Raz’s Definition of a Right

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/raju.12227
• Published date: 01 December 2018
• Date: 01 December 2018
• Author: Mark Mcbride

© 2018 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2018 John Wile y & Sons Ltd

Ratio Juris. Vol. 31 No. 4 December 2018 (460–468)

Raz’s Definition of a Right

MARK McBRIDE

1. Introduction

My aim in this short paper is to d rill into, and attempt to shed light on, a sem inal

definition of a right—Joseph Raz’s—which I believe has not here tofore been suffi-

ciently understood. Let me set out Raz’s (1986, 166) enormously influential defin ition

of a right (a definition which I find ha rd to parse, and which, I believe, could, and

should, have been more precise):

Definition: “X ha s a right” if and only if X can have rights, and, ot her things being equal, an

aspect of X’s well-being (his inte rest) is a sufficient reason for holding some ot her person(s) to

be under a duty.

Discussion in th is paper is fairly abstract at times. To help concretise things, ini-

tially, consider X’s right not to be (unprovokedly) assaulted (the left-hand-side); and

X’s interest in not being assaulted (this aspect of his well-bei ng) is a sufficient reason

for holding others under a duty not to assault X (the right-hand-side).

Let’s take the Correlativity Axiom (CA) to be the conjoint claim t hat: Rights

entail duties, and duties entail rights. R az is pretty clear t hat he rejects the du-

ties-entail-rig hts component of CA, and his definit ion would seem to allow for this.

Regarding the rights- entail-duties component of CA, he is more equivocal. One key

remark which suggests he rejec ts the rights-entai l-duties component of CA seems

to be:

A right of one person is not a duty on a nother. It is the ground of a duty, a ground which, i f

not counteracted by conf licting considerations, justi fies holding that other person to have the

duty. (Raz 1986, 171)

Many commentators, most notably perhaps Nigel Simmonds (1998, 114, 131, 150,

176, 200–5, 214–25), seem to take Raz to deny the rights-entai l-duties component of

CA on account of claims like t his; and thus to an unacknowledged denial of rights’

peremptoriness—where peremptoriness means, in this context, th at rights settle,

NOTES • DISCUSSIONS • BOOK REVIEWS