'Relatively stable military environment' established by collective endeavour of UN and IFOR: implementation of political and civilians undertakings ahead.

• Position: Multilateral Implementation Force - Yugoslav Crisis

A "relatively stable military environment" for the implementation of extremely complex political and civilian undertakings had been established in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali announced on 21 March.

That had become possible after the military provisions of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina--the Peace Agreement--had been complied with under the "powerful presence" of the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), he said. However, the military and civilian aspects were interconnected, and "only when the latter goal is achieved can the implementation of the Peace Agreement be considered successful", the Secretary-General reported (S/1996/210).

The new momentum in the four-year-old conflict in the former Yugoslavia had been created by the Bosnian Peace Agreement, negotiated at Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, and the 12 November 1995 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, the Secretary-General said on 6 February (S/1996/83).

It was gratifying that UN expertise and experience had been recognizes and new operations--the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES); the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), with its International Police Task Force (IPTF); and the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)--had been given appropriate tasks "as part of a collective international endeavour to bring peace where only war has raged", Mr. Boutros-Ghali stated.

Until that time and for almost four years, he pointed out, the UN peace-keeping missions in the former Yugoslavia had "worked tirelessly in dangerous and adverse conditions, often without sufficient resources and under complex and demanding mandates". Lightly armed peace-keepers and un-armed civilians had been sent into "areas of active warfare, where their courageous efforts helped to save untold human lives and to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population", the Secretary-General stated.

Also, it had become obvious that a "peace-keeping mission cannot achieve its objectives without the unfailing support and commitment of the international community in terms of financial and human resources required for the implementation of its mandate, as well as the full cooperation of the parties to the conflict", he stressed.

Council action, appointments

From 1 January to 8 May, the Security Council met formally or in consultations on 19 occasions to consider the situation in the former Yugoslavia, adopting five resolutions and issuing four presidential statements.

Among other things, it established UNTAES and authorized the deployment of 100 military observers for that new operation; increased by 50 military observers the strength of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; extended the UN presence in the Prevlaka peninsula; authorized the deployment to UNMIBH of five military liaison officers and two helicopters, with the necessary operating and support personnel; and appointed Justice Louise Arbour of Canada as Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia effective 1 October 1996.

On 1 February, the Secretary-General appointed Iqbal Riza of Pakistan as his Special Representative and Coordinator of the UN operations in Bosnia and Herzagovina. Peter FitzGerald of Ireland was named Commissioner of the IPTF. The post of Secretary-General's Special Representative for the Former Yugoslavia was thus terminated. Residual political support and liaison functions in Croatia and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) were entrusted to the new Zagreb and Belgrade Liaison Offices.

On 17 January, Jacques Paul Klein of the United States became UNTAES Transitional Administrator, with overall authority over the civilian and military components of the operation. On 13 February, Major General Jozef Schoups of Belgium was named UNTAES Force Commander, with effect from 1 March. Brigadier-General Bo Lennart Wranker of Sweden on 16 February was appointed UNPREDEP Force Commander, also effective 1 March. His compatriot, Colonel Goran Gunnarsson became UNMOP Chief Military Observer on 28 February.

Benefits and problems

The first phase of implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, from its signature on 14 December 1995 to the beginning of March 1996, had "highlighted the benefits of peace, as well as the problems we face", High Representative Carl Bildt, the final authority regarding the civilian aspects of the implementation, reported on 13 March (S/1996/190).

IFOR had been able to carry out its tasks as envisaged and thus had supported the complex and long-range efforts at reconciliation, reintegration and reconstruction, Mr. Bildt stated. He stressed that military implementation had been the decisive factor during the first three months, the "prerequisite for all other activities".

The necessary structures for the support to the different civilian implementation efforts, as well as all the Commissions provided for in the Peace Agreement--on refugees and displaced persons, public corporations, and preservation of national monuments--had been set up, he stated.

While the separation of forces had been done successfully with the help of IFOR, political developments surrounding the transfer of territory had been more troubling, he reported. There had been widespread destruction in the areas that were transferred from the Federation to the Republika Srpska in Western Bosnia, and the transition in Sarajavo also faced difficulties, with large numbers of displaced persons as a result. "Three months after the Peace Agreement was signed, we must regrettably conclude that the forces of ethnic separation are still far stronger than the forces of ethnic reintegration", the High Representative stated.

During the next phase of peace implementation, which would cover the period until the Rome Review Conference scheduled for 13 and 14 June, preparations for elections had to be completed. There must be visible signs of the international community living up to its commitment to help with the economic rebuilding of the country, and to see the start of repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, Mr. Bildt stated.

In the third phase, "elections must be at the centre of our efforts", he went on. Although there was an "obvious risk that the elections will strengthen rather than weaken the forces of ethnic separation", they were of crucial importance in paving the way for the setting up of the common political institutions of the country. In that regard, the High Representative was concerned about the right of all political forces to have equal access to the media, especially radio and television.

The most critical, however, would be the fourth phase following the elections, when the "process of setting up the common institutions, in accordance with the detailed and complex arrangements of the Constitution must be initiated", he reported. That would also be the time when IFOR's mandate would be terminated and the future of the Brcko area had to be decided. "It is then that we can judge whether Bosnia is heading for partition or reintegration, and whether the peace we have sought will hold", Mr. Bildt stressed. The successes of the past months were obvious, he declared. "The guns are silent, and life is slowly returning to normalcy. Soldiers are returning home to their families, and politicians can start to address all the problems of peace in contrast to the problems of war."

But he was concerned with two problems: "significant funding shortfalls" for the different civilian implementation efforts, which applied inter alia to the UN, election preparations by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and a "range of other important activities"; and the will of the parties themselves. "Without an active effort at reconciliation and cooperation, there will be distinct limits to what the international community can do", High Representative Bildt warned.

"No lasting peace can be built without a genuine commitment to reconciliation, but nothing is as difficult after a war as bitter and brutal as the war in Bosnia has been as this", he stated. "Reconciliation will be possible when there is a common perception that justice for all will be created, and when the energies and efforts of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina are concentrated less on the legacies of the bitter past than on the promise of a common future", Mr. Bildt declared.

IFOR operations

On 18 April--D+120, or 120 days after the transfer of authority from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR)--"we passed a major milestone in the implemental on of annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement", Javier Solana, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), informed Mr. Boutros-Ghali on 23 April (S/1996/315) .

While, in general, Mr. Solana was "satisfied with the cooperation and compliance" of the parties in implementing the accord's military aspects, he also noted practical difficulties in their efforts to comply with the D+120 requirements relating to cantonment and demobilization of forces. "Compliance has proved to be difficult within this time-scale, as the scale and complexity of this task have exceeded the military organizational capabilities of the Parties", the NATO Secretary-General noted.

Also, it remained "unclear whether full compliance has been achieved on the removal of foreign forces", he went on. Another cause for concern was restrictions on the freedom of movement of civilians, refugees and displaced persons.

On the positive side, a major release of prisoners of war by all parties had taken place in early April, Mr. Solana reported. However, each side continued to hold a number of prisoners, although in many cases they had provided the International...