMED AL-HADI
,
,SYED MUJAHID HUSSAIN
§
,
KHAMIS HAMED AL-YAHYAEE
§
AND HAMDAN SAIF AL-JABRI
School of Accounting, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, Perth, Western
Australia, Australia,
Department of Accounting, College of Economics and Political Science, Sultan Qaboos
University, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman and
§
Department of Economics and Finance, College of Economics and Political Science,
Sultan Qaboos University, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman
ABSTRACT
We investigate the association between the existence of risk committee and
implied cost of equity capital in a unique institutional setting where the
formation of the board risk committee as part of the risk governance
mechanism is not mandatory in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
nancial institutions. Using data from the six GCC countries, we nd that
implied cost of equity capital is negatively associated with the existence of
board risk committee. These ndings indicate that GCC nancial rms with
better risk governance practices at board level have lower implied cost of
equity capital. We contribute to the extant literature on-board risk governance
in emerging market context.
JEL Codes: G22; G30; G31; G32
Accepted: 18 July 2017
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent nancial crisis of 20082009 has highlighted the importance of risk
management as part of the broader corporate governance mechanisms,
particularly in the nancial institutions. The two most important internal risk
governance measures that support the comprehensive risk management
framework in nancial institutions are the appointment of independent chief
risk ofcer (CRO) and establishment of the boards risk committee (thereafter
RC). Accordingly, more recent research has focused on the association between
risk governance and rmsperformance. For example, Aebi et al. (2012) nd that
risk governance has a more signicant effect on the performance of nancial
rms than the standard corporate governance indicators, especially during the
nancial crisis. Their ndings suggest that banks, in which the CRO reports
© 2017 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2017
International Review of Finance, 2017
DOI: 10.1111/ir.12147
International Review of Finance, 18:4, 2018: pp. 689–703
DOI:10.1111/ir .12147
© 2017 International Review of Finance Ltd. 2017

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