A random arrival rule for division problems with multiple references

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12434
AuthorF.J. Sánchez,D.V. Borrero,M.A. Hinojosa,A.M. Mármol
Published date01 May 2018
Date01 May 2018
Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 25 (2018) 963–982
DOI: 10.1111/itor.12434
INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS
IN OPERATIONAL
RESEARCH
A random arrival rule for division problems with multiple
references
D.V. Borreroa,F.J.S
´
ancheza, M.A. Hinojosaaand A.M. M´
armolb
aDepartamento de Econom´
ıa, M´
etodos Cuantitativos e Historia Econ´
omica, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Ctra. de Utrera
Km. 1. 41013, Sevilla, Spain
bDepartamento de Econom´
ıa Aplicada III, Universidad de Sevilla, Avda. Ram´
on y Cajal no. 1. 41018, Sevilla, Spain
E-mail: dvbormol@upo.es [Borrero]; fsansan@upo.es [S´
anchez]; mahinram@upo.es [Hinojosa];
amarmol@us.es [M´
armol]
Received 15 October 2016; receivedin revised form 22 March 2017; accepted 11 May 2017
Abstract
We address the problem of the division of a homogeneous, infinitely divisible good among a set of agents
when several characteristics have to be taken into account. Specifically, we extend the classic random arrival
rule to division problems which do not necessarily represent a bankruptcy situation, and in which several
references are considered for each agent. We establish the links of the extended rule with the classic random
arrival rule and we prove that the outcomes coincide with the Shapley value of an appropriate cooperative
game. The results permit a complete description of the allocations that would be obtained for any value of
the quantity to be divided.
Keywords:division problem; random arrival rule; Shapley value
1. Introduction
In this paper,we deal with the problem of the division of a quantity of a homogeneous and infinitely
divisible good among a set of agents according to certain characteristics associated with the agents.
The simplest case of these problems, and the most studied in the literature, is that each agent is
characterized by a single amount that represents the reference of this agent.This case includes both
bankruptcy problems (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) and surplus sharing problems (Moulin, 1987),
which havebeen widely studied in the literature (for a recent survey,see also Thomson, 2003, 2015).
However, there are many real-life situations where each agentis characterized by several references
related to different characteristics, and a final allocation must be determined on the basis of these
different characteristics. One of these situations could be: the budget of the European Union must
be divided among the member countries by taking into account their needs with respect to different
items, such as agriculture and natural resources, security and justice, citizens programs and foreign
relations. In these situations, the problem becomes a multi-dimensional extension of the division
C
2017 The Authors.
International Transactionsin Operational Research C
2017 International Federation of OperationalResearch Societies
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA02148,
USA.
964 D.V. Borrero et al. / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res.25 (2018) 963–982
problem. These problems, introduced in Calleja et al. (2005), are henceforth called division problems
with multiple references.The model has been studied in the literature from two possible approaches.
In a first approach, the total quantity is initially allocated between the different characteristics. The
amount assigned to each characteristic is then allocated among the agents. With this approach,
an allocation is a matrix whose components are the amounts assigned to each agent for each
characteristic. This approach is followed in Lorenzo-Freire et al. (2010), Berganti˜
nos et al. (2010,
2011), and Moreno-Ternero (2009). In the second approach, the different characteristics are also
taken into account, however, an allocation is a vector whose components are the final amounts
assigned to each agent. This second model is investigated in Calleja et al. (2005), Gonz´
alez-Alc´
on
et al. (2007), Ju et al. (2007), and in Hinojosa et al. (2012, 2013).
A primary objective in the study of division problems is to identify well-behavedrules that provide
a single allocation to the agents. One of the most outstanding division rules is the random arrival
rule, introduced by O’Neill (1982) for bankruptcy problems. This rule turns out to be the Shapley
value of the cooperative game that assigns to each coalition the remainder of the estate after the
agents outside the coalition have obtained their claims. We first consider this random arrival rule
in a more general context that includes both bankruptcy problems and surplus sharing problems,
and prove that, for these division problems, the rule also coincides with the Shapley value of the
above-mentioned O’Neill’s game.
The main goal of the present paper is the design of a division rule for problems with multiple
references that is based on the same principle underlying the classic random arrival rule and that
can accommodate the possible multi-dimensionality of the references. Specifically, our extension of
the classic random arrival rule takes into account, for each possible permutation of the agents, the
best aggregated expectations across the characteristics of the predecessors of a given agent, instead
of the sum of the claims (the unique characteristic) of these predecessors, as is considered in the
classic random arrival rule.
It is shown in the paper that our generalization of the random arrival rule also provides the
outcomes proposed by the Shapley value of the appropriate cooperative game. Moreover, there are
several links with the classic random arrival rule and with the extended talmudic rule proposed in
Hinojosa et al. (2012) that are established in the paper.
Finally, we provide a complete description of the allocations obtained with the rule for any value
of the quantity to be divided.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the random arrival rule for division
problems is defined and the relationship between the rule in this context and the Shapley value is
proved. In Section 3, we propose a division rule for division problems with multiple references and
analyze its behavior. Section 4 is devoted to setting out the conclusions. The proofs of the results
are contained in the Appendix.
2. The division problem
Let N={1,...,n}be a set of agents. A classic bankruptcy problem (Aumann and Maschler,
1985) consists of the division of a positive amount, EIR ++1, of a homogeneous and infinitely
1Denote by IR (IR+,IR
++) the set of all (non-negative, positive) real numbers and by IRN(IRN
+,IR
N
++) the Cartesian
product of |N|copies of IR (IR+,IR
++).
C
2017 The Authors.
International Transactionsin Operational Research C
2017 International Federation of OperationalResearch Societies

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