The court refuses to drown state wrongful death remedies for nonseamen.

• Author: Graham, Christopher P.
• Position: Case Note

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

2. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: YAMAHA MOTOR CORP. V. CALHOUN

3. ANALYSIS

   1. From The Harrisburg to Moragne

   2. Unseaworthiness Becomes a Species of Liability Without Fault

   3. Moragne Responds to Resulting Anomalies

   4. Court's Uniformity Principle Soon Forgotten

   5. Yamaha Consciously Creates Anomaly

4. CONCLUSION

1. INTRODUCTION

   "The federalism aspect of the United States Supreme Court's admiralty jurisprudence has long been adrift."(1) The Court's involvement with maritime wrongful death remedies since Me Harrisburg(2) epitomizes inconsistency. Setting the stage for over a decade of contradictions, The Harrisburg court held that general maritime law did not afford an action for wrongful death.(3) In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on the traditional common-law rule, which denied any action for wrongful death,(4) and grafted it to maritime law.(5) The Supreme Court, however, did not preclude the application of state statutes to provide a right and remedy for wrongful death.(6) Twenty-one years later, the Court in The Hamilton(7) held that a state statute could be applied to grant wrongful death recovery occurring on the high seas.(8) The harshness of The Harrisburg's rule has often been avoided by federal admiralty courts permitting recovery for wrongful death under state survival and wrongful death statutes.(9) Because of the wide variance in individual state statutes, this practice has led to a lack of uniformity and overall inequity in maritime judgments.

   Absent contrary statutory authority, general maritime law was unable to recognize a cause of action for wrongful death.(10) In an effort to achieve desired uniformity and mitigate the impact of The Harrisburg, Congress passed the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)(11) and the Jones Act(12) in 1920.(13) The DOSHA created a cause of action in admiralty for any wrongful death it occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State ....".(14) The Jones Act, which incorporates provisions of the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA),(15) provides a wrongful death claim to the survivors of seaman killed in the course of employment, whether on territorial waters or on the high seas.(16) In its aim for uniformity, DOSHA has clearly missed the mark. The DOSHA has been appropriately labeled "statutory chaos" by one of the most prestigious admiralty treatises.(17)

   Attempting to correct this problem, the Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines(18) overruled The Harrisburg.(19) For almost one hundred years, The Harrisburg decision prevented the Court from shaping a uniform remedy for maritime wrongful death. Instead of clearing the waters, Moragne left it up to the lower courts to navigate the muddied waters without a map. The Court in Moragne held "an action does he under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties,"(20) but failed to define the remedy it created. Instead, Moragne left the task of defining the parameters of the general maritime law remedy it created to "further sifting through the lower courts in future litigation."(21) Instead of seizing the opportunity to establish uniformity, the Moragne court created more questions than answers.

   The latest piece in this "unsolvable puzzle,"(22) Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun,(23) is the subject of this Note. The question presented in Yamaha is whether state wrongful death and survival statutes have been displaced by Moragne, a federal maritime rule of decision.(24) Yamaha held that the death of a nonseaman in territorial waters is a question to be decided in accordance with state law.(25) The Court reasoned that the motivating force behind Moragne also placed Yamaha beyond its reach.(26) As a result, state remedies may still supplement general maritime law, at least for nonseaman.

   This Note will focus particularly on the reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in Yamaha. This note will also discuss the state of the law before and after Moragne and its progeny as a necessary precondition. While Yamaha is important for its specific holding, the opinion provides an important piece to the "unsolvable puzzle"(27) of the maritime wrongful death paradox. The puzzle is further frustrated by the imaginary boundary line between conflicting and nonconflicting state regulation in the maritime context.(28) The Supreme Court recently admitted, "[i]t would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent within our admiralty jurisprudence."(29)

   II STATEMENT OF THE CASE: YAMAHA MOTOR CORP. V. CALHOUN

   During a vacation in Puerto Rico with family friends on July 6, 1989, 12-year-old Natalie Calhoun rented a "Wavejammer" jet ski manufactured by Yamaha.(30) While riding the jet ski, she crashed into a vessel anchored in territorial waters and was killed.(31)

   Lucien and Robin Calhoun, individually and in their capacities as administrators of their daughter's estate, brought suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.(32) The Calhouns sought recovery under Pennsylvania's wrongful death(33) and survival statutes,(34) alleging negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranties.(35) They sought remedies for lost future earnings, loss of society, loss of support and services, funeral expenses, and punitive damages.(36) Jurisdiction was grounded on both diversity of citizenship(37) and admiralty.(38)

   The petitioner, Yamaha, moved for partial summary judgment asserting that federal maritime wrongful death law announced in Moragne provided the sole basis for recovery, displacing all state remedies.(39) The district court sided with Yamaha in part and held that general maritime law superseded the state wrongful death and survival claims as recognized in Moragne.(40) Nevertheless, the district court ruled that loss of society and loss of support and services were compensable.(41) Displeased by the district court's decision, both sides sought immediate interlocutory appeal.(42) The district court agreed to certify the order.(43)

   The following questions were certified to the Third Circuit: "whether, pursuant to [a federal] maritime cause of action, plaintiffs may seek to recover (1) damages for the loss of the society of their deceased minor child, (2) damages for the loss of their child's future earnings, and (3) punitive damages."(44) The Court of Appeals granted both parties' petitions for interlocutory review.(45) However, the appeal never reached the questions presented in the certified order.(46) Rather, the Third Circuit panel "determined that an anterior issue was pivotal."(47) Specifically, the Third Circuit decided "that general maritime law does not preempt state law wrongful death acts in actions based on the death of a nonseaman in territorial waters, and that such acts therefore govern this case."(48) In other words, the court disposed of the case on preemption grounds, without answering the specific questions certified for appeal.

   The Supreme Court granted certiorari(49) and first disposed of all jurisdictional issues.(50)...