Pricing and quality level decisions of substitutable products in online and traditional selling channels: game‐theoretical approaches

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12487
AuthorFaezeh Akhavizadegan,Javad Ansarifar,Ata Allah Taleizadeh
Published date01 September 2019
Date01 September 2019
Intl. Trans. in Op. Res. 26 (2019) 1718–1751
DOI: 10.1111/itor.12487
INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS
IN OPERATIONAL
RESEARCH
Pricing and quality level decisions of substitutable products
in online and traditional selling channels: game-theoretical
approaches
Ata Allah Taleizadeh, Faezeh Akhavizadegan and Javad Ansarifar
School of Industrial Engineering, College of Engineering, Universityof Tehran, Tehran,Iran
E-mail: taleizadeh@ut.ac.ir [Taleizadeh];f.akhavizadegan@ut.ac.ir [Akhavizadegan];
javad.ansarifar@ut.ac.ir [Ansarifar]
Received 7 December 2016; receivedin revised form 23 October 2017; accepted 26 October 2017
Abstract
This study addresses a pricing problemof two substitutable products in a two-echelon supply chain including
two manufacturers and one retailer. The manufacturers sell their productsthrough two distribution channels,
namely traditional and Internet channels. The linear demand functions of products depend on selling prices,
service value of channels, and quality level of products. Moreover, various market power structures are con-
sidered for the members of the supplychain. This study focuses on the specific game-theoretical approaches to
highlight the effect of marketpower structures and leadership between firms. The manufacturer–leader Stack-
elberg (MSS) game,retailer–leader Stackelberg game (RSS), manufacturer-Bertrand competition (MSB), and
retailer-Bertrand competitions (RSB) are appliedto analyze equilibrium solutions. The models help both man-
ufacturers and retailer not only to maximize their profits but also to see the influences of their powers and
decisions under different strategies. As a result, the leader has enough power to get higher profit, and the
maximum profit of the whole supply chain is affected by the market powers of manufacturers and retailer.
The best strategies for the retailer are those that are based on the RS games. The results illustrate that lower
price does not lead to lower profit, and more sales does not necessarily result in higher profit. Moreover, the
Bertrand strategy considered by the manufacturers to determine their optimal decisions is the best strategy
from the customers’ perspective.
Keywords:pricing; supply chain management; substitutable products; game theory; market power; channel competition
1. Introduction
One of the main managerial tools of both supply chain management and revenue management is
pricing. The optimal pricing decision leads to maximization of profit forretailers and manufacturers
C
2017 The Authors.
International Transactionsin Operational Research C
2017 International Federation ofOperational Research Societies
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA02148,
USA.
A. A. Taleizadeh et al. / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res.26 (2019) 1718–1751 1719
in the supply chain. Since the demands are anticipatedbased on the product’s selling price and quality
level, paying more attention to the pricing issue is very important. On the other hand, considering
both traditional and online channels, and also powers of the members of each supply chains, which
have important effects on the profits of all firms, is recommended. In this paper, we simultaneously
study the effects of pricing, channels, market powers, and quality levels of substitutable products.
In order to review and summarize the literature, the main subjects of the literature review section
include pricing, channels, and substitutable product for a comprehensive review.
According to Soon (2011) pricing strategy is used to determine the production quantity, to set the
optimal quality level of product, and to dividethe market shares of firms between different channels.
Like the traditional channel, the Internet is also considered a new channel for direct selling because
of progress in information technology. Mukhopadhyay et al. (2011) explain that direct selling via the
Internet has a several benefits, such as information sharing, demand forecasting, and detecting the
sales trends rapidly and inexpensively. Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Eastman Kodak, Nike, and Apple,
and about 42% of the best and popular suppliers in various industries have applied the Internet as a
direct channel to introduce their products. The supplier presents their product information such as
quality, appearance, usage, and other features on the website in direct selling approach. Purchasing
the product through the Internet channel depends on the credit rating of the supplier, product
quality,supplier’s commitment to the product, and a description of the product. Dissatisfaction and
satisfaction of consumers depend on the heterogeneity of quality level of products with consumer
expectations. Hence, Teo and Yeong (2003) explain that the quality level of product and return
policy are significant characteristics in an online channel.
Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo (2004) show that the upstream and downstream members of
a supply chain have important roles in deter mining the optimal quality level. The suppliers by
investing on resources play vital role in controlling and improving the quality of products. They
stated that by improving the product’s quality the sale is increased, the market share is enhanced,
and the profit of manufacturers and retailers is also increased.
This research addresses the pricing problem of a two-echelon supply including one common
retailer and two competitive manufacturers. The game theory is applied to develop the equilibrium
prices for two substitutable products, each of which is produced by a manufacturer. The manufac-
turers offer their products in the traditional and online channels. Wholesale prices, retail prices, and
online prices of product must be determined by manufacturers not only based on their own cost
structures but also by considering their competitors simultaneously. The profits and optimal deci-
sions of the manufacturers and retailer are affected by market power structures and the leadership
between firms. Hence, this paper considers these factors to determine the optimal decisions under
various conditions.
EI-Ansary and Stern (1972) show that manufacturers and retailers have different powers to
influence the pricing decisions in marketing channels. Pan et al. (2010) define that the power of
members of the supply chain in a marketing channel as the “ability of one channel member to
control the decision variables in the marketing strategy of another member in a given channel at
a different level of distribution.” Based on the power structures, each member of the supply chain
who has more power play more dominant role than other members. There are several studies, such
as Hsieh and Wu (2009), Choi (1991), Lee and Staelin (1997), Trivedi (1998), Tsay and Agrawal
(2004), Zhao et al. (2012), Wu et al. (2012), and Wei et al. (2013), that focus on the market power
structures in the supply chain for single, substitutable, and complementary products.
C
2017 The Authors.
International Transactionsin Operational Research C
2017 International Federation of OperationalResearch Societies
1720 A. A. Taleizadeh et al. / Intl. Trans. in Op. Res.26 (2019) 1718–1751
Due to the importance of the pricing in business to maximize the profit of each firm, several
researchers have used pricing techniques in the recent years. Soon (2011) and Chan et al. (2004)
provide the comprehensive reviews on pricing techniques. The dynamic pricing is studied by Cao
et al. (2012), where the demand rate follows a stochastic pattern. The maximization of expected
discounted revenue for finite or infinite horizon planning is considered a factor to obtain the
optimal pricing policies.Also some researchers have limited their research on pricing of substitutable
products.Tang and Yin (2007) propose a model forpricing problem with two substitutable products
to determine the order quantity and selling price of a retailer. Wagner and Friedl (2007) apply a
pricing policy for substitutable products to select and switch between suppliers. The game theory
is applied by Xia (2011) to obtain the optimal decision for pricing of two substitutable products
in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of two suppliers and multiple buyers. The impacts of
price discount contracts and pricing schemes are investigated by Cai et al. (2009) in a supply chain
including two competitive channels. Manufacturer-Stackelberg, retailer-Stackelberg, and vertical
Nash pricing strategies are developed by Choi (1991) to decide the selling prices of substitutable
products.In another research, Choi (2007) studies the pricing of fashion products. Zhao et al. (2014)
study the effects of various pricing strategies and the powers of channel members on optimal pricing
policies of substitutable products. They consider the pricing problem for a two-echelon supply chain
including two manufacturers and one retailer. Ai et al. (2012) study the pricing problem in a supply
chain of substitutable products by considering return policies and uncertain demand. They obtain
the optimal decisions for the selling price, return policies, and clearance pricing. Karakul and Chan
(2008) study a single-period pricing and procurement problem simultaneously for two substitutable
products. Chen and Chang (2013) propose a dynamic model to solve pricing problem of two
substitutable products (new and remanufactured products). Sinha and Sarmah (2010) investigate
the pricing problemof substitutable products in a two-stagesupply chain in terms of the coordination
and competition.
Along with the advancement in information technology, the Internet has become an effective
sale channel through which suppliers can show the product and introduce the new achievements
to the customers. Moreover, the consumers can search their requirements through the Internet
channel and compare the products together rapidly and inexpensively, and purchase the selected
one directly. Jain and Kannan (2002) show that the online direct selling changes the pricing strategies
and type of sale. According to Tsay and Agrawal (2004), online direct selling increases the profit
margins of suppliers. The demand for purchasing through online channel is estimated to increase
from US$155.2 billion in 2009 to approximately US$248 billion in 2014. Mulpuru et al. (2010)
explain that online direct selling outpaces the traditional channel because of its benefit such as
the lower price and greater convenience. By distinguishing the benefit of the online direct selling,
several manufacturers such as Panasonic, Kodak, and Apple have offered their products through
the Internet. Khamseh et al. (2014) developed the MS-Bertrand, RS-Bertrand, and NG models to
formulate a pricing problem considering the market power structure and fuzzy demands. Huang
and Swaminathan (2009) propose four pricing policies to determine the optimal selling price for
different channels of sales. Chiang et al. (2003) and Jain and Kannan (2002) address the pricing
problem in which manufacturer offers his/her products in both traditional and Internet channels.
According to their results, online direct selling enhances the efficiency of marketing efforts and
increases the profits. Chen et al. (2013) propose a model for pricing of two substitutable products
sold by two or more manufacturers. Consumer’s purchasing behavior and various channels for
C
2017 The Authors.
International Transactionsin Operational Research C
2017 International Federation ofOperational Research Societies

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT